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In this dissertation, the aim was to explain why some people are indecisive, in the 
broadest sense of the term. To do so first required synthesizing a behavioral definition of 
indecisiveness that was both informed by the variety of explicit and implicit definitions 
of indecision and indecisiveness found across different disciplines and sensitive to the 
common uses of the term. Indecisive behaviors were then derived from the synthesized 
definition and used to develop a multi-dimensional behavioral scale of indecisiveness. 
The aim of the scale was to capture the breadth of indecisive behaviors, but not a priori 
attribute to them any particular causes. In three studies, the scale was developed, refined, 
validated, and used to test distinct mechanisms underlying indecisiveness.  
In Study 1 (N = 369), the behavioral indecisiveness scale was developed and used 
to test the multi-dimensionality of indecisiveness in an undergraduate population. 
Specifically, distinct types of indecisiveness were hypothesized to occur at four phases in 
the decision-making process: 1) before commitment, 2) before enacting the commitment, 
3) before completing the commitment, and 4) after the commitment had been fulfilled. 
Factor analysis suggested that indecisiveness consisted of four dimensions different from 
those hypothesized: 1) decision evasion, 2) prolonged latency, 3) waiting, and 4) 
changing commitments. Based on these results, indecisiveness was conceptually and 
operationally refined. The result was that indecisiveness manifested itself in three core 
behaviors: 1) prolonged latency, 2) not-deciding, and 3) changing decisions. Other 
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behaviors associated with indecisiveness, such as decision evasion and waiting, were 
considered to be proximal behavioral contributors to one or more of the three core 
behaviors. 
In Study 2 (N = 169), the refined scale was used to test both the multi-
dimensionality and multi-determination of indecisiveness in an undergraduate population. 
The three core indecisiveness behaviors were found to be predicted by specific patterns 
of proximal behavioral contributors and four of the Big Five personality traits. The 
refined scale’s validity was further established using a measure of information processing 
style, performance on a double-disjunct task, and two measures of indecisiveness.  
In Study 3 (N = 390), the scale was further refined, and administered to a larger 
and demographically broader sample to test its generalizability. To elucidate the 
relationship between distal contributors, proximal behavioral contributors, and 
indecisiveness with greater precision, the HEXACO model of personality (Ashton & Lee, 
2007) was used at the facet-level. Evidence was again found for the multi-dimensionality 
and multi-determination of indecisiveness. Facets from five of the six HEXACO 
dimensions contributed to indecisiveness through seven mechanisms: 1) worry, 2) low 
self-confidence, 3) dependence, 4) high standards, 5) escapist impulsivity, 6) careless 
impulsivity, and 7) concern for others. The scale’s validity was also further established 







Chapter 1: Introduction 
Imagine that Maya was chosen to plan her family’s four-day reunion. Many of her 
planning decisions (e.g., budget, location, accommodations) will be based on how many 
people attend, and everyone knows that the sooner Maya has a list of confirmed 
attendees, the better. Her aunt Diane promptly lets her know she will be there, shows up, 
and stays for the whole event. Cousin Sam waits right until the RSVP deadline, and then 
lets Maya know he will attend. Cousin Pat avoids responding until eventually, well past 
the RSVP date, she is told that she cannot attend if she does not reply immediately. 
Maya’s nephew Mark says he will attend, changes his mind and says he will not attend, 
and then changes it again and shows up.  
In contrast to Diane, who behaved decisively, each of the other family members 
in some way exhibited indecision: Sam waited as long as possible before committing; Pat 
did not commit one way or the other and probably would not have unless pressured to; 
Mark made a commitment and then changed it. Although most people behave 
indecisively in one or more of these ways at some points in their lives, Diane, Sam, Pat, 
and Mark routinely make and carry out their personal and professional decisions in the 
manners described. Thus, Diane would be considered decisive, whereas the others, who 
experience chronic indecision—or indecisiveness—would be considered indecisive.  
The central aim of this dissertation was to explain why some people are 
indecisive, in the broadest sense of the term. To do so required a measure of 
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indecisiveness that captured the breadth of indecisive behaviors, but did not a priori 
attribute to them any particular causes. Because no such measure existed, an important 
secondary aim of this dissertation project was to develop a new measure of 
indecisiveness. 
It is not difficult to call to mind how a case of indecision resulted in lost time and 
money, a missed opportunity, or even an accident. Indecisiveness is costlier still. 
Indecisive individuals (hereafter “indecisives”) and the intended beneficiaries and 
stakeholders of their decisions all pay the psychological costs of indecisiveness, typically 
in the forms of anxiety and frustration. Research bears this out. Indecisives are bothered 
by their indecisiveness, claim that it interferes with the quality of everyday functioning, 
and report greater difficulty in academic, social, and family decision making (Frost & 
Shows, 1993). Given these costs, it is perhaps not surprising that indecisives report lower 
life satisfaction (Rassin & Muris, 2005a). Indecisiveness has also been found to be 
painful and frustrating for the people who have to constantly deal with indecisives, such 
as family, friends, clients, and employers (Ferrari, 1994; Ferrari, Harriott, & Zimmerman, 
1999). These costs, it should be noted, are present beyond where one might expect them. 
The costs incurred by indecision on relatively big decisions (e.g., whether to 
marry the person you have been dating for three years) are highly salient because they are 
familiar enough to be easy to call to mind and hard to forget. In other words, indecision is 
not always undesirable (Grites, 1981; Krumboltz, 1992; Milgram & Tenne, 2000; 
Tykocinski & Ruffle, 2003), and can even be rational when there are no preferences 
(Eliaz & Ok, 2006). If the benefit of waiting for, gathering more, or carefully processing 
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information relevant to a decision outweighs the costs of the time spent doing so, it is 
sensible to not commit prematurely to a choice. 
In contrast, the potentially greater aggregate costs of indecisiveness on the myriad 
trivial decisions on which indecisives spend undue time and effort (e.g., what toothpaste 
or pens to buy) can slip under the radar. However, as Milgram and Tenne (2000) point 
out, it is prudent to make minor decisions quickly because “these kinds of decisions must 
be made frequently, almost automatically, and there is a low cost for making ‘wrong’ 
decisions” (p. 142). Yet indecisives, who are on average no less intelligent than are more 
decisive people (Effert & Ferrari, 1989), are reluctant to commit to these and other 
equally mundane decisions—decisions that most people do not think twice about. 
Unfortunately, the extant research on indecisiveness is fragmented across 
different, unconnected literatures. Despite the converging evidence on the costliness of 
indecisiveness, there is considerable variation in how, how clearly (Rassin, 2007), and 
even whether indecisiveness is explicitly defined and operationalized. For example, in the 
procrastination literature, indecisiveness is defined by some as putting off deciding (e.g., 
Effert & Ferrari, 1989). In the vocational literature, it is often conceived as having 
difficulty with decisions in general (e.g., Cooper, Fuqua, & Hartman, 1984). In the 
clinical psychology literature, indecisiveness is characteristic of several disorders, though 
nowhere in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American 
Psychiatric Association [DSM-IV-TR], 2000) is it ever explicitly defined.1 In economics, 
indecisiveness is taken to mean the inability to state a preference for an alternative, but 
                                                
1 The DSM-IV-TR also lists criteria for some disorders as difficulty making everyday decisions, as is the 




not conceding that they are equally desirable (e.g., von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944). 
Perhaps most surprisingly, indecisiveness per se has received little conceptual or 
empirical attention in the mainstream judgment and decision-making literature.  
On the one hand, these conceptualizations of indecisiveness, while nominally 
alike, are operationally quite diverse (see Bargh & Chartrand’s, 1999, treatment of an 
analogous problem with “automaticity”). On the other, relevant constructs that might 
shed light on the mechanisms of indecisiveness are often left unexplored (e.g., 
ambivalence, impulsivity, strategic waiting). This has meant that studies of 
indecisiveness have used disparate measures of indecisiveness that may have only 
nominal or surface similarities. No scholarly effort has yet been made to understand how 
the different concepts and measures themselves compare. Trying to integrate and 
generalize empirical findings about indecisiveness without first considering  the diversity 
of conceptions and operationalizations of the phenomenon can only muddy our 
understanding. Still, each of these conceptions, operationalizations, lines of research, and 
literatures captures some aspect(s) of, or is related to, indecisiveness. Ultimately, each 
has both something to contribute to and something to gain from a more comprehensive 
and integrated conceptualization and understanding of indecisiveness.  
The central tenet of this dissertation was that indecisiveness is most meaningfully 
conceived of as a behavior that manifests itself in a limited number of ways and for 
different reasons. Three main hypotheses were tested: 1) indecisiveness is multi-
dimensional; 2) the dimensions of indecisiveness are multi-determined; and 3) there are 
distinct mechanisms that contribute to indecisiveness. The three main hypotheses are 
explained in more detailed below. 
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Hypothesis 1: Multi-dimensionality of Indecisiveness 
The first core hypothesis was that, contrary to what most researchers suggest (e.g., 
Chartrand, Robbins, Morill, & Boggs, 1990; Crites, 1969; Effert & Ferrari, 1989; Elyadi, 
2006; Cooper, Fuqua, & Hartman, 1983; Gati, Krausz, & Osipow, 1996; Goostein, 1972; 
Milgram & Tenne, 2000; Reed, 1985; Wanberg & Muchinsky 1992), indecisiveness is 
multi-dimensional. The hypothesis has some face validity by virtue of the very variety in 
scholars’ conceptions, several of which were illustrated by recognizable indecisive 
behaviors in the opening vignette. One might object that the dimensionality of 
indecisiveness is contingent on the definition(s) one chooses—and one is free to 
opportunistically mix and match from the range of existing definitions. The first point 
was taken. The fact remains, however, that the variety of extant conceptions, both 
scholarly and in lay usage, constitutes one type of evidence that indecisiveness is a 
phenomenon with conceptually distinct dimensions. This, in turn, suggests that one might 
gain a clearer understanding of indecisiveness by not collapsing its distinct dimensions 
when investigating its (or their) contributors.  
Because no scholarly attempt has yet been made to take stock of the variety of 
conceptions of indecisiveness, or to distill from it a comprehensive definition, a key 
preliminary step in this dissertation was to do both these things. This effort speaks to the 
second point, that one can opportunistically select from extant definitions to test one’s 
hypothesis. The synthesized definition that will shortly be presented was informed by and 
sensitive to the range of both scholars’ conceptualizations and ways the term is popularly 
used (i.e., as reflected in dictionary definitions). These are the twin sources of the 
synthesized definition’s validity. 
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The multi-dimensionality hypothesis was not novel. Some researchers have 
acknowledged that indecisiveness has multiple dimensions, though there is considerable 
variety in, and no consensus on, what those dimensions are. For instance, Germeijs and 
De Boeck (2002) include a broad range of phenomena in their scale. They first list seven 
“descriptors” of difficulty making decisions (pp. 114–115), then base their scale on 11 
“features” of indecisiveness (p. 116, which consists of the list of aforementioned 
descriptors plus four additional items), but ultimately treat their scale as unidimensional. 
Like Germeijs and De Boeck’s scale, the Frost and Shows (1993) Indecisiveness Scale 
(IS) measures a variety of phenomena ,but was treated as unidimensional. Results from 
recent studies testing the dimensionality of the IS, however, are inconsistent. Swami et al. 
(2008) found that the IS was unidimensional in Chinese and Malay samples. Patalano and 
Wengrovitz (2006) found that their Chinese sample had three dimensions on the IS, with 
high cross loadings: anxiety, checking, and planning. In contrast, their American sample 
had only two dimensions—general indecisiveness and planning. More recently, Spent, 
Rassin, and Epstein (2009) found the IS also had two dimensions, but two different ones: 
aversive and avoidant indecisiveness. Ultimately, the dimensionality of the IS has not 
been consistently replicated. The only researcher who proposed a priori that 
indecisiveness was a two-dimensional construct, and measured it as such, was Bacanli 
(2000, 2005, 2006). However, the 20 items she used in her two scales tap more than two 
distinct concepts. Consider, for example, the following item: “I decide quickly because of 
my impatience to search and collect data on it [sic] and then I give it up.” The item 
includes three distinct concepts: 1) rapid deciding, 2) attributed to impatience 
(specifically impatience with information search), and 3) changing the decision. 
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On closer inspection, most indecisiveness scales appear to measure a cluster of 
related constructs. These measures often include items so similar to those on a dependent 
variable of interest, that their correlation is much less informative than is believed. The 
result is that many of the findings using these broad spectrum measures of indecisiveness 
need to be interpreted with care. 
In the three studies in this dissertation, the multi-dimensionality of indecisiveness 
was tested in two ways. First, the presence of stable, distinct factors in a factor analysis 
was taken as evidence. Because the indecisive behaviors were predicted to be related to 
each other, the factors (and scales based on them) were expected to be moderately 
correlated. The second test of multi-dimensionality was the distinctness of the pattern of 
contributors for each factor or dimension (see Whiteside & Lynam, 2001, who used the 
same argument to establish types of impulsivity). Thus, the multi-dimensionality 
hypothesis was supported to the extent that contributor variables were not related to each 
of the three indecisive behaviors to the same degree. 
Hypothesis 2: Multi-determination of Indecisiveness 
The second core hypothesis was that each dimension (or type) of indecisive 
behavior is brought about by multiple mechanisms, that is, it is multi-determined. That a 
given indecisive behavior could be exhibited for different reasons also has face validity. 
A case in point is Sam and Pat from the vignette, who both took a long time to commit 
(i.e., prolonged latency), but for different reasons. The former took long because she was 
waiting to see if something better might come up (i.e., “strategic waiting”), and the latter 
because he procrastinates. Although researchers have found that decision latency is 
related to high neuroticism and low conscientiousness (e.g., Frost & Shows, 1993; 
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Milgram & Tenne, 2000), these distal contributors explain only part of the mechanisms 
of indecisiveness: Missing are accounts of how they contribute through more proximal 
phenomena. Ferrari and colleagues, for example, found that (Pat’s) decisional 
procrastination can come about for a number of reasons, including compulsions and 
obsessions (Ferrari & Emmons, 1994), public self-consciousness and social anxiety 
(Ferrari, 1991), distraction (Harriott, Ferrari, & Dovidio, 1996), and forgetfulness (Effert 
& Ferrari, 1989). On their own, these too are only parts of the mechanism. The objective 
in this dissertation was to understand indecisiveness by integrating the effects of distal 
contributors and proximal ones on the indecisive behaviors (cf. Rassin, 2007). 
The multi-determination hypothesis was tested using a path model showing the 
relationships between distal contributors (e.g., neuroticism), and the indecisive behaviors 
mediated by proximal behaviors. The hypothesis would be supported if more than one 
path of contributors were related to each core indecisive behavior.  
Hypothesis 3: Distinct Mechanisms for Indecisiveness 
The third core hypothesis was a refinement of the second: There are distinct 
mechanisms that explain indecisiveness. If indecisiveness is multi-determined, then it is 
plausible that it has distinct mechanisms that do not necessarily co-occur. Scholars who 
either proposed (e.g., Bacanli, 2000) or discovered (e.g., Spunt, Rassin, & Epstein, 2009) 
the multi-dimensionality of indecisiveness explicitly or implicitly endorse the distinct 
mechanisms hypothesis. In addition, a broader variety of research collectively offers 
compelling support for the distinct mechanisms hypothesis.  
A key source of evidence is in clinical psychology, where the DSM–IV-TR 
(2000) lists indecisiveness (sometimes referred to as difficulty deciding) as a diagnostic 
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criterion or associated feature of several psychological disorders, chief among them 
depression, obsessive-compulsive personality disorder (OCPD), and dependent 
personality disorder (DPD). Although others noted this before (Frost & Gross, 1993; 
Frost & Shows, 1993), none has suggested that it was evidence for multi-determination, 
let alone sought to compare the drivers underlying indecisiveness in each disorder. 
Despite high rates of comorbidity among the disorders and a debate surrounding how to 
categorize them, the mechanisms underlying indecisiveness in each of these three 
disorders appear quite distinct.  
Interestingly, some of the mechanisms underlying indecisiveness suggested in the 
DSM–IV-TR (2000) are remarkably compatible with those in the decision-making styles 
literature. Decision-making styles are generally thought of as learned propensities to 
behavioral response patterns, such as information gathering and processing, when faced 
with decisions (Scott & Bruce, 1995). Although the styles literature does not address 
indecisiveness explicitly, some of the styles are good candidates for contributors. Based 
on a synthesis of decision styles literature, and verified though a series of studies, Scott 
and Bruce identified five decision styles: 1) rational, 2) intuitive, 3) dependent, 4) 
avoidant, and 5) spontaneous. Note that Scott and Bruce found evidence that styles were 
not mutually exclusive, and suggested that individuals might use a combination of styles 
when faced with important decisions. 
Though at the end of the day there may be several types of indecisive people and 
different ways to categorize them, the evidence for only a limited number were sought in 
this dissertation, and their existence was contingent on evidence for the multi-
determination of indecisiveness. To test the distinct mechanisms hypothesis, indecisive 
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individuals should neither all exhibit the same indecisive behaviors, nor do so for the 
same reasons. Although a person-centered approach was taken to test this hypothesis, and 
the discussion of “types” of indecisive implies actual groups of individuals, “type” should 
be thought of in terms of patterns of interacting variables, or mechanisms. Note that 
although these mechanisms are distinct, their occurrence is probabilistic and they are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive. Despite one’s behavioral tendencies, one can be 
indecisive in a number of ways and for a variety of reasons. 
Developing the Indecisiveness Scale 
To properly and validly test these three main hypotheses requires a measure of 
indecisiveness with three characteristics. First, it needs to be grounded in a clear, 
conceptual definition that draws its legitimacy from being informed by how indecision 
and indecisiveness are conceived across scholarly literatures and how the terms are 
commonly used. Second, the measure needs to be tied to an observable phenomena (cf. 
Danan, 2004, who considered indecisiveness to be “a subjective, unobservable 
phenomenon,” p. 8). Third, the measure can have no items that a priori include or 
preclude potential contributors (e.g., scale items that include a causal attribution). 
Because no published measure of indecisiveness was found to meet all three of these 
criteria, a new scale needed to be developed.  
This dissertation has six chapters that describe how the indecisiveness measure 
was developed, and how with that measure a clearer understanding of the phenomenon 
was achieved by testing the three main hypotheses. Chapter 2 offers a brief overview of 
the extant notions and measures of indecision and indecisiveness and their shortcomings. 
A behavioral definition of indecisiveness was then synthesized from researchers’ 
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conceptions and shown to be consistent with common usages of the terms “indecision” 
and “indecisiveness.” The chapter concludes by describing how from this new definition 
a typology of indecisive behaviors was derived, which then directly guided the 
development of the behavioral indecisiveness scale.  
Chapter 3 describes Study 1, in which the initial indecisiveness scale was 
developed. The scale was used to test the multi-dimensionality hypothesis. This resulted 
in an important theoretical shift from considering indecisiveness mainly in terms of when 
it occurs during the decision making process, to focusing on types of indecisive 
behaviors. The theoretical shift led to the refinement of the indecisiveness scale.  
Chapter 4 describes Study 2, in which the multi-dimensionality hypothesis was re-
tested using the refined indecisiveness scale. Study 2 also tested the multi-determination 
hypothesis by showing how proximal and distal contributing variables had multiple, and 
distinct, relationships with each of the indecisive behaviors. More importantly, the 
substance of the multi-determination hypothesis, that is, the specifics of those 
relationships, led to a clearer understanding of why different types of indecisive behavior 
occur. 
Chapter 5 describes Study 3, which tested all three hypotheses on a larger and 
demographically broader sample, and included additional validation of the scale. Study 3 
used a more refined set of distal contributors, which resulted in a clearer understanding of 
the mechanisms underlying indecisiveness. Finally, Chapter 6 offers a general discussion 
of the results of the three studies, including their limitations, the contribution to our 







Chapter 2: Overview of Indecisiveness Research 
Existing Definitions of Indecision and Indecisiveness 
Indecision, indecisiveness, and related concepts (e.g., ambivalence, indifference, 
fear of commitment) have been discussed and studied across several disciplines, from 
clinical psychology, to vocational choice, marketing, and management. Many scholars’ 
conceptions of indecision and indecisiveness are implicit, often ambiguous, and appear to 
compound and confound distinct concepts. Appendix A offers a brief overview of the 
range of conceptual and operational definitions of indecision and indecisiveness used by 
scholars across these literatures. Where authors have not provided explicit conceptual 
definitions, I have inferred them from either their operational definitions or from their use 
of the terms indecision or indecisiveness. I also included notes where I felt clarification 
was needed. 
The fact that many authors do not explicitly define the concepts of indecision or 
indecisiveness, as indicated in Appendix A, might suggest that they think the concepts 
are self-evident. Yet despite a few pockets of consensus, there is no underlying 
conceptual or operational thread that ties them together. What exactly is meant by the 
terms “indecision” and “indecisiveness” is, in short, not self-evident. Taken at face value, 
at least ten notions can be distilled from Appendix A:  
1. Prolonged decision latency (in deciding or implementing decisions) 
2. Putting off decisions (e.g., decisional procrastination, strategic waiting)  
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3. Aversion to decision responsibility (e.g., buck-passing) 
4. Inability to decide 
5. Difficulty deciding 
6. Decision impasse while experiencing negative affect  
7. Experience of negative decision-related emotions before, during, and after 
deciding (e.g., anxiety, doubt, stress, frustration, confusion) 
8. Fear of commitment 
9. Decisional regret 
10. Unstable/changing commitments  
In addition to these, an eleventh conception of indecisiveness, that of chronic 
irresolution (e.g., failing or refusing to decide), is not represented. Note that the inability 
to decide is conceptually distinct from irresolution: The former is a difficult-to-measure 
causal attribution inferred from an unspecified behavior, and the latter is an unattributed 
observed behavior. 
Problems with extant definitions. At least four problems arose in trying to find a 
common thread that connects this variety of conceptions. First, the definitions in 
Appendix A are not all at the same level of specificity. Some definitions are broader than 
are others (e.g., 7 is broader than are 8 or 9), others overlap (e.g., 6 and 7), and some 
seem to be contributors to others (e.g., 7 or 8 plausibly contribute to 1 through 5). The 
latter observation was made by also made by Germeijs and De Boeck (2000). 
The second problem with the extant definitions of indecisiveness—taken 
collectively—is that some of them conflict with one another. Most notably, Ferrari and 
colleagues define indecisiveness as chronic decisional procrastination, but seem to mean 
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the phenomenon includes related behaviors (e.g., greater distractibility) when they point 
out that “indecision is more than not making timely decisions” (Ferrari & Dovidio, 2001, 
p. 1113; cf. Rassin, Muris, Franken, Smit, & Wong 2007, for a different interpretation of 
this quotation). Their definition is in direct contrast to many other conceptions of 
indecisiveness in Appendix A, but particularly to those of prolonged decision latency 
(e.g., Bacanli, 2006; Chartrand, Robbins, Morrill, & Boggs, 1990; Frost & Shows, 1993; 
Milgram & Tenne, 2000) and multidimensional definitions (e.g., Bacanli, 2006; Germeijs 
& DeBoeck, 2002).  
A second example of conflicting conceptions of indecisiveness centers on the role 
of negative decision affect. On the one hand, several scholars hold negative affect to be 
integral to indecisiveness (Callanan & Greenhaus, 1990; Elaydi, 2006; Frost & Shows, 
1993; Germeijs & De Boeck, 2002; Haraburda, 1999). On the other hand, others make no 
mention of affect (e.g., Chartrand, Robbins, Morrill, & Boggs, 1990; Danan & 
Ziegelmeyer, 2006; Gati, Krausz, & Osipow, 1996; Goodstein, 1972; Jones, 1989; Mann, 
Burnett, Radford, & Ford, 1997; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944; Wanberg & 
Muchinsky, 1992). Milgram and Tenne (2000) consider indecisiveness and tension (i.e., 
the “affective response that accompanies the decision making process,” p.146) to be 
associated, but distinct, parameters of the decision-making process. 
A third problem in trying to integrate the conceptual definitions of indecision or 
indecisiveness is that they are often not completely congruent with their own 
operationalizations, thus calling into question the validity of the measures. For example, 
although Ferrari and Dovidio (2001) define indecisiveness as decisional procrastination, 
they also argue that it is “more than not making timely decisions” (Ferrari & Dovidio, 
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2001, p. 1113). As Milgram and Tenne (2000) pointed out, the five items that make up 
the measure Ferrari and colleagues use (i.e., Mann’s Decisional Procrastination Scale; 
Janis & Mann, 1977) actually tap reluctance to decide, decision delay, distraction, 
decisional procrastination, and failure to follow through on a decision. Their measure, 
then, seems broader than their definition on the one hand, but consistent with their claim 
than indecision is more than not making timely decisions, on the other. (For more 
criticisms of the validity of indecisiveness measures see Germeijs & DeBoeck, 2002; 
Lewis & Savickas, 1995.) 
The fourth, and most serious, problem with extant conceptions of indecisiveness 
is that they vary in the kind of construct they hold the phenomenon to be. This variety is 
evident across definitions, but also, as Rassin (2007) points out, within certain definitions 
of indecisiveness. In trying to be comprehensive, some definitions seem so broad that 
they undermine attempts to understand how indecisiveness relates to relevant, but 
distinct, concepts. Germeijs and De Boeck (2002) make a similar observation, when they 
point out that items in measures of indecisiveness either refer to the decision-making 
process, such as prolonged latency, or to correlates or causal factors, such as frustration. 
Consider, for example, the following item from Bacanli’s (2005) scale: “I decide quickly 
for fear that I might miss the opportunities, and then I give my decision up [sic].” 
Appendix A suggests that indecisiveness is characterized as everything from an 
affective or emotional state (notions 7, 8, 9), inability (notion 4), and difficulty (notions 
5, 6), to behavior (notions 1, 2, 3, 10, 11). Before explaining why a behavioral definition 
was adopted in the present research, the problems of indecisiveness as decision-related 
affective or emotional state, inability, and difficulty are briefly explained. 
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Indecisiveness as decision-related stress, anxiety, regret or other negative emotion 
has face validity to the extent that these emotions are thought to commonly accompany 
indecisive behavior, if not contribute it. On closer examination, however, it becomes 
harder to accept that negative decision-related emotions are themselves indecisiveness for 
two reasons. For one, if an individual were to consistently experience such negative 
emotions when deciding, yet make timely and stable decisions, one could call that person 
conflicted, but hardly indecisive. Conversely, if someone did not experience negative 
emotions when deciding, but consistently failed to make timely and stable decisions, we 
would be inclined to call that person indecisive. Milgram and Tenne (2000) say as much 
when they distinguish decision latency from decision tension. Their distinction yields a 2 
(swift/slow) x 2 (tense/relaxed) matrix based on median splits, which results in four types 
of deciders. The swift-tense deciders experience negative decision-related affect, but 
make decisions (relatively) quickly, and so they are not considered indecisive. Of the two 
types of indecisive, tense and relaxed, tense ones are the more common; Milgram and 
Tenne found that only one in four indecisives are relaxed. One way to characterize 
relaxed indecisives is that they are calm and collected, but take longer than average to 
make decisions because they are systematic and very thoughtful, much like Janis and 
Mann’s (1977) vigilant decider (e.g., “I take a lot of care before deciding” and “I consider 
how best to carry out a decision,” from Vigilance scale).  
Next, indecisiveness defined as an “inability” is problematic because the concept 
of (in)ability itself is broad. Is the ability to decide a singular capacity, a collection of 
capacities, or the coordination of a collection? Is it learned or not? Is it absolute (i.e., you 
can or you cannot) or continuous? Even if one were to specify the characteristics of the 
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inability to decide, measuring it directly would prove exceedingly difficult. 
Indecisiveness as an inability in the strong sense is a binary concept—one either has the 
ability and decides, or one does not and never decides. Inability in the strong sense would 
restrict indecisiveness to characterize someone who always fails to decide, which is so 
limited as to have no face validity. In contrast, indecisiveness as inability in the weak 
sense is continuous, where indecisiveness would denote a lower degree of ability. How to 
validly measure the degree of decision ability (i.e., the ability to come to a decision, 
regardless of the quality of that decision) would be contingent on how the degree of 
ability to decide would manifest so that it can be observed and measured. Two 
possibilities are 1) the frequency of failing to decide, and 2) the average time it takes one 
to decide. Though face valid, these are both behaviors, and one cannot infer from them 
that they are caused by a lack of ability, as opposed, say, to a lack of motivation. Unlike 
ability, one can argue that difficulty is a phenomenological experience. As such, self-
reported difficulty is more valid than is self-reported (in)ability. Still, measuring 
indecisiveness as a difficulty is analogous to measuring it as an ability if one does not 
want to limit measurement to self-reports. Milgram and Tenne (2000) address the issue 
thus: “One parameter of difficulty is the time and/or the effort expended in reaching a 
given decision. A decision that requires a great deal of time and/or effort is usually 
regarded as more difficult than one reached quickly and with little effort” [my italics] (p. 
146). 
Finally, if one did infer inability or difficulty from an observed behavior (e.g., 
because of one’s definition), one would be assuming a priori a causal attribution. Such an 
assumption would limit one’s endeavor to understand indecisiveness to searching for 
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explanations for an inability and thus prematurely preclude the search for a broader range 
of possible mechanisms.  
Behavioral Definition of Indecisiveness  
I propose that indecisiveness is most fruitfully characterized as a well-defined 
class of observable chronic behaviors. The four advantages of defining indecisiveness as 
a behavior are that 1) the operationalization is congruent with the definition, requiring no 
questionable inferential steps; 2) the phenomenon is easier to investigate empirically; 3) it 
is a priori the least restrictive phenomenon of the four mentioned in terms of admitting 
other phenomena into explanatory mechanisms; and 4) it offers one a rich research 
agenda to account for the various non-behavioral conceptions in Appendix A as possible 
contributors to, or epiphenomena of, indecisiveness. 
Despite the problems with and inconsistencies among existing conceptions of 
indecision and indecisiveness, the synthesized behavioral definition proposed below was 
surprisingly capable of addressing most of the conceptions in Appendix A. The definition 
aims to a) account at some level for as much of the range of what scholars consider to be 
indecisiveness as possible, b) encompass as few, albeit specific, behaviors as possible, c) 
attribute only behavioral characteristics to indecisiveness, and d) entail no a priori 
assumptions about why indecisiveness occurs. The definition of indecisiveness builds off 
definitions of “indecision” and “undecided,” which, in turn, are based on Yates’s (2003) 
definition of “decision.”  
Yates (2003) defines a “decision” as a commitment to a course of action intended 
to satisfy particular people, i.e., “beneficiaries” (see also Langley, Mintzberg, Pitcher, 
Posada, & Saint-Macary, 1995; Mintzberg, Raisinghani, & Théorêt, 1976). In this 
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definition, a decision involves both a commitment to action and the fulfillment of that 
commitment. To decide, in other words, is to make a commitment and (at least try to) 
carry it out. To be decided is to have made a commitment, and so, conversely, being 
undecided means to have not (yet) made a commitment. Accordingly, “indecision” is 
here defined as the state of not having made a timely and stable commitment to a course 
of action while the need for such a commitment is acknowledged. 
In this definition, a necessary condition for indecision is that someone (e.g., 
decider, beneficiary, stakeholder) acknowledges that a commitment to course of action 
(i.e., decision) needs to be made. From the moment the need to decide is acknowledged, 
the decision in question has either been made or it has not. Though it may seem obvious 
that making a given decision extinguishes that need to decide, in some cases it may not 
(e.g., if it insufficiently addresses what provoked the initial need), and in other cases the 
need passes without a decision having been made (e.g., lost opportunity). Thus, so long 
as there continues to be an acknowledged need for a given decision, the decider remains 
“undecided.” When a decider remains undecided for too long, she is considered to be in a 
state of “indecision.” What exactly counts as “too long” is context dependent—one 
would be expected to take less time on simpler, routine, and low stakes decisions. 
The second part of “not having committed” is based on the tacit expectation—
inherent in the notion of commitment—that a commitment will be honored. An 
unjustified (or poorly justified) failure to follow through on a commitment can indicate 
that the decider had weak or unstable conviction in her commitment (e.g., was not really 
decided). Such failure to remain committed to the same course of action, then, is a second 
form of “not committing” and thus qualifies as indecision. If deciders who remain 
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undecided for too long are in a state of “indecision,” then those who tend to chronically 
experience indecision are “indecisive.” In other words, the chronic experience of 
indecision is called “indecisiveness” and is defined as the tendency to not make a timely 
and stable commitment to a course of action when the need for such a commitment is 
acknowledged.  
Common Definitions of Indecisiveness 
Indecisiveness as a chronic failure to commit and stay committed to a course of 
action was consistent with some of the common usages of the terms “indecision,” 
“indecisive,” and “indecisiveness” (when explicitly distinguished). Seven sources of 
English usage were consulted as descriptions of popular usage, and the most common 
thread was that indecisiveness meant “chronic indecision.” However, as was the case 
with scholars’ conceptions, there was considerable variation in the dictionary definitions 
of indecision (see Appendix B).  
There were nine distinct conceptions of indecision in the dictionaries, several of 
which were similar or identical to those of researchers in Appendix A: 
1. Inability to decide or make up one’s mind 
2. Reluctance to decide or make up one’s mind 
3. The state of not being able to decide 
4. Inability to make decisions quickly and effectively  
5. Hesitation 
6. Vacillation or wavering between courses of action 
7. Tendency to change one’s mind  
8. Lack or want of decision  
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9. Irresolution or not producing a clear decision 
Like researchers’ definitions, the dictionaries characterized indecision and 
indecisiveness as belonging to a variety of phenomena, including an inability (definitions 
1, 3, 4), motivation (definition 2), behavior (definitions 5, 6, 7), and state (definitions 3, 
8, 9). Conspicuously absent were definitions of indecision as affective state or difficulty. 
The behavioral definition of indecision proposed earlier included key features from 
definitions 3 (a state), 4 (timeliness), 6 and 7 (instability of commitment), and 8 and 9 
(non-decision), indicating that it was consistent with common usage. 
Operationalizing the behavioral definition of indecisiveness involved identifying 
distinct indecisive behaviors within a “decision episode” framework. The framework 
served to characterize the “what” and “when” of different indecisive behaviors, and also 
served as a guide for generating items for the initial indecisiveness scale. 
When in the Decision Process Indecisiveness Occurs 
A ‘decision episode’ is the sequence of events entailed in making and carrying out 
a decision, and consists of three phases, each of which begins and ends with a specific act 
(see Figure 1). A decision episode begins with the act of “awareness,” or becoming 
cognizant that a possible opportunity or calamity might affect the satisfaction of one’s 
intended beneficiaries. For example, Jim’s girlfriend Kyla might remind him that the 
longer he waits to rent an apartment for the coming year, the fewer “good” apartments 
there will be from which to choose. Being made aware of the potential apartment 
calamity (or opportunity) presents Jim with a meta-decision: Does he need to make a 




Figure 1. Phases and Points in a Decision Episode 
 
Once Jim acknowledges the need to decide (Yates, 2003) on an apartment, he 
enters the “deliberation” phase of the decision episode (Putsis & Srinivasan, 1994). 
During the deliberation phase, Jim engages in the bulk of decision-related sub-
procedures, such as generating options, considering possible outcomes, making trade-
offs, and considering how acceptable the options are to one’s intended beneficiaries and 
stakeholders (see Yates, 2003). In short, it is during this phase that Jim gathers 
information about different apartments and ponders which to choose. It is important to 
note that although the term “deliberation phase” strongly implies that the decider is 
engaging in conscious analysis, it is not meant to. The decider may reach the point of 
commitment intuitively, automatically (Yates, 2003), and even unconsciously before 
being aware of doing so (Galdi, Arcuri, & Gawronski, 2008).  
In signing a lease, Jim makes a commitment, which ends the deliberation phase. 
The act of “commitment” does not mean that all deliberation (conscious or otherwise) 
about the decision problem ends, however. It is simply the point at which one feels 
sufficiently compelled (for any number of reasons, conscious or otherwise) to make a 
commitment. The commitment is a pledge to do something to satisfy beneficiaries, such 
that if the pledge is broken, one experiences significant adverse affects. (In many 
cultures, for example, breaking a promise can incur a loss of face, credibility, and in 
some cases, even lead to punishment.) If, after signing his lease for one apartment, Jim 
were to subsequently find a much better apartment, he might well be tempted to 
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reconsider honoring his existing lease (i.e., break the first lease and sign a different one). 
Though he would likely not lose face or credibility for breaking his first lease, he would 
almost certainly face financial repercussions for doing so. 
After one has made a commitment to a course of action, one eventually 
implements the actions to fulfill that commitment. The “interim” phase between the act of 
commitment (e.g., Jim’s signing the lease) and the act of initiating the fulfillment of the 
commitment (e.g., Jim’s taking possession of the apartment) can vary in duration 
depending on the decision situation. For instance, the interim between Jim’s lease signing 
and moving is three months, but the interim between his marriage proposal to his 
girlfriend (i.e., act of commitment) and their wedding day (i.e., act of initiating the 
implementation of that commitment) is 15 months. In contrast, when Jim plays hockey in 
the local recreational league, he frequently makes split-second decisions on the ice about 
whether to shoot or pass the puck. Split-second decisions are one type of decision with 
virtually no interim between commitment and initiation, so that the commitment to act is 
almost indistinguishable from the act itself.  
The interim phase ends with the initiation of the implementation phase, during 
which one fulfills one’s commitment by acting on it. The fulfillment of a commitment 
can involve the completion of a discrete action (e.g., pass or shoot) or an extended 
activity (e.g., lease or marriage) for some explicit or implied period of time. Thus, the 
nature of the commitment defines the duration of the implementation phase of the 
decision. In many cases, the commitment is not perpetual, and the implementation ends 
once the commitment is fulfilled. The act of actually passing the puck or of having 
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fulfilled one’s wedding vows until one’s spouse has died are two examples of fulfilled 
commitments.  
The nature of some commitments, however, can be such that even after the 
commitment ends, there is an implicit understanding and even social pressure that one 
should not make subsequent commitments that are inconsistent with the first. This seems 
particularly true when a commitment to a position on an issue is presumed to be based on 
deeper, unchanging values (e.g., “protected values,” Baron & Spranca, 1997). For 
example, once one has committed to a position on the death penalty, the right of women 
to vote, or what side of a civil war to fight on, most people would expect it to be an 
enduring commitment, and one that would be reflected in subsequent decisions based on 
the same underlying values. This is evident in accusations of “flip-flopping” by 
politicians for having made apparently inconsistent decisions (i.e., supported different 
positions) on principle-based issues. The insinuation is that a decider who changes is 
untrustworthy because such a change (in voting pattern) happens when there is 1) a 
failure to conduct due diligence prior to committing, 2) a lack of real convictions and 
vision, or 3) dishonest, opportunistic, political expediency (Chait, 2004). Even ostensibly 
legitimate changes in commitments are often interpreted to mean a lack or vision and 
resoluteness: Staw and Ross (1980) found that people most admired leaders who stay the 
course even when new evidence clearly suggests changing it, but only if they are right in 
the end. 
Types of Indecisiveness 
Indecision and indecisiveness were considered within the framework of decision 
episodes, and thus were thought of as occurring on either side of the point of 
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commitment. This yielded a distinction between “commitment indecision” and “action 
indecision,” which correspond to the states of not making a commitment, and not 
honoring a commitment one has made, respectively. Commitment indecision occurs 
during the deliberation phase, whereas action indecision occurs during the interim phase, 
implementation phase, or even after completion (e.g., “flip-flopping”). Jim hemming and 
hawing for years about whether to propose to his girlfriend is an example of commitment 
indecision, whereas his postponement of the wedding date for the third time (e.g., 
because he has doubts about the marriage) is an example of action indecision.  
The commitment vs. action distinction applied to indecisiveness as well. Thus, 
individuals could be commitment indecisive or action indecisive. This distinction echoes 
the one that Bacanli (2000) made between “exploratory indecision” (e.g., “I think for 
hours even when I make simple decisions”) and “impetuous indecision” (e.g., “I decide 
quickly and give it [the commitment] up quickly”). The commitment vs. action 
distinction is also captured in Mann, Burnett, Radford, and Ford’s (1998) measure of 
decisional procrastination (e.g., “Even after I have made a decision, I delay acting on it”), 
and is supported and complemented by at least two related distinctions. First, it seems 
plausible that individuals who are commitment indecisive are so because they experience 
(for any number of reasons) “pre-decisional conflict,” or are action indecisive because 
they experience “post-decisional conflict” (Janis & Mann, 1977). Second, one way that 
commitment and action indecision can manifest themselves behaviorally is in “decisional 




By further specifying when action indecisiveness occurs during the decision 
episode, we were left with a total of four types of indecisiveness, one for each phase of 
the decision episode: 1) “commitment indecisiveness,” 2) “initiation indecisiveness,” 3) 
“completion indecisiveness,” and 4) “post-completion indecisiveness.” These four types 
of indecisiveness served as the conceptual basis for the four subscales of the behavioral 
indecisiveness scale (see Appendix B).  
Again, the multi-dimensionality hypothesis held that indecisiveness consists of 
distinct behaviors. Specifically, one kind of indecisiveness was predicted to occur before 
the point of commitment, and three others after the point of commitment. Those after the 







Chapter 3: Study 1—Initial Indecisiveness Scale Development 
Aims 
The principal aim of Study 1 was to validate the behavioral indecisiveness scale, 
and in so doing test the multi-dimensionality hypothesis. The 62-item behavioral 
indecisiveness scale was rationally derived based on the four aforementioned types of 
temporally distinct indecisiveness. One item was borrowed from Frost and Shows’ (1993) 
Indecisiveness Scale, (“It seems that deciding on the most trivial things takes me a long 
time”), and two additional items were modifications of items from the same scale (“I 
come to a decision quickly” and “When ordering from an unfamiliar menu, I'm the first 
in my party to select a meal”). 
Method 
Participants. Participants were undergraduate students at a large Midwestern 
university enrolled in an introductory psychology course, and who received course credit 
for participating in the study (N = 369, mean age M = 18.7 years, 46.6% female).  
Procedure. Participants completed a self-report questionnaire in groups of six to 
10 on computer terminals in the laboratory. The study was presented using Medialab 
software. Due to the low percentage of missing data (0.32%), all analyses were conducted 
using pairwise deletion (i.e., each analysis excluded cases that were missing data for 




Behavioral Indecisiveness Scale. The four sub-scales of the 62-item Behavioral 
Indecisiveness Scale (hereafter BIS; Appendix B) were administered with the items 
presented in randomized order by the computer. The commitment indecisiveness scale 
(20 items, nine reverse-scored) measured failure to decide, decision delay, or long 
decision latency (e.g., the reverse-scored “I commit to a course of action well before the 
deadline”). The initiation indecisiveness scale (20 items, eight reverse-scored) measured 
delay in beginning implementation or decision change before implementation has begun 
(e.g., “When it comes time to act on a choice, I change my mind and choose a different 
option”). The completion indecisiveness scale (12 items, five reverse-scored) measured 
decision change before implementation completion or delay in implementation 
completion (e.g., “I wait until the deadline before bringing a project to a close”). Finally, 
the post-completion indecisiveness scale (10 items, two reverse-scored) measured 
decision change or making an incompatible decision after implementation was complete 
(e.g., “Soon after deciding, I find myself making a second decision that reverses the 
effects of the first”). Responses on the behavioral indecisiveness scale used a six-point 
Likert-type frequency scale developed for the study. 
Three of the best-known measures of indecisiveness use a Likert response scale 
from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” (Frost & Shows, 1993; Mann, 1982) or 
seven-point Likert-type scale from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” (Germeijs & 
De Boeck, 2002) to measure the degree to which decision-making statements are true of 
the respondent. These response scales have two problems that weaken the validity of their 
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respective scales: 1) they rely on an ambiguous metric, and 2) they include a mid-point 
response.  
First, most of the statements in these three scales are about feelings, experiences, 
and behaviors (e.g., “I make decisions quickly,” Germeijs & De Boeck, 2002). 
Psychologically, respondents can evaluate the truth of these statements on the basis of 
degree (i.e., how quickly do I make decisions?), frequency (i.e., how often do I make 
decisions quickly?), or both. By including items that either do not admit an evaluation of 
degree (e.g., “I delay making decisions until it is too late,” [my italics] Mann, 1982) or 
explicitly include frequency terms (e.g., “I usually make decisions quickly,” [my italics] 
Frost & Shows, 1993), all three scales are biased towards frequency based evaluation. 
Nevertheless, some items may still be evaluated in terms of degree, which means one 
cannot be sure that all respondents consistently use the same metric.  
Second, the use of response scales with mid-points to measure indecisiveness—a 
phenomenon characterized by uncertainty and equivocation—is inappropriate if not 
ironic. Although there are arguments for and against providing respondents with a 
midpoint response option, the meaning of midpoint responses has long been recognized 
in the survey methodology literature as being ambiguous. A mid-point response could, 
for example, mean 1) the neutral value on the scale, 2) discomfort or unwillingness to 
answer, 3) no opinion, 4) lack of response certainty, 5) not understanding the question, or 
6) contextual variability (Velez & Ashworth, 2007).  
To avoid both metric ambiguity and midpoint response ambiguity, the behavioral 
indecisiveness scale uses a six-point Likert-type frequency response scale. Since no such 
response scale was found to exist, one was constructed. To make the points on the scale 
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as continuous as possible (i.e., equidistant), frequency terms for the six labels were 
chosen based on Rohrmann’s (2003) study of verbal qualifiers for rating scales. 
Rohrmann had participants comparatively rate 12 frequency terms (e.g., usually, 
occasionally, sometimes) from lowest to highest on a scale from 0 to 10, and then rate the 
familiarity of each term. The six most equidistant terms with high familiarity scores were 
adopted for the present scale, namely: 1 = Never, 2 = Seldom, 3 = Sometimes, 4 = Often, 
5 = Very Often, and 6 = Always. 
Results  
Because the four subscales of the behavioral indecisiveness scale were rationally 
derived based on theory, there were clear a priori predictions about the factor structure. 
This justified the use of confirmatory rather than exploratory factor analysis. Two factor 
analyses were conducted on the 62 scale items using LISREL 8.5 (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 
2003): The first was on the null model, a one-factor solution, and the second on the 
hypothesized four-factor model. In all three studies, the standards for good model fit were 
based on Hu and Bentler’s (1999) recommendations: RMSEA < 0.06, GFI > .95, and 
NNFI ≥ .95.  
The null model failed to converge, χ² (1891, N = 369) = 9799.51, p < .01 and had 
very poor fit indices: RMSEA = 0.23, NNFI = 0.00, GFI = 0.23. Although the 
hypothesized model had substantially better fit, it too failed to converge: χ² (1823, N = 
369) = 4808.31, p < .01, RMSEA = 0.093, NNFI = 0.61, GFI = 0.60. Examination of the 
loadings and correlation matrix suggested that items were related based on four 
indecisive behaviors, regardless of when in the decision episode they occurred: 1) 
decision evasion, 2) prolonged latency, 3) waiting, and 4) changing commitments.  
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Consequently, a third factor analysis was conducted on the 35 items that loaded 
highly on one factor, but had low cross-loadings. Four factors were predicted: Evasion, 
prolonged latency, waiting, and changing. It is important to note that items measuring 
these hypothesized factors were part of the original 62-item scale, but their wording 
varied by when in the decision episode they occurred. The 35-item, four-factor model had 
relatively poor fit, with a significant chi-square χ² (554, N = 369) = 1368.98, p < .01. The 
fit indices, though more promising than the first two models, still indicated inadequate fit: 
RMSEA = 0.073, NNFI = 0.81, GFI = 0.80.  
The beta modification indices, which are estimates of the decreases in chi-square 
for given changes to the beta parameters of the path model (Jöreskog & Sörbom, 2003), 
indicated that a better fitting four-factor model could be obtained by eliminating items 
that had cross-loadings. A fourth model was tested with 18 of the 35 items selected based 
on the strength of the primary loading and lack of cross-loading. Though the chi-square 
was still significant χ² (129, N = 369) = 257.81, p < .01, the fit indices were at the 
threshold between acceptable and good fit: RMSEA = 0.052, NNFI = 0.91, GFI = 0.93. 
To re-confirm that the fit of the model was superior to that of a unidimensional model 
(though items had been retained based on their high loadings and low cross-loadings), a 
unidimensional model was tested using the 18 variables. As expected, the unidimensional 
model did not converge, having a significant chi-square of χ² (153, N = 369) = 1916.90, p 
< .01,  and poor fir indices RMSEA = 0.24, NNFI = 0.0, GFI = 0.48. Table 1 shows 
factor correlations, scale means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and correlations for the 





BIS Factor Correlations, Scale Correlations, and Scale Reliabilities 
N = 369 Latency Waiting Evasion Changing 
Latency (3 items) .74 .27 .36 .42 
Waiting (6 items) .31 .77 .37 .20 
Evasion (3 items) .49 .48 .65 .35 
Changing (6 items) .54 .18 .46 .80 
Factor correlations below diagonal; Cronbach’s αs on diagonal; Scale correlations above diagonal 
All correlations significant, p < .01 (two-tailed) 
 
Table 2 
Factor Structure and Loadings of the BIS 
 Latency Waiting Evasion Changing 
Item  Factor Loadings 
I come to a decision quickly. (R) .50    
I take “forever” to make up my mind. .87    
It seems that deciding on the most trivial things takes me a 
long time. .74    
I commit to a course of action well before the deadline. (R)  .70   
I implement my plans at the first opportunity. (R)  .58   
I waste no time starting on something I said I would do. (R)  .60   
I complete a task I have agreed to do without delay. (R)  .49   
I wait until the deadline before bringing a project to a close.  .58   
I finish something ahead of schedule. (R)   .68   
I avoid making definite plans until I have to.   .57  
When I have to take a position on some matter, I do. (R)   .63  
When asked when I will do what I said I would do, I answer 
something non-committal, like “I’ll see,” “Soon,” or “I’m not 
sure.” 
  .68  
I back out of a decision I have made.    .51 
When it comes time to act on a choice, I change my mind 
and choose a different option.    .61 
I abandon a plan before I have seen it through to the end.    .56 
Before I finish acting on my decision, I abruptly stop and 
reverse that decision.    .73 
After I do something, I promptly change my mind and undo 
it.    .74 
I have a sudden change of heart and switch my stand on an 
issue.    .63 




The results of the factor analyses suggested that indecisiveness is made up of four 
distinct behaviors: 1) prolonged latency, 2) waiting, 3) evasion, and 4) changing. This 
lent support to the multi-dimensionality hypothesis, although contrary to what was 
predicted, the items loaded onto their respective factors regardless of where in the 
decision episode the behavior occurred (e.g., all decision change behaviors loaded 
together). Though one could not conclude that specifying when in a decision episode an 
indecisive behavior occurs was not meaningful, the data did suggest that it may be less 
meaningful than specifying the kind of behavior itself. Furthermore, the results 
highlighted the possibility that the etiology of a given behavior is similar regardless of 
when it occurs. Although the scales had low to moderate reliability, this was to be 
expected for scales with so few items.  
A notable shortcoming of the scale items was that they were developed with an 
emphasis on measuring when indecisiveness occurred, and so were not worded to focus 
on the behaviors that they appear to measure. This was one reason why over 70% of the 
items were ultimately eliminated to get a theoretically and empirically coherent model. 
The items had additional shortcomings. For one, the correlation between the waiting and 
latency scales (r = .27) was far lower than would be expected, as those who wait by 
definition take longer to make a final commitment. One explanation might be that 
individuals who tend to wait may have interpreted some latency items to mean unjustified 
delay. For example, “I take ‘forever’ to make up my mind” captures some of the 
exasperation indecisives report feeling about taking too long to decide (Frost & Shows, 
1993). Individuals who tend to wait make up their minds without much delay, and then 
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purposefully delay commitment. As such, such waiters could be expected to distinguish 
between the time it takes them to make up their minds and the time it takes them to 
commit (a pre-commitment interim phase of sorts). In addition, it seems reasonable that 
such individuals would consider their delayed commitment to be strategic and not 
procrastinatory, and thus justified. For these two reasons it seems unlikely that “waiters” 
would see themselves as taking “forever” to make up their minds.  
More generally, the items did not adequately cover the conceptual space of 
several of the empirically derived sub-scales. For example, two of only three evasion 
items are social in nature (e.g., “When asked to commit to something, I answer something 
non-committal, like ‘Maybe,’ ‘I’ll see,’ or ‘I’ll think about it.’”). This lack of coverage 
impoverished the scope and validity of the sub-scales, which, in turn, weakened the 
validity of the final factor analysis. These results pointed not simply to the need to refine 
the existing scales, but rather suggested a reconsideration of how to classify indecisive 
behaviors and better distinguish them from related behaviors. The results also highlighted 
the possibility that there may be more classes of indecisive behavior that were not 






Chapter 4: Study 2—Correlates of a Refined Measure of Indecisiveness 
Indecisiveness Reconsidered 
In light of the results of Study 1, indecisiveness was re-operationalized strictly in 
terms of the (chronic) behaviors that would constitute proof of the state of not-deciding, 
assuming that the need to decide had been acknowledged. This yielded three core 
indecisive behaviors—behaviors that had already been part of the behavioral 
indecisiveness scale, namely, chronically 1) taking relatively long to decide, 2) not-
deciding, and 3) changing one’s decision after having committed. Each of these 
behaviors, when chronic, indicates indecisiveness. These and no other behaviors were 
henceforth considered “core indecisive behaviors,” and so the scale was renamed the 
“Core Indecisiveness Scale” (hereafter CIS).  
Two of the four factors from Study 1 were considered core indecisiveness 
behaviors—prolonged decision latency and changing decisions. The other two factors 
from Study 1, waiting and evasion, were now considered to be contributors to the core 
behaviors. For instance, waiting is one potential cause of prolonged decision latency, and 
could result also in not-deciding. The recasting of waiting and evasion as contributors to 
indecisiveness led to the question of what other behaviors might contribute directly to the 
core indecisive behaviors. A list of plausible, immediate antecedent behaviors was 
generated and labeled “proximal behavioral contributors.” Rassin (2007) followed a 
similar generative process when he asked: “What exactly happens during the prolonged 
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decision times” (p. 5), and then proposed three behaviors similar to the proximal 
behavioral contributors (i.e., procrastination, avoiding making decision, gathering more 
information). 
 The proximal behavioral contributors included the evasion and waiting factors 
from Study 1, in addition to several other conceptions of indecisiveness from Appendix 
A. For example, decisional procrastination was one of the more obvious of several 
potential contributors to prolonged decision latency, but it is actually taking long to 
decide that is the core indecisive behavior. Proximal behavioral contributors fell into two 
broad classes of behavior—decision evasion and prolonged decision engagement—
resulting in the typology depicted in Figure 2. The engagement-evasion distinction 
echoed the well-established approach-avoidance distinction, which has been used to 
describe deciders by a variety of scholars (e.g., Beattie, Baron, Hershey, & Spranca, 
1994). 




Note that according to the multi-determination hypothesis, some behaviors in the 
typology were expected to contribute to more than one type of core indecisive behavior. 
For instance, decisional procrastination was hypothesized to contribute to prolonged 
latency and not-deciding. 
Each of the proximal behavioral contributors was hypothesized to mediate the 
effects of one or more distal contributors on the core indecisive behaviors. Of the 
different possible distal contributors that were plausibly at the root of individual 
differences in indecisiveness (e.g., cognitive, clinical, developmental), personality traits 
were chosen as the focus of study because of their prevalence in indecision and 
indecisiveness research (e.g., Bacanli, 2006; Milgram & Tenne, 2000; Newman, Gray, & 
Fuqua, 1999). The specific distal contributors chosen were the Big Five personality traits 
(see John & Srivastava, 1999, for a review): openness to experience (conventionality, 
daringness, creativity), conscientiousness (goal striving, impulse control, carefulness), 
extroversion (sociability, assertiveness, spontaneity), agreeableness (altruism, good-
naturedness, competitiveness), and neuroticism (negative affect, emotional reactivity, 
insecurity).  
Proximal behavioral contributors. Decisional procrastination and buck-passing 
are the two proximal contributors that fall under decision evasion, and they have been 
found to correlate (r = .64, Harriot, Ferrari & Dovidio, 1996; r = .72, Mann et al., 1997). 
Decisional procrastination, as mentioned earlier, denotes putting off engaging in the 
deliberation process (Ferrari, 1994; Janis & Mann, 1977). It is negatively related to 
openness, conscientiousness, and extroversion (Di Fabio, 2006). Decisional 
procrastination is also positively related to neuroticism directly (Di Fabio, 2006), and 
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through low self-esteem (Di Fabio, 2006; Effert & Ferrari, 1989). By definition, putting 
off deciding means, all things being equal, the decision will take more time. If one puts 
off the decision too long, one might forget about it (e.g., returning RSVPs). Alternately, 
one may reach a point so close to a deadline that, despite panicked deciding (e.g., 
hypervigilance, Janis & Mann, 1977), one fails to decide. One of the items in Janis and 
Mann’s (1977) decisional procrastination scale captures the idea of waiting too long: “I 
delay making decisions until it is too late.” Thus, decisional procrastination was expected 
to mediate the effects of high neuroticism, low conscientiousness, and low extroversion 
on both latency and not-deciding.  
Buck-passing, from the expression “passing the buck,” means avoiding one’s 
responsibility (to decide) by shifting it to another person (Janis & Mann, 1977; Rosen, 
Grandison, & Stewart, 1974). Buck-passing was expected to mediate the effects of high 
neuroticism and low conscientiousness on prolonged latency. It seems reasonable that 
some individuals simply will not bring themselves to make a decision if they fail to pass 
the responsibility to someone else. One reason why might be a lack of self-confidence. 
Buck-passing was thus also predicted to mediate the effects of high neuroticism and low 
conscientiousness and extroversion on not-deciding.  
The second group of proximal behavioral contributors were thought to lead to 
prolonged decision engagement because the decider (unintentionally or intentionally) 
either stops or slows deliberation. The first and most obvious of these, judging from its 
prevalence in definitions of indecisiveness in Appendix A, was “impasse.” Impasse is the 
state of having unintentionally stopped progress toward the point of commitment. It was 
thought to be the result of difficulty with a decision, occurring when something in the 
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decision process (e.g., strong decider ambivalence, envisioning too many possibilities, 
too much information to integrate, conflicting opinions, trying to please everyone) leaves 
the decider unwilling (even feeling unable) to move forward. Despite the range of 
potential causes of impasse, high neuroticism was predicted to be related because worry 
or concern was thought to underlie many of those causes. Low conscientiousness was 
also predicted to be related to impasse as it would impede its timely resolution. Impasse 
was thought to contribute most to prolonged latency and not-deciding. 
An intentional stop in the decision process, in contrast, is often characterized as 
“strategic waiting,” which involves the deliberate withholding of commitment by the 
decider for one of at least two reasons: 1) The decider is waiting for a specific piece of 
information that she thinks will affect her choice (e.g., an important beneficiary’s 
opinion; cf. Tversky & Shafir, 1992 on irrational choice deferral), or 2) the decider has 
made a tentative choice (e.g., to buy a particular television), but waits a while in case 
conditions change in some relevant way (e.g., a clearance sale; Anderson & Wilson, 
2003). Strategic waiting is a calculated behavior, characterized as the prudent suspension 
of impulses (e.g., to buy the television now). As such, strategic waiting was hypothesized 
to be positively related to conscientiousness and prolonged latency, though no research 
was found that has tested either hypothesis.  
Deciders can be chronically slow or slowed in at least three ways: by inefficient 
processing, slow processing, or by extra processing. Inefficient processing can be due to a 
lack of decision-making expertise (Yates & Tschirhart, 2006), though again, no study has 
tested this link. Inefficient processing can also be due to cognitive characteristics such as 
distractibility or absent-mindedness, which are related to lack of impulse control, low 
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conscientiousness, and decisional procrastination (Ferrari & Dovidio, 2001). Finally, 
slow processing speed can result from unintentional factors, such as cognitive 
impairments (e.g., low IQ). (Effert and Ferrari’s (1989) finding that verbal or abstract 
reasoning was unrelated to decisional procrastination did not address the point that low 
intelligence is a plausible contributor to slow processing, and thus to prolonged latency 
and possibly not-deciding. 
Slow processing can also result from more intentional factors, such as very 
careful processing, which is characteristic of vigilant deciding (e.g., “I take a lot of care 
before choosing,” Janis & Mann, 1977), high conscientiousness, and at least moderate 
neuroticism. Interestingly, vigilant deciding is negatively related to buck-passing, 
decisional procrastination, and hypervigilance (Mann et al., 1997). This suggests that 
there may be competing mechanisms that contribute to indecisiveness. Slow processing 
was expected to be positively related to latency and negatively related to changing. 
As indicated in Figure 2, there are at least two distinct ways in which one can 
process more information: by extensive information processing or by re-checking the 
information one has. Extensive information processing refers to how much information 
one gathers and considers when deciding, and the evidence on whether indecisives 
process extensively appears to be mixed. In studies using an information board task (see  
Payne, 1976 for a description of the task), Ferrari and Dovidio (2000) found that 
decisional procrastinators searched for more information, Rassin, Muris, Booster, and 
Kolsloot (2008) found indecisives searched for more information in one study, but not in 
another, and Patalano et al. (2009) found that indecisives did not search for more 
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information. Interestingly, Rassin et al. (2007) found that indecisives did ask for more 
information before making a judgment in a well-structured probability task.  
Patalano et al. (2009) suggested that one explanation for these mixed findings is 
that indecisives, motivated to find the “best” or “right” option because of their 
maximization (Spunt, Rassin, & Epstein, 2009) or perfectionism (Frost & Shows, 1993), 
initially consider information across options. They then have a modest shift away from 
comparing options to focusing on features of one option as a result of the tension between 
wanting to consider as much as possible, and the cognitive demands of doing so. A 
related account is the contingent information search strategy, which holds that indecisives 
search for more information when they perceive that additional information will help 
them make a more certain decision or judgment. In contrast, indecisives turn their focus 
on information about their chosen option when they perceive additional comparative 
information would only complicate their task or decrease the likelihood of finding a 
dominating option (and lead to impasse or “paralysis by analysis”).2  
This second explanation is the more consistent with Reed’s (1985) proposal that 
indecisiveness in obsessionals is a result of a failed attempt to structure problems (and 
decisions). It also better accounts for why, compared to more decisive individuals, 
indecisives seek more information in well-structured tasks, such as Rassin et al.’s (2007) 
                                                
2 When focusing on their eventually chosen option, indecisives may “bolster” (Janis & Mann, 1977) that 
option to make it more appealing by “spreading the alternatives”—increasing the value of its desirable 
characteristics and decreasing the value of its undesirable characteristics. Patalano et al. (2009) observed 
that when focused on the information in their option of choice, indecisives spent more time on its attributes 
that differed from other options, than on the attributes that mattered most to deciders. Patalano et al. took 
this to mean that indecisives were in fact comparing options and deliberating, arguing that had indecisives 
indeed been “verifying the quality” of their selected option, they “should” have spent more attention to the 
most important dimensions. However, one could also argue that if indecisives were indeed bolstering they 
would not spend more time on attributes that were merely more important, but rather on where they thought 
they could most spread the alternatives. In other words, they would focus on attributes that had some value 
that they perceived could either be diminished or increased to make the leading option more attractive. 
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probability task, but spend more time re-processing information about one option in 
messier decisions such as those in Ferrari and Dovidio’s (2001) and Patalano et al.’s 
(2009) information board tasks. The upshot is that the contingent information search 
strategy described above suggests an important qualification to Rassin, Muris, Booster, 
and Kolsloot’s (2008) proposal that indecisives have “informational tunnel-vision.” 
Moreover, given that the driver underlying contingent search behavior is anxiety about 
choosing the right or best option, the mechanism was not expected to hold across all three 
types of indecisive behavior.  
Thus far, the accounts of information search and processing have described and 
presumed one type of neuroticism-driven indecisive. Some evidence on what drives 
extensive information search points to a second mechanism that is quite distinct from the 
first. Need for cognition, defined as “the tendency for an individual to engage in and 
enjoy thinking” (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982, p. 116), is positively related to the amount of 
information searched before deciding (Verplanken, 1993; Verplanken, Hazenberg, & 
Palenéwen, 1992). Need for cognition, in turn, is related to openness to experience and 
conscientiousness (Sadowski & Gulgoz, 1992). This is consistent with Heinström’s 
(2003) finding that the amount of effort put into searching for information is predicted by 
openness to experience (e.g., because of curiosity) and conscientiousness (e.g., because 
of thoroughness). Yet openness to experience and conscientiousness are negatively 
related to neuroticism (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and indecisiveness (Milgram & Tenne, 
2000).  
One account of how higher openness and conscientiousness might contribute to 
indecisiveness—specifically prolonged latency—might involve Milgram and Tenne’s 
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(2000) “slow-relaxed” indecisives. This group would take longer to decide because they 
are adaptively perfectionistic (e.g., Johnson & Slaney, 1996) and vigilant (Janis & Mann, 
1977; e.g., “When making decisions I like to collect lots of information” and “I like to 
consider all of the alternatives”). It would be difficult to identify this type of indecisive 
with conventional measures of indecisiveness because of their broad spectrum of items 
tapping more neurotic behaviors, such as decision-related anxiety and decision difficulty. 
However, the more vigilant type of indecisive may be detectable with a causally agnostic 
behavioral measure of indecisiveness. 
The second manner in which one can process more information, by re-checking it, 
has also been found to correlate with indecisiveness (Ferrari & Dovidio, 2000; Frost & 
Shows, 1993; Gayton et al., 1994; Rassin & Muris, 2005a). Some evidence suggests, 
however, that checking behavior has qualitatively different contributors at different 
levels. Specifically, engaging in moderate checking is typical of thorough and careful 
deliberation, which is driven by higher conscientiousness and is characteristic of the 
aforementioned vigilant type of indecisiveness. In contrast, excessively checking is a 
more compulsive behavior (e.g., typical of obsessive-compulsive personality disorder, or 
OCPD), and driven by high neuroticism. The potentially qualitative difference in 
checking behaviors not only reinforces the earlier suggestion that there is more than one 
mechanism at play, but also exemplifies how the relationship between drivers and 
indecisive behaviors is complex. In the end, both moderate and excessive checking take 
time, and so checking was predicted to relate to latency. 
Distal contributors. Because high neuroticism and low conscientiousness have 
consistently been found to be associated with indecision and indecisiveness (e.g., Frost & 
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Shows, 1993; Jackson, Furnham, & Lawty-Jones, 1999; Holland & Holland, 1977; 
Milgram & Tenne, 2000, Neuberg, Judice, & West, 1997) they were predicted to drive all 
three behaviors in the CIS. That said, they were not predicted to do so equally. Milgram 
and Tenne’s (2000) decision speed is the only extant indecisiveness measure that is 
directly comparable to any of the three core indecisive behaviors. They found that low 
conscientiousness, low extroversion, and high neuroticism predicted speed on minor 
decisions. As such these three distal contributors were predicted to be related to latency.  
One can argue that of the three core indecisive behaviors, not-deciding is the most 
extreme form, as decisions remain unmade rather than eventually made. Though high 
neuroticism likely drives not-deciding, the failure to actually make commitments, 
especially in the face of deadlines, seems more characteristic of a lack of 
conscientiousness. Both high neuroticism and low conscientiousness were therefore 
predicted to contribute to not-deciding. 
Change is perhaps the most complex of the three core indecisiveness behaviors, 
involving deciding relatively quickly, and then changing one’s mind. Even though it is 
the changing itself that is the more central behavior to indecisiveness, deciding too 
quickly can precipitate the consideration of change. One can think of changing decisions 
as consisting of three parts. First a decision, possibly an impulsive one, is made. Second, 
doubting and post- decisional regret lead to reconsideration. Third, there is actually going 
through with the change for any number of reasons, such as a need to satisfy others, lack 
of concern for conventions, or obliviousness to the costs of breaking the commitment.  
Low conscientiousness would account for the quick and careless decision, 
whereas neuroticism is the most obvious driver of the post-decisional doubt and regret, 
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both of which have been shown to be related to indecisiveness (e.g., Frost & Shows, 
1993). Finally, overcoming the barrier to break a commitment might also result from low 
conscientiousness (e.g., low duty or low perseverance) or low agreeableness (e.g., a 
selfish indifference to others). 
Validation of the CIS 
The validity of the CIS was tested with three measures of indecisiveness: one pair 
of scales and two behavioral measures. First, Milgram and Tenne’s (2000) scales for 
decision speed and decision tension in minor decisions was used to measure convergent 
and discriminant validity. Specifically, convergent validity was sought by predicting that 
deciders with higher scores on the speed scale (i.e., fast-relaxed and fast-tense deciders) 
will have lower scores on the CIS latency subscale. The reasoning was that the decision 
speed scale measures self-reported decision latency on a set of concrete, trivial, everyday 
decisions, whereas the CIS subscale does not refer to specific types of decisions. As such 
they are similar, though not equal, measures of decision latency. 
In contrast, decision tension was predicted to be more closely related to not-
deciding and changing. Decision tension is almost synonymous with decision-related 
anxiety. Thus, if the two tense groups (fast-tense and slow-tense) had significantly higher 
not-deciding and changing decisions scores than would the relaxed groups, it would 
provide discriminant validity for the CIS sub-scales. If the relationships between Milgram 
and Tenne’s (2000) four groups and the CIS subscales were distinct, it would serve both 
as validation for the scale, and as added support for the multidimensionality hypothesis. 
Validity was also tested using a version of the Hawaii Problem (Tversky & Shafir, 
1992) modified for Study 2. The original Hawaii problem was developed to test the non-
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rational behavior called the “disjunction effect.” Briefly, the disjunction effect is a 
systematic violation of Savage’s (1954) sure-thing principle (STP) by an apparent failure 
to reason disjunctively through all logical decision outcomes. The STP states that if an 
individual would chose A over B if event X obtained, and if ~X obtained, then that 
individual should chose A over B regardless of what she knows about X.  
Tversky and Shafir (1992) created a scenario in which the participant is told that 
she has just finished a very difficult exam at the end of the semester and is presented with 
a limited-time offer for a vacation package to Hawaii for an exceptionally low price. The 
catch is that by the time the exam results will be in, the offer will have expired. The 
participant is thus faced with a choice under uncertainty, and is offered three options: 1) 
buy the vacation package, 2) do not buy the package, or 3) pay money to extend the deal 
until after exam results are in. Participants are subsequently asked whether they would go 
if they knew they passed the exam and if they knew they failed the exam.  
The group of interest in the study consisted of those who indicated that they 
would go rather than stay (i.e., preferred A over B) regardless of whether they passed 
(i.e., X) or failed the exam (i.e., ~X). Individuals in this group were expected to buy the 
vacation package, but many chose to pay to extend the deal. In paying for information 
about whether they passed or failed—information that would not affect their choice to 
buy the vacation package (A)—they violated the STP. Tversky and Shafir (1992) called 
this pattern of deciding the “disjunctive effect,” and explained that it can occur when 
there are mutually exclusive reasons for choosing a given course of action A that are 
contingent on the outcome of an event X. What is less clear are the motivations 
underlying reason-based decisions.  
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Consider the following account: A major reason why individuals put off making 
decisions is that they are not able to clearly justify picking one option over another (to 
themselves or others), leaving them in doubt. Given that feelings of doubt are related to 
indecisiveness (Frost & Shows, 1993), indecisives have to quell that doubt more 
frequently. This was Reed’s (1985) intuition: Obsessive indecisives have a lower 
threshold for what counts as an important decision, which means they feel the need to 
decide (Yates, 2003) more frequently. Moreover, indecisives experience greater doubt, 
and may have a higher threshold for certainty. That is, they need a greater “spread” 
between the chosen option and the next best option to feel confident enough to choose. 
Taken together, higher decision frequency, greater doubt, and higher certainty threshold 
would mean that indecisives have more doubt to quell. One way indecisives might reduce 
their decisional doubt is by reducing the uncertainty in the reason for deciding (recall that 
indecisives interpret ambiguous situations as threatening). Following this logic, 
indecisives would be more drawn to making reason-based choices rather than 
consequentialist ones (i.e., deciding based on a comparison of the expected outcomes of 
the different choices). In a sense the “right choice” seems to them “more right” when it is 
chosen for known (and thus unequivocal) reasons. 
Though there was a deadline for choosing in the Hawaii task, there was also 
certainty in the choice itself, at least for individuals who claimed they “would go” 
regardless. The rational choice for these individuals, following the STP, was to buy the 
package without knowing the definite reason. The key question, then, was which 
mechanisms would predict paying to be able to make a reason-based decision. As argued 
earlier, of the three indecisive behaviors, not-deciding is the most extreme. If there were 
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no option to defer choice in the Hawaii task, those who both claim they “would go” and 
are prone to not-deciding would be the least likely to make a definite choice, one way or 
the other. The upshot is that because not-deciding is the most extreme form of 
indecisiveness, those prone to it require the greatest amount of certainty before 
committing. Therefore, not-deciding was predicted to be related to making reason-based 
decisions (i.e., the purchase of a deferral option). 
In contrast, changing decisions was expected to be unrelated to the purchase of a 
deferral option—in essence a form of paid strategic waiting—because impulsivity was 
predicted to contribute to changing decisions. Since impulsivity and strategic waiting are 
antithetical, changing decisions should not predict choice of either deferral option. 
Finally, of the three indecisive behaviors, latency has the most complicated relationship 
with choice deferral because at least two significantly different mechanisms were thought 
to contribute to latency. On the one hand, a significant proportion of slow deciders (i.e., 
those with high latency scores) might choose to pay for the added certainty of a reason-
based choice. At least some portion of slow deciders, however, would not. Specifically, 
the sub-group of slow deciders earlier identified with Milgram and Tenne’s (2000) 
relaxed-indecisives would not. Because relaxed-indecisives are thought to engage in the 
decision process by gathering more information and processing it vigilantly, they would 
see that the only additional information to gather and process in the Hawaii task is the 
pass/fail information. Given their high need for cognition, which has some association 
with a greater propensity to reason disjunctively (Toplak & Stanovich, 2002), relaxed-
indecisives would also be more likely to realize that the pass/fail information has no 
bearing on a rational choice. That is, they were thought to be more likely to reason 
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consequentially, especially if there was a cost (i.e., $10) associated with further 
information acquisition.  
Finally, the criterion validity of the scale was tested using the Fundamental 
Attitudes Scale (FAS; Rassin & Muris, 2005a). Rassin and Muris consider the FAS to be 
a behavioral measure of indecisiveness, one that is different from the decision latency 
task used by Frost and Shows (1993). The FAS measures the extent to which respondents 
are decided about socio-political issues. Individuals are presented statements about 
controversial issues worded in such a way as to make complete disagreement or 
endorsement difficult (e.g., “Western society is obliged to interfere in third world 
countries”). For each statement, individuals are asked to indicate whether they agree, 
disagree, or “do not know.” Agreement and disagreement are considered to be decided 
responses, whereas “do not know” responses are considered undecided. The number of 
“do not know” responses is an indication of the frequency of being undecided, and hence 
of indecisiveness. In the present study, it was expected that all three subscales of the CIS 
would correlate with the FAS, but given the nature of the task, not-deciding was expected 
to have the highest correlation.  
There were several aims in Study 2. The first aim was to replicate the multi-
dimensionality of indecisiveness using the refined version of the CIS. The second aim 
was to test the multi-determination hypothesis. The third aim was to test predicted 
contributors underlying indecisiveness using a model with two levels of predictors (i.e., a 
mediated path model). The fourth and final aim of Study 2 was to test the convergent, 




Participants. Participants (N = 182) were undergraduate students at a large 
Midwestern university enrolled in an introductory psychology course and who received 
study for course credit for participating. They completed either a paper-and-pencil 
version of the task in the lab (n = 47), or one of two online versions on their own time 
outside the lab (n = 61 and n = 74). The two online versions differed only in that the 
second (n = 74) included the FAS. Completion time was only measured in the online 
versions and had a mean of M = 19.36 minutes and a range from 5 to 57 minutes. Given 
that the shortest versions of the online study consisted of over 130 questions, three 
decision tasks, and various instructions, responders who took less than 10 minutes to 
respond (n = 13, 7.7%) were dropped from the analyses, leaving N = 169.  
Mean age of the final sample was M = 18.78 years with participants as young as 
18 and as old as 25. Female participants (n = 72) made up 42.6% of the final sample, 
which was 74.0% white non-Hispanic, 4.7% Hispanic or Latino, 6.5% African-American 
or black, 7.1% Asian, 7.1% bi-racial or multiracial, and 0.6% “difficult to classify.” 
Procedure. All versions of the study were randomized, though not in the same 
manner. The paper-and-pencil packet consisted of basic instructions, followed by all the 
tasks and scales in random order, followed by demographic questions and final 
instructions. All scale and task sheets were assembled in random order. In addition, there 
were five versions of the CIS with items randomized, seven versions of the proximal 
behavioral contributors sheet with items randomized, and five versions of the REI with 
items randomized. Randomization on the computer consisted of a CIS and proximal 
behavioral contributors in random order, followed by the BFI in random order, REI in set 
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order, Milgram and Tenne decision speed in random order, computer, vacation, Hawaii, 
Milgram and Tenne decision tension in random order, demographic information, and then 
in one condition, the FAS in random order. Analyses were conducted using pairwise 
deletion because the risk of biasing the results was minimal given the extremely low 
percentage (0.38%) of missing data (Schafer & Graham, 2002).  
Measures. 
Core indecisiveness scale. A refined 10-item Core Indecisiveness Scale 
(Appendix B) was used that was based largely on the latency and changing decisions 
scales from the final factor analysis in Study 1. The refined CIS scale had three subscales, 
each reflecting one of the three core indecisiveness behaviors: 1) prolonged latency, 2) 
not-deciding, and 3) changing one’s decision after having committed. The prolonged 
latency subscale had four items (e.g., “I am slow to decide”), the not-deciding subscale 
had three items (e.g., “I intend to make a decision, but wait so long that the opportunity to 
decide passes”), and the changing decisions subscale also had 3 items (e.g., “I change my 
mind after I choose something”). The response scale was the same six-point Likert-type 
frequency scale used in Study 1. 
Proximal behavioral contributors. Seven scales measuring the proximal 
behavioral contributors in Figure 1 were used (Appendix C), two of which were 
established scales: Mann’s (Mann , Burnett, Radford, & Ford, 1997) five-item decisional 
procrastination scale—used extensively by Ferrari and colleagues—and six-item buck-
passing scale. The other five scales were created for this study. A five-item impasse scale 
measured getting stuck (e.g., “When trying to make decisions, I get so overwhelmed that 
I feel paralyzed”). The five-item strategic waiting scale measured delaying commitment 
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after one had decided in one’s mind (e.g., “After making a tentative selection, I wait for a 
while before committing to it in case I discover something that might change my mind”). 
The five-item slow processing scale focused on measuring deliberate slowness (e.g., “I 
slowly examine the relevant information in a decision”). Other reasons why processing 
can be slow were not measured by this scale or in this study, such as chronic cognitive 
impairment (e.g., due to alcoholism), permanent cognitive impairment (e.g., due to brain 
damage), and low cognitive ability (e.g., IQ or working memory). The seven-item extra 
processing scale measured the search for more information (e.g., “When making a 
decision I like to collect lots of facts”). Finally, the six-item re-processing scale measured 
the reconsideration of information, principally through checking (e.g., “I triple-check 
everything before making my final commitment”). 
Milgram and Tenne minor decision speed and minor decision tension scales. 
Milgram and Tenne’s (2000) minor decision speed and minor decision tension scales 
(Appendix D) were used to test convergent and divergent validity with the CIS. Both 
scales consist of the same 15 everyday, minor decisions items (e.g., which restaurant to 
go to). Participants completed the speed scale first, and after several interim tasks, 
completed the tension scale. Each scale has its own four-point response scale. The 
response scale for speed was: 1 = “immediately or fairly quickly” to 4 = “after a great 
deal of time.” The response scale for tension is: 1 = “little or no tension” to 4 = “a great 
deal of tension.” Cronbach alphas for the scales in Milgram and Tenne’s two studies were 
α = .60 and .75 for speed, and α = .76 and .80 for tension. Speed and tension were related 
(r = .48).  
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Big Five Inventory. The Big Five Inventory (BFI; John, Donahue, & Kentle, 
1991) is a 44-item measure of the well-established Big Five personality factors: openness 
to experience, conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism 
(Appendix E). The items consist of the stem “I see myself as someone who...” completed 
by short phrases with key adjectives (e.g., “I see myself as someone who is curious about 
many different things”). Participants rate the degree to which they agree with the items 
on a Likert scale (1 = “Disagree strongly” to 5 = “Agree strongly”). Cronbach’s alpha for 
the BFI scales typically range from α = .75 to .90, and average above .80, and three-
month test-retest reliabilities range from α = .80 to .90, with a mean of .85. (John & 
Srivastava, 1999).  
Rational-Experiential Inventory. The Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; 
Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996) measures differences in two thinking styles: 
intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational (Appendix F). The intuitive-experiential 
items measure the tendency to trust one’s intuitions, whereas the analytical-rational 
thinking items—all taken from the Need for Cognition scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982)—
measure one’s enjoyment of complex thinking. Participants are asked to rate how true the 
statements are about them using the following Likert scale: 1 = Definitely False, 2 = 
Mostly False, 3 = Undecided or Equally True and False, 4 = Mostly True, 5 = Definitely 
True. The original REI is 40 items long, but because of space limitations we used the 
shorter 10-item version (i.e., two 5-item scales) used by Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, and 
Heier (1996). The reliability of the two 5-item versions of the intuitive-experiential and 
analytical-rational scales range from α = .72 to .77 and α = .68 to .73, respectively 
(Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Wolfradt, Oubaid, Straube, Bischoff, & 
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Mischo, 1999). Epstein et al. found that the two scales were barely correlated (r = .08, p 
< .01), and so considered them orthogonal. 
Fundamental Attitudes Scale. The FAS (Rassin & Muris, 2005a) contains 15 
statements about controversial socio-political topics, each phrased to make it difficult to 
completely disagree with or endorse it (Appendix G). Participants are asked to indicate 
their agreement with each statement, and can “agree,” “disagree,” or choose “do not 
know,” and the number of “do not know” scores is an indicator of one’s indecisiveness. 
The measure was based on Jackson, Furnham, and Lawty-Jones’s (1999) procedure that 
used the number of “do not know” responses on a personality questionnaire as a measure 
of indecisiveness. Following Rassin and Muris’s procedure, “do not know” responses 
were coded 1, and “agree” or “disagree” responses (i.e., definite responses) were coded 0. 
The response values were summed for the RAS score, where a higher score indicated 
greater indecisiveness. Rassin and Muris found the FAS had a Cronbach’s α = .62 and 
correlated (r = .23) with Frost and Show’s (1993) Indecisiveness Scale. 
Modified Hawaii Task. The Hawaii task (Tversky & Shafir, 1992) was modified 
for this study (Appendix H). The original version consisted of a scenario wherein the 
participant is told she has just finished a difficult qualifying exam, and for a limited time 
can buy a vacation package to Hawaii at an exceptionally low price. Unfortunately, the 
promotion will expire before she will know the result of her exam. The participant is then 
presented with three options: buy, not buy, and pay $5 to extend the promotional price 
long enough to know the results of her exam. The next question participants are asked is 
whether they would go if they knew they had failed, and if they knew they had passed. 
Those who indicated they would go regardless yet chose to pay $5 for pass/fail 
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information that would not affect their answer violated Savage’s (1954) sure thing 
principle. 
Several changes were made in the answer options of the Hawaii task in the 
present study. First, the buy option was specified as “non-refundable” to emphasize the 
irrevocability of the commitment. Second, the third option—to defer the decision for a 
cost—was slightly reworded, and the $5 cost (in 1991-1992 dollars) was adjusted to $10 
(in 2008 dollars) based on a GDP per capita index that estimates relative purchasing 
power (Williamson, 2008). Finally, a fourth option was added that allowed the participant 
to purchase a refundable package for an additional, non-refundable $10 fee. The third and 
fourth options both charged a non-refundable $10 fee, but the former charged it for a 
future option to buy, whereas the latter charged it for the future option to change one’s 
mind. After choosing one of the four options, participants were then asked whether they 
would go if they knew they had passed the exam, and if they would go if they knew they 
had failed the exam (counterbalanced). 
Results 
Multi-dimensionality of the CIS. The 10 CIS items were twice factor analyzed 
using LISREL: The uni-dimensional null hypothesis model was compared to the 
predicted three-factor model. The null hypothesis model had a significant chi-square χ² 
(35, N = 168) = 74.56, p < .01, indicating poor fit, though the fit indices suggested an 
almost acceptable fit: RMSEA = 0.085, NNFI = 0.91, GFI = 0.92. In contrast, the 
predicted three-factor model fit had a non-significant chi-square, indicating good fit χ² 
(32, N = 168) = 42.65, p = .099. The fit indices also indicated good fit (RMSEA = 0.044, 
NNFI = 0.97, GFI = 0.95). The chi-square difference between the null and predicted 
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models was significant (χ²difference (3, N = 168) = 20.92, p < 0.001), signifying that the 
latter was a significantly better fitting model. It is worth noting that Core7 (“I am 
undecided about where I stand on a social issue”) loaded poorly on not-deciding (.22) and 
lowered the not-deciding scale reliability to an unacceptably low level. Although 
removing the Core7 worsened model fit (χ² (24, N = 182) = 39.98, p = .022, RMSEA = 
0.059, NNFI = 0.96, GFI = 0.95), the decrement in fit was not significant (χ²difference (8, N 
= 168) = 2.67, p > .10). Core7 was thus discarded. Table 3 shows the factor correlations, 
sub-scale reliabilities, and sub-scale correlations of the CIS. 
Table 3 
CIS Factor Correlations, Sub-scale Reliabilities, and Sub-scale Correlations in Study 2 
N = 169 Latency Not-Deciding Changing 
Latency (4 items) .79 .56 .62 
Not-Deciding (2 items) .76 .67 .60 
Changing (3 items) .80 .84 .77 
Factor correlations below diagonal; Cronbach’s αs on diagonal; Scale correlations above diagonal 
All correlations significant, p < .01 (two-tailed) 
 
Table 4 shows the factor loadings of the final nine items of the CIS.  
Table 4 




Item Factor Loadings 
When I am in a group that is deciding something, I take longer to 
make decision than do other people. .67   
I need more time than I actually have when I am faced with making a 
choice. .69   
It seems that deciding on the most trivial things takes me a long time. .70   
I am slow to decide. .74   
I miss the deadline for making a relatively straightforward decision.  .66  
I intend to make a decision, but wait so long that the opportunity to 
decide passes.  .76  
I change my mind after I choose something.   .78 
I try to undo the effects of a previous decision I made.   .68 
I have a change of heart about a commitment I made.    .70 
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Factor analysis of the proximal behavioral contributors. A confirmatory factor 
analysis of the 39 items of the seven Proximal Behavioral Contributor scales was 
conducted. Chi-square was not significant, and although the RMSEA suggested adequate 
fit, the other two indices indicated poor fit: χ² (681, N = 168) = 1220.10, p < .01, RMSEA 
= 0.063, NNFI = 0.76, GFI = 0.74. Based on the modification indices, three changes were 
made. First, one slow deciding (S) item (S4: “I am not fast at comparing my 
alternatives”) was eliminated. It had a low, though significant factor loading (.17, p < 
.05), but the variance explained by the factor was a mere 3%. The modification index 
suggested that it would have loaded equally well or better on decisional procrastination, 
buck-passing, strategic waiting, or impasse, meaning that S4 does not discriminate among 
them.  
One possible explanation is that of the five slow processing items, S4 was the 
most likely to be interpreted as unintentional slowness. In other words, it was interpreted 
to mean that the decider was not deliberately slowing herself to decide. If so, this could 
explain why S4 is associated with difficulty deciding, and consequently with impasse and 
avoidant decision behaviors.  
Second, the strategic waiting (SW) items did not form a sufficiently coherent 
factor, and so all SW items were eliminated. Although SW1 (“After making a tentative 
selection, I wait for a while before committing to it in case I discover something that may 
change my mind”) and SW4 (“When I know exactly what I want and there is pressure to 
decide, I still do not make my final decision until I have to”) loaded highly on the 
strategic waiting factor (.61 and .64 respectively), and correlated with each other (r = 
.37), the three remaining SW items had relatively weaker loadings (SW2 = .38, SW3 = 
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.32, and SW5 = .22, respectively). The variance explained by the SW factor for the three 
weaker items was 14%, 10%, and 5%. SW2 (“As soon as I decide something, I 
immediately go with that decision” reverse-scored) and SW3 (“Once I make a choice, I 
sleep on it before actually going through with it”) were most highly correlated with each 
other (r = .37), and no correlational pattern with any of the other proximal behavioral 
contributors items was evident. SW5 (“I make a decision without much delay, but then 
wait for the right moment before actually committing to that decision”) had low 
correlations with all items, though slightly higher ones with decisional procrastination 
(DP) items.  
Ironically, the wording of SW5 arguably best captures the sense of strategic 
waiting as having made a tentative decision and purposefully delaying commitment: Note 
that although SW5 implies that the “right moment” is not always right away, it does not 
imply that there is always (much of) a wait. Because the reliability of the five-item 
strategic waiting scale was low (α = .55), and could only be marginally improved when 
SW5 was eliminated (α = .59), strategic waiting was not used in subsequent analyses. 
Still, there seems to be some coherence to the two SW pairs that merits future study.  
Perhaps the most significant change involved regrouping the remaining slow 
processing items (S), extensive processing (E) and re-processing (R) items because 
several items had cross-loadings that were higher than the predicted main loadings. A re-
examination of the correlation matrix revealed a weak, positive manifold with many 
items that had strong correlations with items from conceptually distinct constructs. As 
such, these items did not discriminate well between the hypothesized constructs. 
Nevertheless, two factors emerged that were based partly on behaviors, as predicted, but 
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also partly on the severity of the behaviors. More specifically, the first factor consisted 
mostly of extensive and re-processing items that were more extreme, many of which had 
a distinct obsessive-compulsive and perfectionistic quality. The factor was called 
concerned processing, and included items tapping excessive information gathering (e.g., 
“When I am presented with two good options, I look for a third option”), checking 
behavior (e.g., “I triple-check things before deciding”), and an item suggestive of 
bolstering (e.g., “I re-examine the benefits of an option until I am convinced it is better 
than other options”). 
In contrast, the second factor contained slow and extensive processing items that 
suggested thorough and thoughtful deliberation, and so was called prudent processing. 
Items from this factor included intentionally slowing the deliberation process (e.g., “I 
slowly examine the relevant information in a decision”), searching for more information 
(e.g., “I research my options before deciding”), and consideration of contingencies, (e.g., 
“When I plan something, I make sure I have a backup”).  
A confirmatory factor analysis on the second model was run, and it showed 
reasonably good fit, χ² (367, N = 168) = 612.84, p < .01, RMSEA = 0.058, NNFI = 0.95, 
GFI = 0.81. The 29-item, five factor model had a significantly better fit than the predicted 
39-item seven factor model: χ²difference (314, N = 168) = 607.26, p < .01. Table 5 shows 
the factor loadings of the 29 items on the five proximal behavioral contributors. 
Table 6 shows the factor correlations, scale reliabilities, and scale correlations of 








Factor Structure and Loadings of the Proximal Behavioral Contributor Scales in Study 2 
 DP B I CP PP 
Item  Factor Loadings 
I waste a lot of time on trivial matters before getting to the final decision. .61     
When I have to make a decision, I wait a long time before starting to think 
about it. .65     
I delay making a decision until it is too late. .65     
I put off making a decision. .75     
I avoid thinking about a decision even though I know I will eventually have 
to make it. .66     
Once I know I have a choice to make, I do not put off thinking about it. (R) .50     
I leave a decision to someone else.  .84    
I avoid taking the responsibility to make a decision.  .58    
If a decision can be made by me or by another person, I let the other person 
make it.  .70    
I let someone who is better informed decide for me.  .68    
I try to get out of having to make a decision.  .78    
I ask others to decide for me when I know that I should be deciding.  .65    
I get stuck for a while when making a decision.   .66   
When I am thinking about what to choose, there reaches a point where I 
don’t know how to proceed.   .62   
I end up thinking in circles when deciding something.   .71   
When trying to make a decision, I get so overwhelmed that I feel paralyzed.   .61   
Even after I think that I have made up my mind about something, I have 
trouble getting myself to “bite the bullet” and actually commit to that 
decision. 
  .74   
I try to consider several factors when making a simple decision.    .70  
When I am presented with two good options, I look for a third option.    .46  
I triple-check things before deciding.    .66  
I re-examine the benefits of an option until I am convinced it is better than 
other options.    .66  
I reconsider my alternatives one last time just before I go through with a 
decision.    .58  
When faced with a decision, I consider each fact one at a time.     .69 
I slowly examine the relevant information in a decision.     .51 
I take my time thinking about my choices before going ahead with one of 
them.     .62 
When faced with a choice, I make the effort to look for more information 
than is normally given.     .62 
I research my options before deciding.     .63 
When I plan something, I make sure I have a backup.     .52 
I go over the relevant information as often as necessary for the best option 
to emerge.     .55 
DP = Decisional procrastination, B = Buck-passing, I = Impasse, CP = Concerned processing,  




Table 6  
Factor Correlations, Scale Reliabilities, and Scale Correlations for the Proximal 
Behavioral Contributor Scales in Study 2 
N = 169 DP B I CP PP 
Decisional procrastination (6 items) .80 .57 .69 .34 .05 
Buck-passing (6 items) .69 .85 .57 .30 .04 
Impasse (5 items) .85 .69 .80 .49 .22 
Concerned processing (5 items) .41 .35 .61 .75 .60 
Prudent processing (7 items) .05 .02 .29 .77 .79 
DP = Decisional procrastination, B = Buck-passing, I = Impasse, CP = Concerned processing,  
PP =  Prudent processing. 
Factor correlations on lower diagonal; Cronbach’s αs on diagonal; Scale correlations on upper diagonal 
All correlations in bold significant, p < .01 (two-tailed) 
 
Relationships among predictor variables. Table 7 shows the means, standard 
deviations, scale reliabilities, and correlations for the BFI, Proximal Behavioral 
Contributors, and the CIS subscales. Six of the eight correlations among BFI factors in 
the present study were in the same direction and of similar magnitude as the six reported 
by John and Srivastava (1999). The two additional ones were a very modest correlation 
between openness and agreeableness (r = .16) that may be an anomaly, and a small 
correlation between extraversion and agreeableness (r = .27). The latter might be 
explained by the fact that adjectives of warmth used in the BFI were found to cross-load 
on agreeableness and extraversion (John, 1990), though ultimately included in the 
agreeableness factor. 
Decisional procrastination and buck-passing have not been directly correlated to 
the BFI. Of the two, decisional procrastination has been studied far more often and has 
been associated with the low perseverance subscale of the BFQ (Di Fabio, 2006), low 
competitiveness (Effert & Ferrari, 1989), high neuroticism (Di Fabio, 2006), and with 
high scores on behaviors strongly associated with neuroticism, such as low self-esteem 
(Di Fabio, 2006; Effert & Ferrari, 1989), public self-consciousness, and social anxiety 
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(Ferrari, 1991). The correlations in the present study between decisional procrastination 
and conscientiousness (r = -.42), agreeableness (r = -.17), and neuroticism (r = .31) are 
consistent with these findings.  
Table 7 
Means, Standard Deviations, Scale Reliabilities and Correlations for the BFI, Proximal 
Behavioral Contributors, and the CIS 
      BFI   Proximal Behavioral Contributors  CIS  
 M SD O C E A N DP B I PP CP L ND ∆ 
O 3.63 .62 .78             
C 3.48 .66 .14 .86            
E 3.44 .74 .34 .29 .87           
A 3.84 .62 .16 .33 .27 .80          
N 2.67 .79 .05 -.20 -.33 -.42 .86         
DP 3.00 .75 .02 -.42 -.12 -.17 .31 .80        
B 2.80 .84 -.09 -.32 -.18 -.18 .36 .57 .85       
I 2.84 .80 .02 -.24 -.10 -.14 .38 .69 .57 .80      
PP 3.69 .69 .08 .09 .01 -.03 -.03 .05 .04 .22 .79     
CP 3.41 .79 .07 -.02 -.03 -.15 .20 .34 .30 .49 .60 .75    
L 3.01 .86 .08 -.29 -.12 -.03 .42 .46 .44 .63 .19 .38 .79   
ND 2.43 .69 .02 -.46 -.20 -.24 .32 .38 .32 .45 .12 .21 .56 .67  
∆ 2.89 .80 .06 -.23 -.07 -.24 .40 .38 .30 .51 .11 .26 .62 .60 .77 
O = Openness, C = Conscientiousness, E = Extroversion, A = Agreeableness, N = Neuroticism, 
DP = Decisional procrastination, B = Buck-passing, I = Impasse, CP = Concerned processing,  
PP =  Prudent processing, L = Latency, ND = Not-Deciding, ∆ = Changing 
Cronbach’s αs are on the diagonal 
All correlations in bold significant, p < .05 (two-tailed), and in bold italic significant, p < .10 (two-tailed) 
 
Impasse was in line with the prediction that it would be positively correlated with 
neuroticism and negatively with conscientiousness. The reasoning behind the predictions 
was not tested in the study, namely that neuroticism contributes to the conditions (e.g., 
perfectionistic standards) that are more likely to lead one to impasse, and low 
conscientiousness contributes to keeping one from pulling out of impasse. 
The distinction between slow, extensive and re-processing was not confirmed in 
the factor analysis. However, the items from these three predicted constructs did form 
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two related factors: concerned processing and prudent processing. Concerned processing 
(i.e., obsessive-compulsive and perfectionistic re-processing and extensive processing of 
information) was positively correlated with neuroticism and negatively with 
conscientiousness, whereas the opposite was true for prudent processing (i.e., thorough 
and thoughtful deliberation). Although only one of the four correlations was significant, 
the trends were consistent with the neurotic vs. vigilant indecisiveness distinction. The 
different correlational pattern further supported the distinctiveness of concerned and 
prudent processing, and was consistent with their characterization as obsessive and 
perfectionistic thinking on the one hand, and thoughtful deliberation on the other. 
Multi-dimensionality and multi-determination. The factor analysis already lent 
important support to the multi-dimensionality hypothesis. Additional support piggybacks 
on the evidence for multi-determination. The correlation matrix shows that each of the 
three core indecisive behaviors is related to multiple contributors. This finding alone 
supports only the multi-determination hypothesis. That each core indecisive behavior has 
a unique pattern of relations with contributors, however, supports the multi-
dimensionality hypothesis. As predicted, latency has its root in low conscientiousness (r 
= -.29, p < .01), high neuroticism (r = .42, p < .01), and low extroversion (r = -.12, p > 
.10). Moreover, latency was related to all five proximal behavioral contributors, including 
the only Core Indecisive Behavior to be significantly related to prudent processing (r = 
.19, p < .05). The strongest contributor to latency was impasse (r = .63, p < .01). 
Not-deciding was related to all distal contributors except openness. As predicted, 
not-deciding was most strongly rooted in low conscientiousness (r = -.46, p < .01), which 
is consistent with task procrastination (e.g., Milgram & Tenne, 2000). Not-deciding is 
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less strongly related to the proximal behavioral predictors than is latency, and is not 
significantly related to prudent processing. Finally, changing decisions was related to low 
conscientiousness (r = -.23, p < .01), low agreeableness (r = -.24, p < .01) and high 
neuroticism (r = .40, p < .01). 
Path analysis of indecisiveness. Path analysis is an extension of regression, and 
is used to test various models of relationships among variables. The relationships are 
assumed to be linear, additive, and causal, and the variables are either exogenous, 
endogenous, or both endogenous and exogenous. The models of relationships differ 
principally in their configurations of the endogeneity and exogeneity of the variables (see 
Land, 1966). A three-level path analysis was conducted using LISREL with distal 
contributors as exogenous variables, proximal behavioral contributors as mediating 
variables, and the three core behaviors as endogenous variables. Distal predictor variables 
were allowed to correlate with one another, as were their residuals. Proximal contributing 
behaviors were also allowed to correlate with one another, as were their residuals. 
The null model was a fully mediated model that was not expected to have good fit 
for the simple reason that the proximal behavioral contributors were never presumed to 
be exhaustive mediators of the effect of personality on indecisive behaviors. The null 
model did show poor fit, χ²full mediation (15, N = 168) = 69.04, p < .01, RMSEA = 0.14, 
NNFI = 0.80, GFI = 0.95). Based on the predictions, Model 2 was modified to allow five 
direct effects between distal contributors and core indecisiveness behaviors. The five 
direct effects were between low conscientiousness and not-deciding, high agreeableness 
and slow deciding, and high neuroticism and all three core indecisive behaviors. In 
addition, examination of the beta weights in the null model indicated that of the proximal 
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behavioral contributors, impasse was accounting for virtually all of the variance. For this 
reason, two versions of Model 2 were run, one with impasse (Model 2a), and one without 
(Model 2b).  
Two out of three fit indices showed that Model 2a (Figure 3) had adequate fit, 
though chi-square was significant: χ²2a (10, N = 168) = 20.21, p = 0.027, RMSEA = 
0.075, NNFI = 0.90, GFI = 0.98). Model 2b (Figure 4), however, had good fit and chi-
square was non-significant: χ²2b (10, N = 168) = 15.09, p = 0.13, RMSEA = 0.053, NNFI 
= 0.94, GFI = 0.99). Model 2b had significantly better fit than model 2a, χ²∆ (0, N = 168) 
= 5.12, p < 0.01. Figure 3 shows the path model with line thickness representing relative 
Beta weight, and a table of beta weights for Model 2a. Figure 4 shows the path model and 
a table of beta weights for Model 2b. 
Validity of the CIS. The validity of the CIS was tested using the REI, Milgram 
and Tenne’s speed and tension scales, the FAS, and the Hawaii task. 
Rational-Experiential Inventory. The 10-item version of the REI was submitted 
to a principal components analysis with Varimax rotation and pairwise deletion. Four 
components were extracted with two Eigenvalues greater than one (1.50, 1.06). The 
elbow in the scree plot suggested four components: one comprised of all the intuitive 
items, and the other three composed of analytic items. It is possible that the analytic items 
did not converge onto one factor as a result of artifact of the valence of item wording. 
Although the reliability of the intuitive scale (M = 3.01, SD = .45) was good (α = .81) that 
of the analytic scale was low (α = .60). One item from the analytic scale (M = 2.59, SD = 












To compare intuitive and analytic styles, median splits on both scores (medians = 
3.0 and 2.5, respectively) were combined into four groups: Low intuitive/Low analytic (n 
= 59, 34.9 %), Low intuitive/High analytic (n = 48, 28.8%), High intuitive/Low analytic 
(n = 35, 20.7%), and High intuitive/High analytic (n = 26, 15.4%). Table 8 shows the 
means and standard deviations for the three core indecisive behaviors for each REI group. 
Three one-way ANOVAs were conducted to test differences in scores on each of 
the core indecisive behaviors across the four REI groups. Each ANOVA contrasted the 
low intuitive/high analytic group (i/A) with the high intuitive/low analytic group (I/a). 
The i/A group was predicted to have higher scores across all core indecisive behaviors 
than would the I/a group. In the latency ANOVA, Levene’s statistic was not significant 
F(3,164) 1.67, p = .175, so equality of variance was assumed and the degrees of freedom 
did not need to be adjusted to compensate (Levene, 1960). The ANOVA was not 
significant, F(3,164) = 0.69, p = .56, nor was the contrast between the i/A and I/a groups, 
t(164) = 1.04, p < .30, indicating that individuals with a predominantly analytic thinking 
style do not take significantly longer to decide than do individuals with a predominantly 
intuitive thinking style. 
Table 8  
Rational-Experiential Inventory Median Split Group Means and Standard Deviations on 
the Core Indecisiveness Behaviors 
NOTE: REI scale response: 1 = Definitely False to 5 = Definitely True. 
  Latency Not-Deciding Changing 
 n M SD M SD M SD 
Low Intuition/Low Analytic 59 2.93 .71 2.41 .60 2.84 .62 
Low Intuition/High Analytic 48 3.12 .94 2.61 .63 2.99 .85 
High Intuition/Low Analytic 35 2.94 .85 2.11 .46 2.65 .55 
High Intuition/High Analytic 26 3.14 1.05 2.59 1.04 3.12 1.22 
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In the not-deciding ANOVA, Levene’s statistic was significant F(3,164) 4.80, p = 
.003, so equality of variance was not assumed and degrees of freedom were adjusted to 
compensate (Levene, 1960). The ANOVA was significant, F(3,164) = 4.24, p = .006, as 
was the contrast between the i/A and I/a groups (with df adjusted for not assuming 
equality of variance) t(80.98) = -4.15, p < 0.001. The contrast result indicates that 
individuals with a predominantly analytic thinking style report taking significantly longer 
to decide than do individuals with a predominantly intuitive thinking style. 
Finally, in the changing decisions ANOVA, Levene’s statistic was significant 
F(3,164) 6.63, p < .001, so equality of variance was again not assumed. The ANOVA 
was marginally significant, F(3,164) = 2.46, p = .065, and the contrast between the i/A 
and I/a groups was significant (with df adjusted for not assuming equality of variance) 
t(79.94) = -2.20, p = .031.  This again indicates that individuals with a predominantly 
analytic thinking style report taking significantly longer to decide than do individuals 
with a predominantly intuitive thinking style. 
Decision speed and tension. Convergent validity was also tested using Milgram 
and Tenne’s (2000) speed and tension on minor decisions. The speed scale was subjected 
to a principal components analysis with Varimax rotation and pairwise deletion. Five 
components were extracted, but only two had Eigenvalues greater than one (2.51 and 
1.04). The elbow in the scree plot suggested one component. The two items that did not 
load well on the principal factor were decisions about what to wear in the morning and 
whether to leave a tip for a bad waiter. Because the scree plot suggested one component 
and to keep the scale comparable to Milgram and Tenne’s findings, all items were 
retained and compiled into a15-item decision speed scale (M = 2.16, SD = .40), which 
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had a reliability of α = .76. The tension items were also subjected to the same analysis. 
Four components were extracted, but only one had an Eigenvalue greater than one (1.71), 
and the elbow in the scree plot again suggested one component. The 15 items were 
compiled into a decision tension scale (M = 1.61, SD = .33), which had a reliability of α = 
.80. The correlation between the decision speed and tension scales was r = .50, p < .01. 
The scale reliabilities and correlation are remarkably close to those reported by Milgram 
and Tenne. 
Following Milgram and Tenne’s (2000) procedure, median splits of speed 
(swift/slow) and tension (tense/relaxed) were combined into four groups: swift-relaxed (n 
= 62, 36.7%), slow-relaxed (n = 29, 17.1%), swift-tense (n = 31, 18.3%), and slow-tense 
(n = 47, 27.8%). Although the predominance of swift-relaxed and slow-tense groups is 
consistent with the pattern found by Milgram and Tenne, the proportion of slow-tense to 
slow-relaxed in the present sample was less than 2:1 and not the 3:1 ratio that Milgram 
and Tenne found. Nevertheless, this still confirms that the majority of indecisives are 
tense as opposed to relaxed. Table 9 shows the means and standard deviations for the 
three core indecisive behaviors for each Milgram group. 
Table 9  
Milgram Group Means and Standard Deviations on the Core Indecisiveness Behaviors 
  Latency Not-Deciding Changing 
 n M SD M SD M SD 
Fast-relaxed 62 2.64 .63 2.02 .59 2.62 .56 
Slow-relaxed 29 3.01 .90 2.22 .65 2.74 .61 
Fast-tense 31 2.95 .66 2.34 .70 2.94 .68 
Slow-tense 46 3.56 .97 2.71 1.18 3.31 1.06 
CIS Scale response: 1 = Never, 2 = Seldom, 3 = Sometimes, 4 = Often, 5 = Very Often, and 6 = Always. 
Three stepwise regressions were conducted, each with a core indecisiveness 
behavior regressed on decision speed and tension. In the first regression, decision tension 
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significantly predicted latency scores, ß = .34, t(165) = 4.39, p < .01, as did decision 
speed ß = .26, t(165) = 3.40, p < .01. Decision tension also explained a significant 
proportion of variance in latency scores, R2 = .22, F(1, 167) = 46.25, p < .01, as did 
decision speed, R2 = .27, F(2, 166) = 30.37, p < .01. In the second regression, decision 
tension significantly predicted not-deciding scores, ß = .37, t(166) = 5.06, p < .01, though 
decision speed did not ß = .09, t(165) = 1.03, p = .31. Decision tension also explained a 
significant proportion of variance in latency scores, R2 = .13, F(1, 167) = 25.59, p < .01.  
In the third regression, decision tension significantly predicted changing decisions 
scores, ß = .45, t(166) = 6.56, p < .01, though decision speed did not ß = .08, t(165) = 
1.05, p = .30. Decision tension also explained a significant proportion of variance in 
changing decisions scores, R2 = .21, F(1, 167) = 42.99, p < .01.  
Three one-way ANOVAs were conducted to test differences in scores on each of 
the core indecisive behaviors across the four Milgram and Tenne (2000) groups. Each 
ANOVA had one contrast. In the latency ANOVA, fast deciders (made up of fast-tense 
and fast-relaxed deciders) were predicted to have significantly lower CIS latency 
subscale scores than were slow deciders (made up of slow-tense and slow-relaxed 
deciders). Levene’s statistic was significant F(3,165) 4.12, p = .008, so equality of 
variance was not assumed. The ANOVA was significant, F(3,165) = 12.27, p < .001, as 
was the contrast between fast and slow groups (with df adjusted for not assuming equality 
of variance) t(106.30) = 3.75, p < .001. The contrast result indicates that slow deciders 




In the not-deciding ANOVA, tense deciders (made up of slow-tense and fast-tense 
deciders) were predicted to have significantly higher CIS not-deciding sub-scale scores 
than were relaxed deciders (made up of slow-relaxed and fast-relaxed deciders). Levene’s 
statistic was significant F(3,165) 7.68, p < .001, so equality of variance was again not 
assumed. The ANOVA was significant, F(3,165) = 6.53, p < .001, as was the contrast 
between tense and relaxed groups (with df adjusted for not assuming equality of variance) 
t(121.11) = 3.06, p = 0.002. The contrast result confirmed that tense deciders reported 
not-deciding significantly more often than did relaxed deciders.  
Finally, in the changing decisions ANOVA, tense deciders were predicted to have 
significantly higher CIS changing decisions scores than were relaxed deciders. Levene’s 
statistic was significant F(3,165) 5.91, p < .001, so equality of variance was again not 
assumed. The ANOVA was significant, F(3,165) = 8.76, p < .001, as was the contrast 
between tense and relaxed groups (with df adjusted for not assuming equality of variance) 
t(122.90) = 3.70, p < .001.  The contrast result confirmed that tense deciders reported 
changing their decisions significantly more often than did relaxed deciders. 
Fundamental Attitudes Scale. The FAS had a reverse-J shaped distribution, with 
a mean of 3.03, median of 3.00, and mode of 0 (n = 14, 18.9% of respondents). The FAS 
had acceptable reliability (Cronbach’s α = .74). As predicted, the FAS was correlated 
with not-deciding r(74) = .19, p = .101, but also with latency r(74) = .20, p = .086, and 
changing decisions r(74) = .19, p = .108. The correlations were all in the expected 
direction, though not significant at the .05 level. Given the expected correlation of .20 to 
.25 based on Rassin and Muris’ (2005a) findings, the current sample size (n = 74) lacked 
sufficient power for the aforementioned correlations to reach significance. Interestingly, 
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the FAS was significantly correlated r(74) = .23, p = .049 with item Core7 (“I am 
undecided about where I stand on a social issue”), which had been removed from the not-
deciding sub-scale. 
Hawaii Task. A majority (n = 92, 54.8%) of participants indicated that they 
would go on the Hawaii vacation regardless of whether they passed or failed, whereas 
rest said it would depend on if they passed or failed (two groups compiled; n = 70), or 
would not go (n = 6). Of those who claimed they would go regardless of their exam 
outcome, a small number indicated that they would not buy the vacation package (n = 2), 
just over 20% (n = 19) said they would buy the non-refundable package, over half said 
they would pay the $10 non-refundable premium to buy the refundable package (n = 49), 
and just under 24% (n = 22), would pay $10 to have the option to buy the package for the 
same price once they knew their exam scores. 
As predicted, CIS not-deciding sub-scale scores for the buy group (M = 2.09, SD 
= .54) were lower than those of the refundable buy group (M = 2.37, SD = .67) and option 
to buy group (M = 2.50, SD = .70). A Kruskal-Wallis one-way ANOVA was conducted 
on not-deciding with one contrast: non-refundable buy vs. refundable buy and option to 
buy grouped (i.e., -2, 1, 1). The ANOVA was marginally significant, F(3,165) = 2.37, p = 
.072. Levene’s statistic was not significant, F(3, 165) 0.74, p = .53, indicating equality of 
variances could be assumed. The contrast was marginally significant t(165) 1.95, p = 
.053. The result of the contrast indicates that individuals who bought the non-refundable 
vacation package reported significantly less not-deciding than did those who either 




In line with expectations, the CIS fit significantly better as a three-factor model 
than it did as a unidimensional model, which supports the multi-dimensionality 
hypothesis. The three factors were all moderately correlated with each other, which lends 
empirical support to the conceptual claim that the three core behaviors are distinct 
dimensions of the same construct. The multi-dimensionality hypothesis is further 
supported by the fact that the distal and proximal contributors did not load onto each core 
behavior to the same degree, as illustrated in the path model. Finally, paying for reason-
based decisions on the Hawaii task was only predicted by not-deciding scores, which 
supports the discriminant validity of the three sub-scales, and as such supports the multi-
dimensionality hypothesis. 
That each core indecisiveness behavior had multiple predictors, both in terms of 
zero-order correlations and in the path model where shared variance was accounted for, 
lends strong support to the multi-determination hypothesis. 
The CIS was validated in four ways. First, individuals who had strong analytic 
and weak intuitive processing tendencies differed significantly from those with strong 
intuitive and weak analytic processing tendencies on two of three core indecisiveness 
behaviors. Specifically, those with strong analytic tendencies were more likely to not 
decide and more likely to change their decisions. It is unclear why they did not have 
significantly higher decision latencies. Second, the only core indecisive behavior 
predicted by Milgram and Tenne’s (2000) decision speed when decision tension was 
controlled for was latency. This supports both the convergent and discriminant validity of 
the latency sub-scale. Third, paying for reason-based decisions on the Hawaii task was 
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only related to not-deciding scores, which supports the convergent and discriminant 
validity of the not-deciding sub-scale.  
Finally, the FAS provided some additional convergent validity for the CIS insofar 
as the FAS is a behavioral measure of not-deciding, at least at the moment participants 
were asked (i.e., they may eventually decide about the social dilemmas). Although the 
FAS did not discriminate between the CIS subscales as was predicted, it did correlate 
most highly with an item that tapped decidedness on social issues. One account for why 
the FAS may have been equally related to all three core indecisive behaviors is the 
wording of FAS items. Although the substance of most of the FAS items was likely 
familiar to most participants, the actually wording on the items was intentionally written 
to make them difficult to completely endorse or reject (Rassin & Muris, 2005a). Thus, 
even if participants had positions on the topics themselves (e.g., being against suicide), 
the novel, sometimes extreme, and somewhat contentious wording of the items (e.g., 
“Suicide is never a rational option” my italics) might have required reconsideration in 
some cases. 
Limitations. There were important conceptual, operational, and methodological 
limitations in this study. First, at least three conceptual issues were identified. Although 
some of the strategic waiting items were moderately correlated, they did not form a 
coherent factor. It appears that strategic waiting may be more multifaceted than 
previously thought. There are several possible ways to distinguish different kinds of 
strategic waiting. For example, there may exist a psychological difference between 
waiting before commitment as opposed to waiting before enactment of a commitment. In 
the first case, the commitment itself remains contingent (e.g., watchfully waiting to see if 
76 
 
a tumor becomes malignant), in the second case the only contingency is the condition 
under which the enactment occurs (e.g., a SWAT sniper cleared to shoot a hostage-taker 
at the first opportune moment).  
Strategic waiting is related to “watchful waiting” in medical contexts, a process in 
which treatment is withheld and symptoms are monitored to see if they change. In 
addition, even strategic waiting on commitment may admit a distinction between waiting 
without specific expectations (e.g., in case anything changes) on the one hand, and 
waiting for a specific piece of expected information (e.g., the outcome of a test or a 
beneficiary’s opinion). Waiting without specific expectations of decision-relevant 
information may be a sign of caution or lack of confidence (i.e., to give oneself a chance 
to rethink by “sleeping on it”), and distinguishing the two may prove difficult.  
The core indecisiveness behavior of not-deciding may also have been 
operationalized too narrowly. Not-deciding was intended to mean not making any 
commitment when the need to make a commitment is acknowledged. This was meant to 
include missing opportunities and deadlines one was aware of, not making a decision 
when there is no deadline, and refusing to decide. Actively deciding not to decide is an 
interesting case, as it can indicate status quo bias (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988) or 
strategic abstention (formal or otherwise). That said, if either is chronic then the need to 
decide is not being fulfilled. Thus, consistently deciding not to decide is a form of 
indecisiveness.   
Finally, the fact that slow, extensive, and re-processing did not result in three 
factors was somewhat surprising, as similar constructs have been used in various 
literatures. Slow processing was operationalized as careful and meticulous processing 
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(e.g., S1 “When faced with a decision, I consider each fact one at a time”). Extensive 
processing was operationalized as extensive search (e.g., “When I am presented with two 
good options, I look for a third option”) and consideration (e.g., “I try to consider several 
factors when making a simple decision”). Janis and Mann’s (1977) vigilance scale 
includes similar items, including ones that measure slow processing (e.g., “I take a lot of 
care before choosing”) and extensive processing in both the search (e.g., “When making 
decisions I like to collect a lot of information”) and consideration (e.g., “I try to find out 
the disadvantages of all alternatives”) senses. The logic behind the generation of two 
scales was that slow (i.e., careful) and extensive processing are conceptually distinct. 
Finally, re-processing was operationalized as checking behavior (e.g., “I triple-check 
things before deciding”), a construct that is measured by such instruments as the checking 
subscale of the Maudsley Obsessive Compulsive Inventory (MOCI; Rachman & 
Hodgson, 1980).  
The two-factor solution that did emerge, namely prudent processing and 
concerned processing, offered more empirical support for the distinction between 
neurotic and vigilant indecisiveness. It also furthered our understanding of the principles 
on which these behaviors tend to group factor analytically, which in this case was not an 
unreasonable proxy for co-occurrence. In Study 1 provided evidence that behaviors 
related to indecisiveness tended to form factors around the type of behavior, rather than 
when in the decision episode the behaviors occurred. Study 2 suggested, however, that 
behaviors were not related simply because of superficial similarity (e.g., all checking 
behavior), but rather because of shared underlying drivers. Shared underlying drivers 
help account for why certain qualitatively distinct behaviors loaded together, such as 
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slowly examining information and planning contingencies both loading on prudent 
processing. Shared underlying drivers also help explain why quantitatively different 
behaviors loaded differently, such as triple-checking loading on concerned processing, 
but double-checking loading on both factors (and consequently being discarded). 
Distal Contributors. Although measuring the distal contributors using the Big 
Five personality structure at the domain level (i.e., openness to experience, 
conscientiousness, extroversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism) offered an initial sense 
of the underpinnings of indecisiveness mechanisms, it fell short in two ways.  
First, it failed to consider differences in facet-level relations. Each domain is 
composed of several distinct components called facets, but the exact number and nature 
of the facets that make up a given personality domain depends on the measure. At a 
theoretical level, the facets are narrowly defined constructs, whereas domains are clusters 
of related facets. Conscientiousness in the HEXACO measure of personality (Ashton & 
Lee, 2007, 2008, 2009) for example, has four facets: diligence, organization, 
perfectionism, and prudence. Facets within domains may predict dependent variables to 
different degrees (or not at all) and in different directions. Using the example of the facets 
of conscientiousness, high perfectionism and low diligence might both be predicted to 
drive prolonged latency. This means that one consequence of using a domain-level 
measure is that it can reduce or mask its facet-level relations to the dependent variables.  
Second, facet composition of the clusters themselves varies from measure to 
measure, which, in turn, can make domain-level interpretations harder to translate from 
measure to measure. Differences in the aggregation of facets in the five factor model and 
the Big Five are a case in point (John & Srivastava, 1999), as is that between the Big Five 
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and the six-factor HEXACO model (Ashton & Lee, 2007). In the end, the advantage of 
using facet-level predictors over domain-level predictors is that facet-level predictors 
offer conceptually clearer and more meaningful mechanisms to test and compare across 
measures. 
Sample. The undergraduate convenience sample was also a limitation for a 
number of reasons. First, one cannot assume that undergraduates are representative of the 
broader population. In addition, the motivation to participate in the study was course 
credit. Because the study was done online and at home, some participants may have seen 
this as an opportunity to quickly get course credit without much effort. The lack of 
experimenter presence may have reduced some participants’ sense of accountability 
(Birnbaum, 2004), which could explain some of the unrealistically fast completion times. 
Rushing though a study because one lacks the motivation to answer questions carefully 
creates a form of noise in the data. This noise was corrected for to some extent by 
excluding from the analysis the roughly 7% of participants who rushed through the study. 
In contrast, those who took the paper-and-pencil versions were not timed because they 






Chapter 5: Study 3—Mechanisms of Indecisiveness 
Aims 
There were four principal aims in Study 3. The first three were to test the multi-
dimensionality, multi-determination, and distinct mechanisms hypotheses. The fourth aim 
was to further validate the CIS. This was done using a status quo task, an optimistic bias 
task, and a decision change task designed for this study. In addition, self-reported scores 
on the CIS were compared with peer ratings to address common method variance. 
To better achieve these aims, Study 3 also addressed two of the shortcomings of 
Study 2. First, a larger and demographically more diverse sample was used. Second, 
more specific distal contributors were used, by measuring personality traits at the facet-
level, and by using a measure based on the six-factor HEXACO model of personality 
rather than on the more established Big-Five model.  
The HEXACO is a six-dimensional model of personality that is an alternative to 
the Big Five model of personality (Ashton & Lee, 2007, 2008, 2009). Unlike the Big Five 
model, which bases its personality structures on lexical studies in English, the HEXACO 
is based on the six factors that consistently emerge from lexical studies of personality in 
various languages (Ashton et al., 2004), including re-analyses of the original lexical 
studies in English on which the five-factor model was based (Ashton, Lee, & Goldberg, 
2004). Consequently, the HEXACO has been shown to have both greater explanatory 
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power by accounting for a wider range of behaviors (e.g., altruism), and greater cross-
cultural validity (Ashford & Lee, 2007; Ashton, Lee, & Goldberg, 2004). 
There is considerable overlap between the HEXACO dimensions and those of the 
NEO-FFI (Costa & McCrae, 1992), a popular Big Five measure. Three of the dimensions 
are highly correlated—openness to experience, conscientiousness, and extraversion. The 
HEXACO differs from the NEO-FFI in whether certain facets load on agreeableness or 
neuroticism/emotionality (e.g., anger, toughness), as well as in its inclusion of a sixth 
dimension, Humility-Honesty. The correlation between the two agreeableness scales is 
moderate, as is that between the NEO-FFI’s neuroticism and the HEXACO emotionality 
scales. The Humility-Honesty dimension is moderately related to agreeableness, and has 
a modest correlation with conscientiousness.  
Each of the HEXACO’s six dimensions has four facets. Honesty-Humility is 
composed of items measuring sincerity, fairness, greed-avoidance, and modesty. 
Emotionality is composed items tapping fearfulness (i.e., fear of physical harm), 
sentimentality (i.e., strong emotional bonds and empathy), dependence, and anxiety (i.e., 
worry). Extraversion consists of social boldness, social self-esteem, liveliness (i.e., 
optimism and energy), and sociability. Agreeableness is made up of gentleness, 
flexibility, forgiveness, and patience. Conscientiousness includes perfectionism, 
prudence, organization, and diligence (i.e., work ethic). Openness to experience consists 
of creativity, unconventionality, aesthetic appreciation, and inquisitiveness.  
Predicted Contributors and Mechanisms 
A total of 10 mechanisms were hypothesized to contribute to one or more of the 
core indecisiveness behaviors. The mechanisms were based largely on those implied in 
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the various literatures, but also included additional plausible mechanisms. Some of these 
mechanisms were partly alluded to in Study 2 when describing the hypothesized 
relationships between distal and proximal behavioral contributors (e.g., the reasons why 
neuroticism was thought to contribute to impasse). The use of facet-level predictors in 
Study 3 allowed greater precision in specifying the nature of the mechanisms. However, 
the change from the BFI to the HEXACO allowed only some of the findings from Study 
2 to be tied to the present hypotheses. The 10 mechanisms are: 
1) Worry 
2) Low self-confidence 
3) Dependence  
4) Disengagement 
5) High standards  
6) Escapist impulsivity 
7) Careless impulsivity 
8) Concern for others 
9) Low honor 
10) Active open-mindedness 
In the following paragraphs, each core indecisiveness behavior is described in 
terms of its hypothesized contributing mechanisms. Each mechanism, in turn, is 
characterized in terms of the facets thought to contribute to it, and the proximal 






In terms of possible contributing mechanisms, prolonged latency is the most 
complex of the three core indecisiveness behaviors. At least seven mechanisms were 
thought to contribute to prolonged latency, several of which were thought to be possibly 
related. The first four are documented in the literatures: worry, low self-confidence, 
dependence, and high standards. The second set of three were plausible mechanisms: lack 
of care, concern for others, and active open-mindedness. 
Worry. Worry is perhaps the most common account for prolonged latency 
(Bacanli, 2005; Chartrand, Robbins, Morrill, & Boggs, 1990; Frost & shows, 1993; 
Germeijs & De Boeck, 2002). The more one is preoccupied with the possible negative 
outcomes of one’s decisions, including how they might be perceived by others, the more 
reluctant one is to commit, and consequently the longer one takes to decide.  
Worry was thought to lead to prolonged latency through decisional 
procrastination, buck-passing, impasse, or engaging in concerned processing. The 
HEXACO facet that was thought to capture worry is anxiety (e.g., “I sometimes can’t 
help worrying about little things”). Consequently, anxiety is predicted to be positively 
correlated with decision latency. Worry is a key affect contributing to Milgram and 
Tenne’s (2000) “tension,” and so would be one of the principal mechanisms driving 
slow-tense indecisiveness. 
Low self-confidence. Low self-confidence has long been thought to be a 
contributor to indecisiveness (Holland & Holland, 1977), and indecisive individuals have 
consistently been found to have low self-esteem (Effert & Ferrari, 1989; Ferrari, 1991). 
The facets of (low) social boldness (e.g., “I can handle embarrassing social situations 
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better than most people can”) and (low) social self-esteem (e.g., “I sometimes feel that I 
am a worthless person,” reverse-scored) were believed to be at the core of the low self-
confidence mechanism, and both were thought to be mediated by decisional 
procrastination, buck-passing, and impasse. Low self-confidence would be a second 
mechanism driving Milgram and Tenne’s (2000) slow-tense indecisiveness. 
Dependence. Related to low self-confidence is a dependence on others, which 
was also believed to contribute to prolonged decision latency. At a clinical level, the first 
diagnostic criterion of dependent personality disorder in DSM–IV-TR (2000) is 
“difficulty making everyday decisions without an excessive amount of advice and 
reassurance from others” (p. 725). However, there is no reason to believe that the same 
mechanism would not exist at the sub-clinical level. Consistent with the DSM–IV-TR 
(2000), Salomone (1982) suggested that one contributor of indecisiveness was difficulties 
with dependence, and Jones (1989) included “reliance on others” as one of the reasons 
people take unnecessarily longer to decide in his definition of career indecision (p. 479).  
Although no study has related the HEXACO facets to dependent personality 
disorder, the dependence facet of extroversion seemed to capture the idea well for a sub-
clinical population (e.g., “When I have a problem, I like to get advice from others”). The 
effect of dependence on prolonged latency was expected to be mediated by buck-passing 
and impasse. Dependent deciders were thought to fall under Milgram and Tenne’s (2000) 
slow-tense indecisiveness, especially as their tension rises if nobody can help them 
decide. 
Disengagement. Disengagement is a somewhat broad mechanism that involves 
low positive affect and low motivation, and thus a passive form of what Beattie, Baron, 
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Hershey, and Spranca (1994) call decision avoidance. The mechanism was thought to 
lead to prolonged latency because the decider who is unmotivated to decide takes longer 
to finally get around to deciding. Disengagement was captured by (low) liveliness (e.g., 
“Most people are more upbeat and dynamic than I generally am). The effects of 
disengagement were hypothesized to be only partly mediated by decisional 
procrastination, as disengagement was thought to be a more passive form of decision 
avoidance than was procrastination (e.g., “I waste a lot of time on trivial matters before 
getting to the final decision”). 
Although the disengagement mechanism is one account of why depressed 
individuals have difficulty making decisions (see DSM IV, p. 380), the very mechanism 
may well keep these individuals from being (intrinsically) motivated enough to 
participate in Study 3 given the sampling method. Thus, if such a mechanism did exist, it 
was not clear that enough of the population whose indecisiveness is driven by 
disengagement would be captured in the sample of participants who started and 
completed Study 3.  
High standards. Having high standards translates into two distinct, but related, 
attitudes. On the one hand, it dictates the standard of quality to which one holds oneself 
when performing a task. In this regard, indecisiveness has reliably been associated with 
perfectionism (Frost & Shows, 1993; Gayton, Clavin, Clavin, & Broida, 1994; Patalano & 
Wengrovitz, 2007). On the other hand, having high standards affects how demanding one 
is of the quality of an option before being willing to commit to it. In this sense, 
indecisiveness has been associated with maximization, or the belief that “only the best 
will do” (Spunt, Rassin, & Epstein, 2008). In both senses, then, the higher one’s 
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standards, the longer one is likely to work or search for the object of one’s standard to be 
of sufficient quality.  
The high standards mechanism was captured by the HEXACO conscientiousness 
facet of perfectionism, though admittedly it better captured the first of the two attitudes. 
The effect of perfectionism on prolonged latency was hypothesized to be mediated 
through strategic waiting, concerned processing, and prudent processing. The wording of 
some facet items (e.g., “I always try to be accurate in my work, even at the expense of 
time”) does not clearly distinguish between the maladaptive, socially proscribed 
perfectionism that drives concerned processing on the one hand, and the more adaptive, 
self-oriented perfectionism that drives prudent processing on the other (Hewitt & Flett, 
1991). Still, other items (e.g., “I often check my work over repeatedly to find any 
mistakes”) clearly tap the excessive checking (Frost & Shows, 1993; Gayton et al., 1994; 
Rassin & Muris, 2005b), precision (Rassin & Muris, 2005b), and intolerance of 
ambiguity (Rassin & Muris, 2005a) characteristics of indecisiveness. For this reason, 
perfectionism was predicted to be more highly correlated with concerned processing than 
with prudent processing or strategic waiting.  
Having excessively high standards and engaging in concerned processing was 
thought to be a mechanism underlying Milgram and Tenne’s (2000) slow-tense 
indecisiveness, whereas having moderately high standards and engaging in prudent 
processing (e.g., “I need to find a good solution, but not necessarily the very best one”) 
was thought to underlie some slow-relaxed indecisiveness.  
Concern for others. Individuals with a higher concern for others were thought to 
take longer to decide insofar as they “try to please everyone” (cf. Yates, 2003, on 
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acceptability). The more a decider is concerned about a decision’s beneficiaries and 
stakeholders, the more views she will consider, and the more she will try to reconcile 
conflicting views. All things being equal, more consideration and reconciliation translates 
into more time taken to decide. The concern for others was conceived as being grounded 
in genuinely positive sources, such as agreeableness. The mechanism was believed to 
account for why high agreeableness (e.g., “Is considerate and kind to almost everyone” 
and “Likes to cooperate with others”) was related to prolonged latency in Study 2. In 
contrast, a more negative take on concern for others (e.g., “what will they think of me if I 
make this decision?”), driven by such phenomena as socially proscribed perfectionism 
(Hewitt & Flett, 1991), is ultimately a concern for oneself and associated with low self-
confidence and worry.  
Again, the meaning of the current mechanism was restricted to the positive 
concern for others, as is evidenced by the three facets that were thought to contribute to 
the concern for others mechanism: (high) fairness, (high) sentimentality, and (high) 
gentleness. Each was expected to be positively related to and have a direct effect on 
prolonged latency. 
Active open-mindedness. This mechanism (hereafter AOM) was named after 
Baron’s concept of “actively open-minded thinking,” which he characterized as a 
disposition to search for and fairly consider evidence contrary to one’s current beliefs and 
goals (Baron, 1985, 1988, 1993). Stanovich and West (1997) expanded and 
operationalized the concept. Their actively open-minded thinking scale (AOT) is made up 
of various existing scales that together measure a cluster of dispositions to engage in 
deliberation, including a willingness to postpone closure (e.g., “There is nothing wrong 
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with being undecided about many issues”), the consideration of evidence contrary to 
one’s views (e.g., “People should always take into consideration evidence that goes 
against their beliefs”), and an openness to alternative opinions and new ideas (e.g., 
“Beliefs should always be revised in response to new information or evidence”).  
An important part of active open-mindedness is the tendency to avoid quick, 
habitual responses and consider, if not seek, novel alternatives. Doing so takes time, and 
so active open-mindedness was expected to be mildly correlated with prolonged latency. 
As the first sample item from the AOT suggests, actively open-minded thinking can also 
mean a longer suspension of commitment on certain issues, and so the AOM mechanism 
was also hypothesized to contribute to not-deciding. 
The three facets of the HEXACO that approximate actively open-minded thinking 
were prudence (e.g., “I make a lot of mistakes because I don’t think before I act” reverse 
scored), flexibility (e.g., “I am usually quite flexible in my opinions when people 
disagree with me”), and inquisitiveness (e.g., “I’m interested in learning about the history 
and politics of other countries”). Unconventionality has one item that would be 
considered characteristic of AOM (e.g., “I like hearing about opinions that are very 
different from those of most people”), but the other three items do not (See Appendix O), 
consequently it was not included as part of the mechanism. The effect of all three AOM 
facets on prolonged latency were expected to be partly mediated through prudent 
processing, whereas the effects of prudence were also hypothesized to be mediated 






Four mechanisms were thought to contribute to not-deciding: worry, low self-
confidence, dependence, and disengagement. The four mechanisms are identical to those 
described as contributing to prolonged decision latency. Each facet was hypothesized to 
contribute to not-deciding in the same direction as it was for prolonged latency. 
Disengagement, however, was believed to be a bigger contributor to not-deciding than it 
would be to prolonged latency because the low motivation characteristic of 
disengagement might not lead to a decision at all in the absence of a strong enough 
exogenous incentive to do so. 
Changing decisions. 
Three mechanisms were hypothesized to contribute to changing decisions: worry, 
impulsivity, and low honor.  
Worry. Worry was made up of the same facets described earlier, but the 
mechanism was thought to function slightly differently in changing decisions. 
Specifically, worry leads one to doubt, regret, and reconsider one’s choice after the 
decision is made. Post-decisional worry, regret, reconsideration, and rumination have all 
been considered part of or related to indecisiveness. Germeijs and De Boeck (2001), for 
example, include two items measuring rumination and regret in their indecisiveness scale 
(i.e., “After making a decision, I can’t get it out of my mind” and the reverse-scored 
“After making a decision, I don’t regret the decision”). The mediating variable for the 
effect of worry on changing decisions was hypothesized to be concerned processing (i.e., 
excessive information gathering and checking).  
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Impulsivity. Rassin and Muris (2005a) found that impulsivity was positively 
associated with indecisiveness. They measured indecisiveness using the IS, and 
impulsivity using the obsessional impulses to harm self/others subscale (e.g., “I 
sometimes feel the need to break or damage things for no reason”) of the PADUA 
Inventory (Burns, Keortge, Formea, & Sternberger, 1996), which measures obsessional 
behaviors. Unfortunately, the finding shed little light on why impulsivity is related to 
indecisiveness: Rassin and Muris did not suggest any mechanism, and the IS does not 
measure changing decisions specifically. What is more, there are several kinds of 
impulsivity (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001), and it is unclear which is related to that on the 
PADUA subscale. 
The present account of how impulsivity is related to indecisiveness is as follows: 
Impulsivity leads the decider to make decisions quickly (Whiteside & Lynam, 2001), 
which leads to poorer decisions. Poor decisions, especially given indecisives’ propensity 
to worry, increase the likelihood and degree of doubting, regret, and reconsideration. 
These, in turn, increase the chances of ultimately changing the decisions. Separate 
mechanisms exist for each of the three parts of this process: deciding quickly, 
reconsideration, and changing. Forms of doubting, regret, and reconsideration (e.g., 
rumination) fall under the worry mechanism described earlier. The focus here was on 
explaining quick deciding and changing. 
At least two distinct impulsivity mechanisms explain quickly made decisions—
one driven by a desire to escape the decision, and the other by carelessness. The escapist 
mechanism was thought to be driven by worry, and lead to the same feelings of decision 
anxiety as those felt by indecisives who avoid the decision process (e.g., procrastinate). 
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The key difference is that, in this case, the deciders attempt to relieve the pressure to 
decide by making quick, temporary commitments, thus buying time and postponing their 
final commitments. Their decision-making process is not unlike the hurried, almost 
panicked, one that Janis and Mann called (1977) “hypervigilance” (e.g., “Whenever I get 
upset by having to make decisions I choose on the spur of the moment”), except that with 
escapist impulsivity the push to make some commitment is endogenous, and not an 
exogenous deadline.  
The escapist impulsivity mechanism involves a type of impulsivity labeled 
“urgency” by Whiteside and Lynam (2001), who defined it as “engaging the decision 
problem and committing quickly to alleviate negative emotions, despite the harmful long-
term effects of these actions” (p. 685). At least two indecisiveness scales have measured 
the escapist mechanism. Bacanli’s (2005) impetuous indecisiveness scale measures it 
(i.e., “I decide quickly for want to get rid of that responsibility and later generally I give it 
up” [sic]), and Haraburda’s (1999) scale measures it, albeit with a conditionally worded 
item (i.e., “If making a decision is stressful for me, I make quicker decisions than I 
should just to end the decision-making process”). 
Whiteside and Lynam (2001) found that urgency was related to all facets of 
neuroticism on the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992). The analogous facets in the 
HEXACO, where they exist, are anxiety, and (low) social self-esteem. Consequently, 
anxiety was predicted to be positively related to, and social self-esteem negatively related 
to, changing decisions. 
In contrast, the careless impulsivity mechanism is associated with a different type 
of impulsivity identified by Whiteside and Lynam (2001): lack of premeditation. Lack of 
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premeditation is, simply put, not thinking carefully before acting (or deciding). Bacanli’s 
(2005) scale measures the lack of premeditation (i.e., “I decide quickly because of my 
impatience to search and collect data on it and then I give it up” [sic] and “When 
deciding, instead of thinking in detail, I decide quickly and then I generally give it up” 
[sic]).  
Whiteside and Lynam (2001) found that the lack of premeditation was negatively 
related to all facets of conscientiousness on the NEO-PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992). 
Interestingly, Bacanli’s (2005) two aforementioned items correspond closely to two 
HEXACO conscientiousness facets, (low) prudence and (low) diligence, as well as to the 
agreeableness facet of (low) patience. A third item in Bacanli’s scale combines elements 
of (low) diligence and (low) prudence: “I choose the most attractive option to me at that 
time, since I find difficult the search on all options, and later I give it up.”  
The conscientiousness facets of (low) diligence, (low) prudence, and the 
agreeableness facet of (low) patience were expected to be negatively related to changing 
decisions. Although perfectionism is a facet of conscientiousness in the HEXACO, it has 
no direct counterpart in the NEO-PI_R, and there was no reason to expect it to be related 
to impulsivity. The effects for both impulsivity mechanisms were predicted to be partly 
mediated through (low) concerned and (low) prudent processing.  
In sum, with both types of impulsivity the decider processes decision-relevant 
information with little breath, depth, or care. As a result, impulsivity can increase the 
likelihood of making time-inconsistent choices. Stigler and Becker (1977) define a time 
inconsistent choice as “one that would not have been made if it had been contemplated 
from a removed, dispassionate perspective; it represents a transient alteration in tastes, 
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not a permanent reevaluation of an alternative due to receipt of new information” (p. 
493). Making time-inconsistent choices, in turn, helps explain why indecisives tend to 
have a lingering feeling of uncertainty about the commitment after it has been made 
(Callanan & Greenhaus, 1990, 1992; Frost & Shows, 1993).  
Interestingly, the escapist and carelessness mechanisms might be one difference 
between how Milgram and Tenne’s (2000) fast-tense and fast-relaxed deciders approach 
decisions, respectively. Recall that Milgram and Tenne’s definition of indecisiveness was 
strictly in terms of prolonged decision latency (i.e., slow deciders), and thus fails to 
include changing decisions.   
Low honor. Although “low honor” may appear to be a somewhat anachronistic 
and dramatic label, it captured the combination of a low concern for both others and 
social conventions regarding the making and keeping of commitments. In contrast to 
concern for others, which was hypothesized to drive prolonged latency, the low concern 
for others was thought to result in less consideration of beneficiaries and stakeholders, 
and thus would contribute to making decisions quickly. The low honor mechanism was 
thought to be captured by a combination of (low) fairness, (low) sincerity, and (low) 
sentimentality. These three facets were predicted to contribute directly to changing 
decisions insofar changing decisions involves breaking commitments.  
More importantly, low honor was believed to lead one to more easily renege on a 
commitment (i.e., changing decisions). It may lead the indecisive to think of decisions 
and commitments as less binding, lead to a greater belief in the reversibility of decisions, 
or lead the decider to an increased sense of her ability to get away with changing 
commitments. Said differently, at least some changing decisions were thought to be 
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opportunistic, and driven by a low concern about violating the social conventions 
associated in making and keeping commitments. Accordingly, the facets predicted to 
contribute to low honor were (low) fairness (e.g., “I’d be tempted to use counterfeit 
money, if I were sure I could get away with it,” reverse-scored), (low) sincerity (e.g., “If I 
want something from someone, I will laugh at that person’s worst jokes,” reverse-
scored), and (low) sentimentality (e.g., “I feel like crying when I see other people 
crying”). This mechanism was believed to have a direct effect on change. Table 10 
summarizes the hypothesized relationships between distal contributors, core 
indecisiveness behaviors, and mediating proximal behavior contributors. 
A refined version of the CIS was validated using three behavioral measures 
expected to have differing relationships to the three core indecisive behaviors: decision 
change, status quo bias, and optimistic bias. In addition, peer ratings were compared to 
self-reported scores to address potential method variance in the CIS, and to test the 





















Table 10  
Summary of Predicted Relationships Among Distal Contributors, Proximal Behavioral 
Contributors, and Core Indecisiveness Behaviors 
HEXACO Scales Indecisive Behaviors  Proximal Behavioral Contributors 
  L ND ∆ DP B I SW CP PP 
Honesty-Humility          
Fairness +8  –9       
Greed-avoidance          
Modesty          
Sincerity   –9       
Emotionality           
Anxiety +1   +1, 6 +1 +1 +1  +1  
Dependence +3 +3     +3 +3       
Fearfulness          
Sentimentality +8  –9       
eXtraversion          
Liveliness –4 –4   –4 –4      
Social boldness –2  –2  –2 –2 –2     
Sociability          
Social self-esteem –2  –2 –6 –2 –2 –2    
Agreeableness           
Flexibility +10         +10 
Forgiveness          
Gentleness +8          
Patience   –7       
Conscientiousness          
Diligence     –7            
Organization                  
Perfectionism +5      +5 +5 +5 
Prudence +10   –7    +10   +10 
Openness to experience          
Aesthetic appreciation          
Creativity          
Inquisitiveness +10         +10 
Unconventionality            
Mechanisms: 1worry, 2low self-confidence, 3dependence, 4disengagement, 5high standards, 6escapist 
impulsivity, 7careless impulsivity, 8concern for others, 9low honor, and 10active open-mindedness 
 
Scale validation 
Decision change. In principle, if presented with an opportunity to change a 
decision for a low cost, individuals with high CIS changing decisions scores are more 
likely to do so than are those with low changing decisions scores. Changing one’s 
decision was here meant in the narrow sense of changing a relatively recent decision 
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without having received any new information, or there being no other change in 
conditions aside from the passing of time. In this narrow sense, then, changing one’s 
decision is attributable to the reconsideration of existing information. As such, the 
number of changes in the decision change task (i.e., sinking ship task) was predicted to be 
positively related to the CIS changing decisions subscale. 
Status quo bias. In contrast to the greater propensity to change one’s decision 
when given the option to do so, status quo bias is a tendency found in the general 
population to choose the option that reflects the current state of affairs (i.e., the status 
quo) when presented with similarly attractive options (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988). 
The underlying driver of the status quo bias is loss aversion (Kahneman, Knetsch, & 
Thaler, 1991). Individuals who exhibit the status quo bias either do not experience 
indecisiveness because they choose the status quo quickly and stick with it, or else they 
do experience indecisiveness and either end up choosing the status quo, or ultimately fail 
to decide and end up with the status quo. Status quo bias was thus predicted to be 
positively related to the not-deciding subscale of the CIS, but negatively related to the 
changing decisions subscale.  
Optimistic bias. Optimistic bias is the belief that possible negative future events 
are less likely and possible positive future events are more likely to happen to oneself 
than they are to people similar to oneself (Weinstein, 1980). Although optimistic bias has 
consistently been found in the population at large, depressed individuals appear to be less 
affected by optimistic bias—a phenomenon called “depressive realism” (Alloy & 
Abramson, 1988). The leading explanation is that depressed individuals engage in less 
dissonance reduction of potentially negative outcomes than do less depressed individuals. 
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Using an earlier version of the indecisiveness scale, Potworowski and Yates (2006) found 
that indecisives tended to show significantly less optimistic bias for positive and negative 
future events than did more decisive people. This pattern of depressive realism among 
indecisives should not come as a complete surprise given that indecisiveness is a 
diagnostic criterion of depression. The CIS subscales of latency and not-deciding were 
predicted to correlate with lower optimistic bias.  
Peer Rating of CIS. Although the related behavioral tasks in Study 2 provided 
some criterion validity for the CIS, they were not alternative measures of the CIS itself. 
As such, it was unclear whether the degree of error variance in the CIS self-reports 






a peer rating of an individual’s indecisiveness, the convergence of the scores from two 
separate raters (i.e., self- and peer-report) could be tested. A high level of convergence 
between self- and peer-report scores would offer some evidence of low method variance, 
and thus help validate the CIS as a self-report scale.  
Method 
Participants. Participants consisted of a respondent-driven, convenience sample 
(N = 573). Family, friends, and acquaintances were informed of the study by e-mail and 
posts on the social networking site Facebook, and encouraged to recruit others. The 
98 
 
recruitment message (Appendix I) explained that the study was about differences in 
decision-making, that participation took about 30 minutes, was voluntary, and completely 
anonymous. The message also emphasized that the study was the final project of my 
dissertation and participation would help me graduate. Participants were not remunerated. 
The recruitment message also indicated that participants had to be at least 18 years old 
and native speakers of English. The study ran for 12 days. A portion of the subjects did 
not complete the study.  
Missing Data. 
Of all participants who began the study (N = 573), just over a quarter (n = 162, 
28.3%) dropped out before completing the study, slightly less than half (n = 270, 47.1%) 
completed the study with no missing data, and just under a quarter (n = 141, 24.6%) 
completed the study with missing data.  
Incomplete cases. The consent form in this study explicitly stated that if a 
participant chose to end the study before it was completed, none of her responses would 
be submitted (see Appendix L). As such, all participants who failed to complete the study 
(n = 162) were excluded from further analyses. Of those excluded, one third (n = 54) 
dropped out after finishing the sinking ship task (page 1) when faced with the first of 
seven pages of questions from the core and behaviors questionnaire. This suggests they 
may have been curious to see the study, but had little motivation to actually participate.  
About another third of those who dropped out (n = 50, 30.9%) did so by the end 
of the third page of the core and behaviors questionnaire (n = 21 before starting the 
second page; n = 13 before starting the third page; n =16 before starting the fourth page). 
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Drop off for the rest (n = 58, 35.8%) continued in a monotone pattern. In Figure 5, each 
line indicates the completion rate for each question, and questions are clustered by page. 
The overall completion rate of just under 72% is not surprising given that drop out 
rates tend to be higher for online studies than in lab-based studies (Birnbaum, 2004). In 
online studies, dropouts typically occur because of technical difficulties (e.g., a bad 
Internet connection) or because participants intentionally drop-out. Intentional dropping 
out is often a result of boredom, lack of interest or motivation, or the nature of the 
questions.  
Interviews in pilot testing indicated that the questions were clear and not 
contentious. There were over 200 questions, however, which may have posed a burden or 
led to boredom for certain responders. To reduce response burden, the study was 
designed to have 5–10 questions per page and alternate between self-report questions and 
(more engaging) decision tasks. In 10 days almost 600 individuals started the study with 
no remuneration, suggesting that there was sufficient participant interest. Participant 
interest was highlighted by the fact that several participants sent e-mails expressing 
interest and asking for information about results. The considerable dropout at the 
beginning, however, suggests that a portion of participants were only superficially 
curious. 
Complete cases. Almost two thirds of the 411 participants who completed the 
study, did so with no missing data (n = 270, 65.7%), and over a quarter (n = 120, 29.2%) 
completed the study with 2% or less missing data (i.e., 4 or fewer missing responses). 
Specifically, 61 (14.8%) participants missed one response, 35 (8.5%) were missed two, 
20 (4.9%) missed three, and four (1.0%) missed four responses. Just over 5% of 
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participants (n = 21) completed the study, but were missing five or more answers. Only 
participants with 2% or less missing data (n = 390) were retained for further analyses. 
Figure 6 shows the completion rates of all 573 participants distinguished by whether they 
completed the study.  
Two perspectives were used to understand the nature of the missing data—the 
first was orthodox, and the second was recent, more comprehensive, and more pragmatic. 
The more orthodox approach is based on Rubin (1976), who explained that missing data 
on a given variable can be missing completely at random (MCAR), missing at random 
(MAR), or missing not at random (MNAR). Missing data that are MCAR are not missing 
in any systematic way, that is, they do not depend on observed or unobserved variables. 
Missing data that are MAR are unrelated to unobserved variables, but do depend on one 
or more observed variables (e.g., gender). MAR data are thus completely random once 
the observed variables on which they depend have been controlled for. Finally, missing 
data that are MNAR depend on unobserved variables (Schafer & Graham 2002). The 
pattern of missing data on a given variable is called its “missingness mechanism.” A 
missingness mechanism consists of the pattern of binary numbers across a variable 
representing whether data for each case was observed or not. Each unique missingness 
pattern can be MCAR, MAR, or MNAR, accordingly, data sets with missing data on 
more than one variable can have a mix of missingness patterns. 
Because MNAR is related to variables that have not been observed, it cannot 
statistically be distinguished from MAR. To distinguish whether the missing data is 
MCAR from MAR and MNAR, one tests whether there is a relationship between the 
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When MCAR is tested for, and often it is assumed, the test typically involves comparing 
responders and non-responders on the other variables using two-sample t tests. Thus, 
given p variables, each variable can be compared to all other variables, or p – 1 times. If 
every variable has a unique missingness mechanism (i.e., is not missing data from the 
same combination of participants as any other variable), then the total number of t tests is 
p(p – 1) (Little, 1988). Little points out that as the number of missingness mechanisms 
grows, it becomes extremely difficult to meaningfully interpret the large number of t 
tests.  
Of the 231 variables in Study 3, 124 (53.7%) had missing data. There were 114 
out of a possible 124 distinct missingness patterns. Only 10 pairs of variables shared a 
missingness pattern. The mean number of missing data per variable across 390 
participants (only 120 of whom were missing data) was M = 0.91 (SD = 1.10), and the 
modal number of missing data per variable was 0 (46.3%). No variable had more than 
1.3% missing data. Table 11 shows the distribution of missing data by variable. 
Table 11  
Missing Data by Variable 
Number of missing 
data by variable 
Percent missing data 
by variable 




0 0.0 107 46.3 
1 0.3 70 30.3 
2 0.5 31 13.4 
3 0.8 16 6.9 
4 1.0 5 2.2 
5 1.3 2 0.9 
Note: Based on N = 390 participants. 
In a more recent and comprehensive approach to treating missing data, McKnight, 
Sidani, McKnight, and Figueredo (2007) also consider the patterns of missing data from 
the participant perspective. They point out that the fewer (participant) missing data 
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patterns (i.e., variables on which they are missing data) relative to the number of 
participants, the more likely that the patterns are systematic and not MCAR. Said 
differently, the more people who have the same pattern of missing data, the more likely 
that the pattern is systematic. Conversely, as the number of patterns approaches the 
number of participants—which they call “messy” missing data—the less likely that data 
is missing systematically (i.e., the data are more likely to be MCAR). As the messiness 
increases, the replacement of missing data through more acceptable imputation methods, 
such as maximum likelihood (see McKnight at al. 2007, for a review), becomes 
increasingly difficult. 
McKnight et al. (2007) proposed using the ratio of missing data patterns to 
number of participants (n) as an index of messiness, such that the range of the index 
would be from 1/n (i.e., everyone shares the same pattern) to 1 (i.e., everyone has a 
unique pattern). In Study 3, there were 120 participants with missing data in the final 
analysis, with 111 unique missing data patterns. Of those patterns, 104 participants had 
their own patterns, and 16 participants shared patterns. There were five missing data 
patterns that had two participants each, and two patterns that had three participants each. 
The messiness index was thus .925, strongly suggesting that the missingness was MCAR, 
and so the missingness was considered as such. 
In subsequent analyses, cases with missing data were deleted either pairwise or 
listwise (i.e., an entire case is removed from an analysis if one of the case’s relevant 
values is missing), depending on and reported in the given analysis. Both are appropriate 
means of dealing with missing data that is MCAR (McKnight et al., 2007). Two sets of 
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data were analyzed separately and compared for equivalency: 1) completed cases with no 
missing data (n = 270), and 2) completed cases with 2% or less missing data (n = 390).  
Demographics.  
The final sample (N = 390) was 34% male (n = 134), 65% female (n = 255), and 
one unreported. The sample overwhelmingly self-identified as white non-Hispanic (91%, 
n = 354). Most of the remainder of the sample self-identified as Hispanic or Latino (1%, 
n = 4), African-American, African-Canadian, Afro-Caribbean, or black (3%, n = 12), 
Asian (2%, n = 6), or bi-racial or multiracial (3%, n = 10). Only two people self-
identified as Native American, and one as a Pacific Islander.  
One percent of the sample reported having a high school or GED level education 
(n = 5), 12% had some college education (n = 47), 7% had a technical or community 
college degree (n = 27), 39% had a bachelor’s degree (n = 154), 28% had a Master’s 
degree (n = 109), 5% had a professional degree (e.g., MD, JD; n = 18), and 8% had a 
doctoral degree (n = 30). Most participants were either single and never married (42%, n 
= 165), or else married (48%, n = 188). The remainder were either divorced (7%, n = 28), 
separated (2%, n = 6), or widowed (1%, n = 3). 
Procedure. Study 3 was an online study using a respondent-driven convenience 
sample. Given the objectives of the study, the advantages of an online study, principal 
among them the ability to gather a large sample quickly, conveniently, and cheaply, 
outweighed some of its shortcomings, such as higher drop out rates (Birnbaum, 2004). 
Online studies, which eliminate interviewer bias (Birnbaum, 2004), can also be easily 
made anonymous, which serves to reduce social desirability bias (Birnbaum, 2004). 
Although relying on sample that has Internet access may have biased the sample 10 or 
106 
 
even five years ago, this is no longer a serious concern today. At the time of data 
collection (i.e., March 1, 2009), 72.3 % of Canadians and 74.7% of Americans had 
Internet access (Miniwatts Marketing Group, 2009). 
The respondent-driven convenience sample began with an invitation to participate 
in the study that were posted on Facebook and e-mailed to friends and family who were 
unfamiliar with the hypotheses. They were told that this was the final study in my 
dissertation, and that the study was not remunerated. They were also asked to forward the 
invitation to anyone they thought might be willing and interested in helping by 
participating. The combination of participant anonymity and intrinsic motivation to 
participate were thought to make family, friends, and subsequent participants less likely 
to feel pressured to participate, and more likely to give candid responses if they did 
participate. 
Two versions of the study were administered, a solo and peer version. Participants 
chose the version in which to participate. The two versions differed in that only the solo 
version included the optimistic bias task, and only the peer version included the peer 
rating on the CIS. The URL that was included in the Facebook posting and e-mail and led 
to the study’s welcome page. The welcome page thanked participants for their interest in 
the study, briefly outlined the conditions of the study, and included a list of frequently 
asked questions that addressed most of the issues in a typical psychological consent form 
(Appendix J). After consenting to participate by clicking on a button, participants were 
sent to a page explaining the two conditions—solo and peer—and instructed to choose 




Solo Version (208 Questions) Peer Version (211 Questions) 
1) Sinking Ship Task – Ship Phase (10 questions on 1 page) 
2) CIS and Proximal Indecisive Behaviors scales  (64 questions over 7 pages) 
3) Status Quo Task (one question) 
4) HEXACO (95 questions over 11 pages) 
5) Optimistic Bias Task  
(20 questions over 4 pages)  
5) Peer Rating of CIS  
(23 questions over 3 pages)  
6) Sinking Ship Task – Island Phase (10 questions on 1 page) 
7) Demographics (five questions on one page)  
  
Measures. 
CIS. The CIS scale from Study 2 was expanded from 10 to 22 items (Appendix K) 
with the addition of three latency items, five not-deciding items, and four changing 
decisions items to flesh out the conceptual space of their respective scales. The most 
notable additions were the not-deciding items. To rebalance the overrepresentation of 
items focusing on missing deadlines or opportunities in the scale (e.g. “I miss the 
deadline for making a relatively straightforward decision”), two of the new not-deciding 
items emphasize the recognition that a decision ought to (have been) made (i.e., 
CoreND4, “I fail to make a decision that I had the opportunity to make and feel I should 
have made,” and CoreND6, “A decision that I am expected to make remains unmade”). 
Next, in Study 2 Core7 had a higher correlation with the behavioral measure of not 
deciding (i.e., the Hawaii task) than did the not-deciding subscale of which Core7 was 
not part. Consequently, a second item similar to Core7 that measured commitment on 
issues was included (CoreND5; “I do not have an opinion on an important matter that 
others have opinions on”). CoreND8 echoed the social comparison element of CoreND5, 
but was not tied to issues specifically (“I ‘sit on the fence’ after those around me have 
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already committed to something one way or the other”). Finally, CoreND7 introduced a 
new form of not-deciding (“I abstain from a decision”). All new items were iteratively 
pilot tested to improve for clarity and consistency of interpretation. The same six-point 
Likert-type frequency scale was used as in Studies 1 and 2. 
Proximal behavioral contributors. The proximal contributing behaviors scales 
remain largely unchanged from Study 2 (Appendix L). Four items were adjusted so that 
they referred to a single event in the present tense. For example, impasse item I1 was 
changed from “I get stuck for a while when making decisions” to “I get stuck for a while 
when making a decision.” The wording on four items was changed more substantially to 
simplify, clarify and make them less redundant with other items. Two items were deleted 
and four new items were added to the scale. One buck-passing item (B6) was added to 
distinguish buck-passing from legitimate delegation of responsibility: “I ask others to 
decide for me when I know that I should be deciding.” The three additional items (S6–
S8) were slow processing items: “I deliberately take my time when deciding something,” 
“I slow myself down to consider my options more carefully,” and “I make up my mind 
about something in an unhurried manner.” The total number of items was 41. 
HEXACO. The version of the HEXACO scale used in Study 3 was made up of the 
60-item version of the HEXACO (Ashton & Lee, 2009) supplemented by 35 additional 
items from the full 200-item version of the scale (see Appendix M; HEXACO-200; Lee, 
Ashton, Pozzebon, Visser, Bourdage, & Ogunfowora, 2009). The additional items were 
drawn from key facets predicted to be related to the CIS and proximal behavioral 
contributors, such as prudence (e.g., “I usually stop myself before doing anything that I 
might later regret”), dependence (e.g., “When I have a problem, I like to get advice from 
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others”), and social boldness (e.g., “In social situations, I'm usually the one who makes 
the first move”). The response scale for the HEXACO is a Likert scale (1 = Strongly 
Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Neutral (Neither agree nor disagree), 4 = Agree, 5 = Strongly 
Agree).  
Optimistic bias task (solo condition only). Five negative possible future events 
were selected, some from Weinstein’s (1980) optimistic bias task (e.g., “Being the victim 
of a mugging”; Appendix N). Events were chosen to vary in how serious they were and 
to be relevant to the general population. Participants were asked four questions about the 
events. First, they were asked to estimate the probability that each event would happen to 
the average person on a seven-point Likert-type scale (1 = No chance, 2 = Very unlikely, 
3 = Unlikely, 4 = Moderate chance, 5 = Likely, 6 = Very Likely, 7 = Certain to happen). 
Second, they were asked to rate the controllability of each outcome on a four-point 
Likert-type scale (1 = The risk of occurrence cannot be reduced, 2 = The risk of 
occurrence can be reduced by a little, 3 = The risk of occurrence can be reduced by a lot, 
and 4 = The event is completely preventable). Third, they were asked to rate the 
seriousness if it were to occur on a Likert scale (1 = Not at all serious, 2 = Slightly 
serious, 3 = Serious, 4 = Very serious, 5 = Extremely serious). Finally, participants were 
asked to estimate the probability that each event would happen to them using the same 
seven-point Likert-type probability scale as in the first task.  
Most studies of optimistic bias ask a single, comparative probability question for 
the different events (e.g., “Compared to other people like you, what do you think your 
chances are of experiencing…”). In Study 3, separate probability estimates were 
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solicited. This permits assessing the effects of two distinct sources of optimistic bias 
(Helweg-Larsen & Shepperd, 2001).  
Peer Rating on CIS (peer condition only).  Before the Peer Rating on the CIS was 
administered, participants in the peer condition were asked to choose and use the same 
code-word as his or her significant other. They were informed that matching code-words 
was the only way to pair up their otherwise anonymous responses for later analysis. The 
peer rating version of the CIS is identical to the 22-item version of the scale used in the 
present study, except that the wording of each item was modified to refer to the 
participant’s significant other (e.g., “My significant other changes his/her mind after 
he/she chooses something”). The same six-point Likert type frequency response scale 
was used as in the CIS.  
Sinking ship task. The Sinking Ship task (See Appendix O) is a modification of a 
task originally measuring the number of binary choices an individual could make in 15 
seconds (Potworowski, 2006), which was mildly correlated (r = .17) with a very early 
version of the behavioral indecisiveness scale. The modified version of the task retained 
the original selection scenario and item pairs, but was not timed. Instead, a second phase 
was added during which participants could trade the items they had selected. Each item 
could be traded for the item from the original choice pair that was left behind. For 
example, if a participant chose bug repellent over sunscreen in the ship phase, she could 
then trade it for slightly used sunscreen in the second phase. The item traded for was 
slightly used to reflect the cost of making a trade. Thus, the nature of the new task was 
changed to measure the number of decisional changes. 
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The first phase (hereafter “ship phase”) presents a scenario wherein the 
participant is below deck on a small sinking sailboat and has a limited amount of time to 
run out to keep from drowning. The participant is told that she realizes she will have to 
swim for an island to survive. As she runs out, she has the presence of mind to grab a bag 
in one hand and stuff items into the bag with the other hand. She passes the items two at a 
time, but can only grab one of the two. Items are presented in pairs (e.g., a metal bowl 
and a magnifying glass). In the original version, participants were presented one pair of 
items at a time. Every time they made a choice, the next pair of items was shown. In 
contrast, all the item pairs were presented on the same page in the modified version.  
In the second phase (hereafter “island phase”), the participant met other 
shipwrecked survivors with whom she had the opportunity to trade. Three parameters of 
trading were stipulated: 1) all the items that could be traded for were identical to the ones 
left behind, but in slightly worse condition (i.e., the cost of trading); 2) a given item could 
only be traded for the item it had been chosen over on the ship; and  3) as few as 0 and as 
many as 10 trades could be made. The item choices themselves had no bearing on 
indecisiveness. The number of changes made constituted total task “change” score. 
Status quo bias task. The status quo bias task (see Appendix P) was a modified 
version of Samuelson and Zeckhauser’s (1988) original assistant professor status quo 
task. In that task, participants are asked to choose between their current job (i.e., the 
status quo) and three other job opportunities that varied in which attributes were 
attractive (i.e., location, prestige, salary, or job security). 
To make the task more relevant to a non-academic audience, the scenario was 
changed from being an assistant professor at a university to having a “good job” in a 
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company. Correspondingly, the original “chance for tenure” attribute was substituted for 
the more appropriate analog “job security.” All other elements were identical to the 
original task. Four versions were created, each differing in which of four jobs was the 
status quo, and varying in answer order. Each participant saw only one version, chosen 
randomly by the computer. 
Results 
Multi-dimensionality of the CIS. Using LISREL, two confirmatory factor 
analyses on the 22 items of the CIS were compared: the uni-dimensional null hypothesis 
model and the predicted three-factor model (i.e., latency, not-deciding, and changing 
decisions). The null hypothesis model had poor fit: Chi-square χ² (253, N = 390) = 
4440.01, p = 0.00, RMSEA = 0.37, NNFI = 0.68, GFI = 0.25. Although the predicted 
three-factor model also fell short of acceptable fit, χ² (227, N = 390) = 690.35, p < .01, 
RMSEA = 0.075, NNFI = 0.96, GFI = 0.86), it clearly had a better fit. 
An examination of the correlation matrix revealed that the two not-deciding items 
(“I do not have an opinion on an important matter that others have opinions on” and “I 
am undecided about where I stand on a social issue”) were more highly correlated with 
each other than either was with any other item. In Study 2, the latter item was removed 
because it did not load highly enough on the not-deciding factor. In the present study, 
however, the two items were considered to be a fourth factor, named “withholding 
commitment.” To better reflect the nature of items in the not-deciding factor, it was 
renamed “failure to decide.” A third confirmatory factor analysis on the four-factor 
model showed its fit was better than that of the three-factor model, but just short of good 
fit: χ² (253, N = 390) = 522.64, p < .01, RMSEA = 0.064, NNFI = 0.97, GFI = 0.89).  
113 
 
Again looking at the correlation matrix and fit indices suggested a simpler and 
better fitting model could be achieved by removing seven items with low factor loadings 
or high cross-loadings. A simplified version of the four-factor model with 15 of the 
original 22 CIS items was tested. The chi-square remained significant, but the indices 
indicated good model fit: χ² (84, N = 390) = 179.13, p < .01, RMSEA = 0.053, NNFI = 
0.98, GFI = 0.94). As was done in Study 2, a confirmatory factor analysis on a uni-
dimensional model was conducted on the final 15 items. The model fit was poor: χ² (105, 
N = 390) = 2468.39, p < .01, RMSEA = 0.36, NNFI = 0.56, GFI = 0.35). Table 12 shows 
the final factor structure and factor loadings for the 15-item CIS.  
Table 12 
Factor Structure and Loadings of the Core Indecisiveness Scale in Study 3 






to Decide Changing 
Item  Factor Loadings 
When I am in a group that is deciding something, I 
take longer to make a decision than do other 
people. 
.63    
I need more time than I actually have when I am 
faced with making a choice. .67    
It takes me a long time to decide on something 
trivial. .73    
I am slow to decide. .87    
I take longer to settle on an option than do other 
people faced with the same options. .85    
I am undecided about where I stand on a social 
issue.  .71   
I do not have an opinion on an important matter 
that others have opinions on.  .58   
I miss the deadline for making a relatively 
straightforward decision.   .70  
I intend to make a decision, but wait so long that 
the opportunity to decide passes.   .77  
I fail to make a decision that I had the opportunity 
to make and feel I should have made.   .75  
I change my mind after I choose something.    .80 
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I have a change of heart about a commitment I 
made.    .73 
I make what I think is a final choice, but then end 
up switching it later.    .76 
I commit to something, but then change my 
commitment more than once.    .66 
Someone points out that I am making a decision 
that is not consistent with a previous decision that I 
made. 
   .44 
 
For all CIS sub-scales in Study 3, scale scores were computed using the average 
score of items that were not missing. Cases with missing data had fewer items averaged 
in computing their scale scores. Descriptive statistics for the CIS subscales are presented 
in Table 13. 
Table 13 
Descriptive Statistics for the CIS in Study 3 
Scales Items M SD Med Skew Kurtosis Cronbach’s α 
Prolonged Latency 5 2.58 .76 2.40 .85 1.02 .86 
Withholding 
Commitment 2 2.29 .75 2.00 .90 1.53 .59 
Failure to Decide 3 2.01 .67 2.00 1.17 3.11 .78 
Changing 5 2.35 .55 2.20 1.18 3.15 .81 
Note: Response scale 1 = Never to 6 = Always 
Even though the reliability of the two-item withholding commitment scale is low, 
its pattern of relations to the other CIS subscales suggests that it is distinct from failing to 
decide. As such, it was included in subsequent analyses with the understanding that any 
results pertaining to withheld commitment would be interpreted conservatively. Table 14 









CIS Factor Correlations, Sub-scale Reliabilities, and Sub-scale Correlations in Study 3 







Prolonged Latency  .86 .30 .61 .47 
Withheld Commitment  .45 .59 .28 .25 
Failure to Decide .77 .49 .78 .56 
Changing  .58 .39 .69 .81 
Factor correlations on lower diagonal; Cronbach’s αs on diagonal; Scale correlations on upper diagonal 
All correlations significant, p < .01 (two-tailed) 
 
Proximal Behavioral Contributors. 
First, the correlations among the strategic waiting items were examined given the 
difficulties with the factor in Study 2. As in Study 2, only two of the items were related to 
each other, and so only the two were kept as strategic waiting items. A confirmatory 
factor analysis was conducted on the 38 items of the six Proximal Behavioral Contributor 
scales. Chi-square was not significant, and the three fit indices indicated inadequate fit: χ² 
(362, N = 390) = 1092.82, p < .01, RMSEA = 0.074, NNFI = 0.86, GFI = 0.83.  
Based on the modification indices, three items were eliminated. Item D1 (“I waste 
a lot of time on trivial matters before getting to the final decision”) cross-loaded highly 
on impasse, item B1 (“I leave a decision to someone else”) cross-loaded highly on 
decisional procrastination and impasse, and item E2 (“When faced with a choice, I make 
the effort to look for more information than is normally given”) cross-loaded highly 
across all factors. A second confirmatory factor analysis was conducted on the 35 
remaining items. The second model still fell short of good fit: χ² (284, N = 390) = 746.16, 
p < .01, RMSEA = 0.065, NNFI = 0.90, GFI = 0.87. Because the internal reliability 
(Cronbach’s α) of the two strategic waiting items was lower than .60, the items were 
dropped. To make the remaining scales more parsimonious, 10 additional items with 
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lower factor loadings, higher cross-loadings, or with some redundancy were dropped, 
leaving 23 items across five subscales, each with four or five items. 
The more parsimonious model was factor analyzed. The chi-square remained 
significant, and the indices approached good fit: χ² (220, N = 390) = 570.33, p < .01, 
RMSEA = 0.063, NNFI = 0.91, GFI = 0.89). The fit of the model of proximal behaviors 
in Study 3 was similar to that reported in Study 2 (i.e., χ² (367, N = 168) = 612.84, p < 
.01, RMSEA = 0.058, NNFI = 0.95, GFI = 0.81). Table 15 shows the final 23 proximal 
behavioral contributor items and their factor loadings. Table 16 shows scale descriptives 
for the proximal behavioral contributors, and Table 17 shows factor correlations, scale 
correlations and scale reliabilities for the proximal behavioral contributors. 
Table 15 
Factor Structure and Loadings of the Proximal Behavioral Contributors in Study 3 
 DP B I CP PP 
Item  Factor Loadings 
When I have to make a decision, I wait a long time before starting to think 
about it. .67     
I delay making a decision until it is too late. .76     
I put off making a decision. .82     
I avoid thinking about a decision even though I know I will eventually have 
to make it. .81     
I avoid taking the responsibility to make a decision.  .79    
If a decision can be made by me or by another person, I let the other person 
make it.  .75    
I let someone who is better informed decide for me.  .60    
I try to get out of having to make a decision.  .82    
I ask others to decide for me when I know that I should be deciding.  .80    
I get stuck for a while when making a decision.   .73   
When I am thinking about what to choose, there reaches a point where I 
don’t know how to proceed.   .72   
I end up thinking in circles when deciding something.   .77   
When trying to make a decision, I get so overwhelmed that I feel paralyzed.   .77   
Even after I think that I have made up my mind about something, I have 
trouble getting myself to “bite the bullet” and actually commit to that 
decision. 
  .75   
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I try to consider several factors when making a simple decision.    .56  
When I am presented with two good options, I look for a third option.    .39  
I triple-check things before deciding.    .67  
I re-examine the benefits of an option until I am convinced it is better than 
other options.    .65  
When faced with a decision, I consider each fact one at a time.     .54 
I make up my mind about something in an unhurried manner.     .47 
I research my options before deciding.     .80 
When I plan something, I make sure I have a backup.     .54 
I go over the relevant information as often as necessary for the best option 
to emerge.     .83 




Scale Descriptives for the Proximal Behavioral Contributors in Study 3 
Scales Items M SD Med Skew Kurtosis Cronbach’s α 
Decisional 
Procrastination 
4 2.17 .71 2.00 .98 1.75 .85 
Buck-passing 5 2.33 .76 2.20 .86 1.26 .77 
Impasse 5 2.40 .75 2.20 .93 1.09 .85 
Concerned Processing 4 3.26 .78 3.25 .34 0.07 .65 
Prudent Processing 5 3.64 .74 3.60 .21 0.23 .77 
 
Table 17 
Factor Correlations, Scale Correlations and Scale Reliabilities for the Proximal 
Behavioral Contributors in Study 3 






Procrastination .85 .67 .71 .22 -.03 
Buck-passing .81 .77 .73 .17 -.10 
Impasse .87 .87 .85 .34 .04 
Concerned  
Processing .43 .33 .51 .65 .62 
Prudent  
Processing  .08 -.05 .12 .86 .77 
Factor correlations on lower diagonal; Cronbach’s αs on diagonal; Scale correlations on upper diagonal 




HEXACO. Although all six HEXACO dimensions had acceptable Cronbach’s 
αs, five subscales had reliabilities lower than .60, and so were not used in subsequent 
analyses. Table 18 shows scale descriptives for the HEXACO dimensions and facets. 
Table 18 
Scale Descriptives for the HEXACO Dimensions and Facets. 
HEXACO Dimensions  
and Facets 
Items M SD Skew Kurtosis Cronbach’s α 
Honesty-Humility 10 4.23 .59 -.34 .20 .77 
 Sincerity 3 3.97 .83 -.64 .21 .70 
 Fairness 3 4.64 .88 -.71 .13 .71 
 Greed-avoidance 2 3.69 .86 -.21 -.33 .52 
 Modesty 2 4.63 .83 -.51 .03 .65 
Emotionality  20 3.64 .53 -.25 .16 .85 
 Fearfulness 4 3.31 .76 .20 -.23 .65 
 Sentimentality 4 4.04 .73 -.47 -.05 .66 
 Dependence 4 3.63 .73 -.03 -.37 .73 
 Anxiety 8 3.56 .77 -.13 -.53 .84 
eXtraversion 15 3.88 .57 -.32 .38 .86 
 Social boldness 5 3.71 .76 -.25 -.10 .79 
 Social self-esteem 3 4.48 .75 -.88 .86 .70 
 Liveliness 5 3.99 .76 -.58 .26 .83 
 Sociability 2 3.32 .83 -.18 -.45 .54 
Agreeableness  14 3.46 .60 -.26 -.40 .85 
 Gentleness 3 3.32 .84 -.15 -.77 .72 
 Flexibility 3 3.68 .75 -.16 -.38 .59 
 Forgiveness 3 3.01 .75 -.05 -.61 .55 
 Patience 5 3.82 .79 -.42 -.33 .82 
Conscientiousness 20 4.01 .44 -.10 .05 .80 
 Perfectionism 5 3.86 .60 -.36 .35 .64 
 Prudence 6 4.14 .58 -.47 .31 .74 
 Organization 3 3.92 .80 -.35 -.27 .65 
 Diligence 6 4.26 .61 -.23 -.06 .72 
Openness to experience 16 4.10 .44 -.46 .34 .77 
 Creativity 6 4.19 .67 -.62 .26 .76 
 Unconventionality 4 4.32 .60 -.40 .07 .69 
 Aesthetic appreciation 3 4.39 .80 -.54 .12 .59 
 Inquisitiveness 3 3.49 .49 -.54 .47 .47 




Mechanisms. Mechanism hypotheses were tested in two ways: 1) zero-order 
correlations between HEXACO facets, core indecisiveness behaviors, and predicted 
mediating proximal behaviors (see Table 19), and 2) path modeling to test which 
mechanisms held when the covariance of all the variables was considered.  
Table 19  
Correlations Between HEXACO Facets, CIS, and Proximal Behavioral Contributors 
HEXACO Scales CIS Proximal Behavioral Contributors 
  L WC FD C DP B I CP PP 
Honesty-Humility 0.02 -0.04 -0.06 -0.12 -0.03 -0.08 -0.06 -0.04 0.04 
Fairness -0.05 -0.05 -0.07 -0.09 -0.09 -0.12 -0.12 -0.04 0.02 
Greed-avoidance 0.07 0.03 0.02 -0.06 0.07 0.03 0.05 -0.03 0.01 
Modesty 0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.08 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.04 
Sincerity 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.10 -0.04 -0.10 -0.06 -0.01 0.05 
Emotionality  0.35 0.17 0.21 0.28 0.22 0.32 0.38 0.04 -0.08 
Anxiety 0.32 0.12 0.25 0.28 0.25 0.30 0.41 0.10 -0.09 
Dependence 0.24 0.17 0.08 0.20 0.13 0.21 0.25 -0.05 -0.05 
Fearfulness 0.29 0.20 0.24 0.22 0.23 0.33 0.32 0.09 -0.05 
Sentimentality 0.14 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.09 -0.02 -0.02 
eXtraversion -0.33 -0.23 -0.35 -0.29 -0.39 -0.41 -0.39 -0.12 0.06 
Liveliness -0.31 -0.09 -0.35 -0.29 -0.34 -0.28 -0.37 -0.16 0.00 
Social boldness -0.34 -0.33 -0.24 -0.16 -0.31 -0.44 -0.30 -0.02 0.09 
Sociability -0.08 -0.12 -0.10 -0.07 -0.15 -0.17 -0.10 -0.09 -0.01 
Social self-esteem -0.26 -0.15 -0.36 -0.35 -0.36 -0.34 -0.41 -0.09 0.11 
Agreeableness  0.07 0.06 -0.07 -0.13 -0.03 0.00 -0.07 -0.03 0.08 
Flexibility 0.01 0.08 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 0.01 -0.06 0.01 0.09 
Forgiveness 0.05 0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.08 -0.03 
Gentleness 0.10 0.01 -0.03 -0.08 0.03 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.06 
Patience 0.04 0.01 -0.08 -0.17 -0.05 -0.03 -0.09 -0.01 0.12 
Conscientiousness -0.21 -0.11 -0.37 -0.31 -0.40 -0.32 -0.29 0.17 0.31 
Diligence -0.36 -0.27 -0.45 -0.35 -0.46 -0.46 -0.41 -0.01 0.19 
Organization -0.23 0.01 -0.36 -0.17 -0.38 -0.22 -0.22 0.07 0.16 
Perfectionism 0.13 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.11 0.31 0.25 
Prudence -0.07 -0.09 -0.17 -0.37 -0.20 -0.20 -0.26 0.11 0.26 
Openness to experience -0.09 -0.26 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 -0.20 -0.12 0.07 0.14 
Aesthetic appreciation -0.01 -0.16 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.12 -0.06 0.05 0.09 
Creativity -0.16 -0.16 -0.11 -0.09 -0.13 -0.24 -0.20 0.01 0.09 
Inquisitiveness -0.01 -0.17 0.01 0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.10 
Unconventionality -0.10 -0.22 -0.04 -0.07 -0.03 -0.14 -0.08 0.10 0.12 
Bold correlations significant at p <.01, bold italic correlations significant at p <.05, italic correlations 




Based on the zero-order correlations between the HEXACO facets and the core 
indecisiveness behaviors and proximal contributors, seven of the 10 mechanisms were 
well supported, two had moderate support, and one mechanism was unsupported. The 
facets constituting the worry, low self-confidence, dependence, disengagement, high 
standards, escapist impulsivity, and careless impulsivity mechanisms were all correlated 
significantly (albeit some marginally) with both their respective predicted core 
indecisiveness behaviors and mediating proximal behaviors (where applicable). Note that 
because the strategic waiting items were not coherent enough to form a scale, predictions 
about its mediating effect in the high standards and active open-mindedness mechanisms 
could not be tested. 
The concern for others and low honor mechanisms received some support. Of the 
three facets that made up the concern for others mechanism, only sentimentality and 
gentleness were related to prolonged latency as hypothesized. Contrary to predictions, 
fairness was negatively related to prolonged latency, albeit non-significantly. The low 
honor mechanism also received moderate support. Of the three facets that made up the 
mechanism, only (low) fairness and (low) sincerity were significantly related to changing 
decisions as hypothesized. Sentimentality, in contrast, was positively related to changing 
decisions, but non-significantly. 
The active open-mindedness mechanism received very little empirical support. 
The three facets thought to make up active open-mindedness all significantly predicted 
prudent processing in the direction hypothesized. None of the facets, however, was 
significantly related to prolonged latency in the predicted direction, with prudence being 
negatively related to prolonged latency. 
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Path Model. In building the initial path model, a HEXACO facet was included if 
it met two conditions: 1) It had a significant zero-order correlation with at least one core 
indecisiveness behavior, and 2) it had an internal reliability (i.e., Cronbach’s α) of at least 
.60. As a result, greed avoidance, modesty, flexibility, and forgiveness were excluded 
because they were not related to any core indecisiveness behavior, whereas sociability, 
aesthetic appreciation, and inquisitiveness were excluded because of low reliabilities. Of 
these seven excluded facets, only inquisitiveness and flexibility were hypothesized to be 
involved in a mechanism of indecisiveness, namely, actively open-minded thinking. 
A total of 17 distal contributors, five proximal behavioral contributors, and four 
core indecisiveness behaviors were included in Model 1, which consisted of the 42 paths 
(open parameters) between variables that represented the 10 hypothesized mechanisms. 
As in Study 2, distal predictor variables were allowed to correlate with one another, as 
were their residuals. Proximal contributing behaviors were also allowed to correlate with 
one another, as were their residuals. 
Although Model 1’s fit was inadequate: χ² (131, N = 390) = 438.18, p < .01,  
RMSEA = 0.071, NNFI = 0.81, GFI = 0.93, several of the predicted mechanisms had 
paths with significant loadings. Building on this initial model, four additional paths were 
freed, one at a time. Each path was added because the beta modification index estimated 
a weight greater than .10 and the path was theoretically justifiable. Table 20 shows the 
paths and betas of the initial and final models. It is worth noting that each of the four 
parameters that were freed exceeded the .10 threshold on the initial model and every 
subsequent model until freed. In addition, at no point did the modification indices predict 




Table 20  
Initial and Final Path Models for Indecisiveness in Study 3 
 
Model 1. Predicted Path Model for Study 3  
χ² (131, N = 390) = 438.18, p < .01, RMSEA = 0.071, NNFI = 0.81, GFI = 0.93 
 Fair Snc Anx Dep Fr Snt Liv SB SSe Gnt Pat Dil Org Prf Prd Crt Unc DP B I CP PP 
DP   .08    -.05 -.19 -.22   -.14 -.19          
B   .11  .09   .08 -.35 -.21              
I   .24 .13    -.14 -.23              
CP   .11           .27 .14        
PP          .11     .21 .15        
L .01     .07    .09        .21 .14 .47 .12 .06 
WC        -.21          -.18 -.07 .31 .16 .04  
FD                  .61 .03 .12 .05  
∆ .05 -.01 .09 .16  .06   -.12  .00 -.16   -.30   .30 .34 .45 .23  
 
Model 5. Predicted Model for Study 3 with Five Additional Parameters Freed 
χ² (127, N = 390) = 283.86, p < .01,  RMSEA = 0.053, NNFI = 0.90 GFI = 0.95 (∆χ² (4, N = 390) = 154.32, p < .01) 
 Fair Snc Anx Dep Fr Snt Liv SB SSe Gnt Pat Dil Org Prf Prd Crt Unc DP B I CP PP 
DP   .10 .11   -.03 -.20 -.18     -.20          
B   .12 .09   .08 -.36 -.20   -.12           
I   .25 .12    -.15 -.21              
CP   .13      -.12     .24 .15        
PP               .19 .24        
L .01     .07    .09        .20 .13 .48 .12 .06 
WC       .13 -.22          -.13 -.08 .21 .17 .05  
FD                  .60 .02 .20 .02  
∆ .06 -.03 -.04    .05   -.04  -.06 -.03   -.23     .17 .50 .07  
Bold beta weights significant at p <.01, bold italic beta weights significant at p <.05, italic beta weights significant at p <.10. Underlined beta weights are 
noteworthy (i.e., >.10) standardized beta modification index estimates. They are for illustrative purposes and are not part of the models. 
 
NOTE: Fair = Fairness, Snc = Sincerity, Anx = Anxiety, Dep = Dependence, Fr = Fear, Snt = Sentimentality, Liv = Liveliness, SB = Social boldness,  
SSe = Social Self-esteem, Gnt = Gentleness, Pat = Patience, Dil = Diligence, Org = Organization, Prf = Perfectionism, Prd = Prudence, Crt = Creativity,  
Unc = Unconventionality, DP = Decisional Procrastination, B = Buck-passing, I = Impasse, CP = Concerned Processing, PP = Prudent Processing,  
L = (Prolonged) Latency, WC = Withholding Commitment, FD = Failure to Decide, and ∆ = Changing Decisions 
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Although upward of 10 modifications could have been made to improve model 
fit, changes were limited to the following four because they had the most compelling 
rationales to be included. First, social boldness was allowed to have a direct effect on 
withholding commitment. The path beta in the final model (i.e., -.22) suggests that the 
more one is outgoing and takes initiative, the less one is likely to withhold commitments. 
This seems to be an extension of the self-confidence mechanism. 
The second path that was freed was between (low) organization and decisional 
procrastination. Although Lay (1987, 1988) found that disorganization was related to task 
procrastination, nobody has linked disorganization to decisional procrastination 
specifically. Nevertheless, one item out of the three that make up the organization scale 
explicitly taps the temporal dimension of organization (i.e., “I plan ahead and organize 
things, to avoid scrambling at the last minute”), which explains why it is negatively 
related to decisional procrastination. 
Third, the path from prudence to concerned processing was opened. Prudence is 
related to concerned processing as they both measure careful thought before action. 
Prudence more explicitly taps the distinction between impulsivity versus careful thinking 
(e.g., “I make a lot of mistakes because I don’t think before I act” and “I make decisions 
based on the feeling of the moment rather than on careful thought,” both reverse scored), 
whereas concerned processing gauges specific types of excessively cautious thinking 
(e.g., “I try to consider several factors when making a simple decision” and “I triple-
check things before deciding”). Thus, concerned processing describes in greater detail 
how prudence can manifest itself in decision contexts. 
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Finally, impasse was allowed to predict changing decisions. The logic underlying 
the change was that difficulty in coming to a decision (i.e., experiencing impasse) is a 
very plausible contributor to unstable commitments, but it was unaccounted for in the 10 
hypothesized mechanisms. Opening this path affected the direct relationship of five 
HEXACO facets on changing decisions. Specifically, the effects of anxiety, (low) social 
self-esteem, and (low) diligence were reduced and became non-significant. The effect of 
(low) prudence on changing decisions was also reduced, but remained significant, and the 
effect of (low) patience was increased, but remained non-significant. In addition, it 
attenuated the estimated effects of dependence, decisional procrastination and buck-
passing on changing decisions. Clearly there is considerable covariance among these 
variables, which merits future attention. 
Adding four paths may appear to be an exercise in model-fitting, but the number 
of changes was kept small and all were justifiable. The modification indices suggested 
that several additional parameters could have been freed to further improve fit, but in no 
case was there a sufficiently compelling reason to do so. In addition, predicted paths that 
were non-significant in the final model were not removed.  
The chi-square of the final path model (see Figure 7) was not significant, but two 
of three fit indices met or exceeded Hu and Bentler’s (1999) recommended cutoffs and 
the third was close to the cutoff, indicating reasonably good fit: χ² (127, N = 390) = 
283.86, p < .01, RMSEA = 0.053, NNFI = 0.90 GFI = 0.95. The improvement in fit from 




Final Structure of the Indecisiveness Path Model 
 
Line thickness = relative beta weight; Solid lines = negative betas, dotted lines = positive betas 
Percentages = R2 
sse = Social self-esteem, dep = dependence, anx = anxiety, prf = perfectionism, prd = prudence 
DP = Decisional procrastination, B = Buck-passing, I = Impasse, CP = Concerned processing,  
PP = Prudent processing  
L = Prolonged latency, WC = Withholding commitment, FD = Failure to decide, ∆ = Changing 
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The path model offered strong support for four of the 10 mechanisms (i.e., worry, 
low self-confidence, dependence, and high standards), moderate support for three 
mechanisms (i.e., escapist impulsivity, careless impulsivity, and concern for others), and 
failed to support three mechanisms (i.e., disengagement, low honor, and active open 
mindedness). The support for each mechanism is described in more detail below. 
Worry. The worry mechanism received considerable support in the final path 
model (i.e., Model 6). First, anxiety, the sole facet associated with worry, was 
significantly related to all four of the predicted proximal behavioral contributors: 
decisional procrastination, buck-passing, impasse and concerned processing. Moreover, 
all four were significantly related to prolonged latency, suggesting a mediating effect. 
Although in the final model concerned processing did not have a significant relationship 
to changing decisions, the relationship was in the predicted direction. As mentioned 
earlier, the inclusion of the impasse-change path reduced the effect of concerned 
processing on changing decisions to non-significance. An additional factor may be a 
dampening effect of the (non-significant) direct effect of anxiety on change. 
Low self-confidence. The low self-confidence mechanism was also supported by 
the final path model. Social boldness and social self-esteem were both significantly 
related to decisional procrastination, buck-passing, and impasse. As predicted, all three 
proximal behaviors had statistically significant paths to prolonged latency. Although all 
three were also predicted to be related to not-deciding, the emergence of two not-deciding 
factors (i.e., withholding commitment and failure to decide) meant that a priori 
hypotheses across all mechanisms involving not-deciding could not be rigorously tested. 
Nevertheless, each of the three proximal behavioral predictors in the low self-confidence 
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mechanism was significantly related to at least one form of not-deciding. Further support 
for the low self-confidence mechanism is provided by the negative direct effect of social 
boldness on withholding commitment. Although this direct effect was not predicted, it is 
consistent with the spirit of the mechanism and as such was considered part of it. 
Dependence. The dependence mechanism was supported by the path model. The 
dependence facet of the HEXACO was significantly related to both buck-passing and 
impasse, which were both significantly related to at least one facet of not-deciding. 
Disengagement. The path model did not support the disengagement model as it 
was conceived. Although liveliness was negatively related to decisional procrastination 
as predicted, the beta was not significant. Although liveliness had a significant, negative 
relationship with buck-passing (r = -.28) it had a slight, but significant positive 
relationship to buck-passing in the path model. The path model suggests that the more 
energetic and optimistic one is, the more one is likely to try to have others make one’s 
decisions.   
High standards. The high standards mechanism was largely supported by the path 
model. Perfectionism was related to both concerned and prudent processing, though more 
strongly to the former. Concerned processing was significantly related to prolonged 
latency, whereas the path between prudent processing and prolonged latency was 
positive, as predicted, it was not significant. This may be because of the lower expected 
number of adaptively high standard people (slow relaxed deciders), and because they  
would not take as long as would more perfectionistic individuals (e.g., who maximize, 
Schwartz et al., 2002). 
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Escapist impulsivity. The two facets of escapist impulsivity, anxiety and (low) 
social self-esteem, had direct effects on change in the first path model. Once the path 
between impasse and change was opened, both became non-significant and only social 
remained in the predicted direction.  
Careless impulsivity. The three facets of careless impulsivity were predicted to 
have direct, negative relationships with change. In the initial model, both diligence and 
prudence had significant paths as predicted, but patience was unrelated to change. When 
the impasse-change path was unconstrained, it reduced the direct effects of both diligence 
and prudence on change, with the former becoming non-significant. At the same time, the 
effect of patience on change approached significance in the predicted direction. It is 
unclear whether low prudence, especially without low patience, captures the spirit of 
careless impulsivity, and may constitute a simpler carelessness mechanism. 
Concern for others. Two out of three facets that made up the concern for others 
mechanism, namely sentimentality and gentleness, had significant positive direct effects 
on prolonged latency, as predicted. Fairness, however, was unrelated to prolonged 
latency. Recall that contrary to predictions, the correlation between fairness and 
prolonged latency was negative, though non-significant. One plausible explanation is that 
individuals who are intentionally trying to be unfair in their decision (e.g., trying to cheat 
someone) may be more cautious (e.g., preparing a contingency in case they are caught) or 
just more hesitant (e.g., out of guilt) before committing. 
Low honor. The low honor mechanism received no empirical support in the path 
models. Although sincerity was negatively related to changing decisions, fairness and 
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sentimentality were positively related to changing decisions, which was contrary to 
predictions. None of the betas was significant.  
Active open-mindedness. With flexibility and inquisitiveness excluded from the 
analysis on account of low reliabilities, the only remaining facet of the AOM mechanism 
was prudence. It was significantly related to prudent processing, although as mentioned 
earlier, prudent processing was not significantly related to prolonged latency. 
Distinct Mechanisms. Although correlational data are limited in their ability to 
test the distinctness mechanisms hypotheses (i.e., that mechanisms do not necessarily co-
occur), there is one relatively strong test of the hypothesis: If otherwise unrelated 
behaviors both predict the same target behavior. This was indeed the case. Gentleness, for 
example, was unrelated to any of the proximal contributing behaviors, but like decisional 
procrastination, buck-passing, impasse, and concerned processing, was related to 
prolonged latency. Sentimentality, which had only a marginally significant zero-order 
correlation with impasse, was also related to prolonged latency. These suggest that at 
least some of the mechanisms of indecisiveness do not necessarily co-occur. 
Validation Studies. 
Sinking Ship Task. A total of 365 participants made choices on all the questions 
in both phases of the sinking ship task (missing n = 25). Change scores were computed 
by summing the changes participants made from the 10 items in the second phase of the 
task. Change scores had a reverse-J shaped distribution: 52% of participants (n = 190) 
made no changes, 25% (n = 92) made one change, 13% (n = 49) made two changes, 6% 
of participants (n = 21) made three changes, 2% of participants (n = 21) made four 
changes, and fewer than 1% of participants made five changes (n = 1), six changes (n = 
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2), and seven changes (n = 2). For the first nine pairs of items, the mean percentage of 
participants who made a change in each pair was relatively consistent (M = 9.7%; SD = 
1.5%). For the hand mirror and toothbrush pair, however, 58% of respondents changed 
their choice.  
Because the number of changes had a J-shaped distribution, the number of 
changes by respondents was dummy coded into four change groups: missing data (n = 
25), no change (n = 190), one change (n = 92), and many changes (n = 108). A one-way 
one (changing decisions) by four (change group) ANOVA was conducted to test 
differences in scores on changing decisions across the four change groups. The ANOVA 
contrasted the no change with the many changes groups. Contrary to predictions, the 
mean changing decisions score for the no change group (M = 2.35, SD = 0.57) was not 
lower than that for the many changes group (M = 2.36, SD = 0.54). Levene’s statistic was 
not significant F(3,386) 1.38, p = .25, so equality of variance could be assumed. The 
ANOVA was marginally significant, F(3,386) = 2.20, p = .09, but the contrast between 
the no change and many change groups was not, t(386) = 0.08, p = .93.  
Status Quo Task. In all four conditions the status quo option received the most 
responses. The proportion of status quo responses across conditions, however, varied. 
Responses were compiled across conditions into a binary dummy variable indicating 
whether the participant’s response was the status quo or not. Table 21 indicates the 
number and percentage of status quo and non-status quo responses for each job. 
Because the split between participants who chose the status quo option (46%) and 
those who chose one of the three non-status quo options (54%) was not exactly even, it 
was more appropriate to use biserial correlation rather than the point biserial correlation 
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(i.e., Pearson product moment coefficient) to measure the relation between the 
dichotomous choice response (i.e., status quo or not) and the CIS sub-scale scores.  
Table 21 
Number and Percentage of Status Quo Responses and Non-status Quo Responses Overall 
and Across Conditions 
N = 383 
Chosen When 
SQ Option 
Chosen When  
Not SQ Option 
Job 
n % within condition response n 
% of all  
not SQ options 
East Coast 53  50.0% 62 30.2% 
West Coast 1 61  62.2% 67 32.7% 
West Coast 2 35  39.3% 39 19.0% 
Midwest: 29  32.2% 37 18.0% 
Total 178 46.5% 205 53.5% 
NOTE: “Chosen When not SQ Option” refers to the three conditions under which the option was not SQ  
 
Point biserial correlations (rpbis) were converted to biserial correlations (rbis) using 
Ferguson’s (1976) formula, where p and q are the proportions of the largest and smallest 
groups, respectively, and y is the height of the ordinate at p on the normal curve: 
 
As predicted, status quo bias was positively related to withholding commitment 
(rbis = .13, p = .01), and negatively correlated to changing decisions (rbis = -.10, p = .05). 
In contrast, status quo bias was not related to either prolonged latency (rbis = .03, p = .56) 
or failure to decide  (rbis = -.01, p = .82). 
Optimistic Bias Task (solo version only) 
For each participant, an optimistic bias score was calculated for every one of the 
five negative possible future events. Each score was calculated by subtracting the 
probability estimate made for the average person from that made for one’s self. A 
positive score indicated optimistic bias, and a negative score indicated a pessimistic bias. 
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All five bias scores were significantly and positively correlated with each other at the .01 
level (r = .28 to r = .44), so an average bias score was calculated. Inter-correlations 
among all five seriousness ratings were also positive and significant at the .05 level or 
better (r = .11 to r = .34), and inter-correlations among the preventability ratings were 
positive and significant at the .01 level (r = .16 to r = .28).  Consequently, average 
seriousness and preventability scores were computed. Means and standard deviations for 
optimistic bias, seriousness ratings, and preventability ratings for each of the five 
negative possible future events and average scores are displayed in Table 22. 
Table 22 
Means and Standard Deviations for Optimistic Bias, Seriousness, and Controllability of 
Negative Possible Future Events 
N = 347 Optimistic bias Seriousness Preventability 
 M SD M SD M SD 
Car accident 0.52 0.99 4.01 0.92 2.47 0.66 
Food poisoning 0.46 1.11 2.09 0.88 2.39 0.66 
Job loss 1.44 1.36 3.62 1.05 2.03 0.75 
Mugging 0.35 1.00 3.27 0.96 2.47 0.66 
Disastrous trip 0.60 1.03 1.84 0.87 2.53 0.77 
Average Score 0.67 0.75 2.96 0.59 2.38 0.42 
Note: Possible range for optimistic bias is -6 to 6, with 0 indicating no bias. 
Seriousness scale: 1 =Not at all serious to 5 = Extremely serious. 
Preventability scale: 1 = The risk of occurrence cannot be reduced, to 4 = The event is completely 
preventable 
 
As predicted, optimistic bias was negatively correlated with the CIS subscales of 
prolonged latency (r = -.09, p = .08) and failure to decide (r = -.08, p = .15), although 
only the former reached marginal significance. In contrast, optimistic bias was unrelated 
to withholding commitment (r = .03, p = .63) or changing decisions (r = -.04, p = .45). 
Seriousness was not significantly related to prolonged latency (r = .07, p = .20), 
withholding commitment (r = .07, p = .20), failure to decide (r = .06, p = .24), or 
changing decisions (r = -.02, p = .77), but was in the predicted directions. Preventability 
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was negatively related to prolonged latency (r = -.09, p = .09) and withholding 
commitment (r = -.13, p = .02), although the former was marginally significant. 
Peer Rating on CIS. A total of 11 pairs of raters had matching code words, which 
resulted in 22 sets of matched data to compare. (Each pair of raters yielded two sets: 
one’s own and that of one’s peer.) To describe the discrepancies between self-report and 
peer ratings, difference scores were calculated by subtracting the self-reported score from 
the corresponding peer reported score. Thus negative difference scores indicated higher 
self-reported indecisiveness, and difference scores could range from -5 to 5. 
The degree of inter rater agreement was assessed using Brown and Hauenstein’s 
(2005) awg (or awg) index. The awg index is based on the proportion of observed 
agreement to the maximum possible disagreement. Maximum possible disagreement in 
the awg index is based not only on the observed mean, but also where on the scale that 
mean occurs (i.e., close to the middle or close to the ends of the rating scale) by including 
the minimum and maximum possible scores in the formula (Brown & Hauenstein, 2005).  
The Brown and Hauenstein’s (2005) awg index incorporates five values: The mean 
M of the two scores (i.e., those of the participant and peer rater); the variance, sx2, of the 
two scores; the highest possible scale value, H; the lowest possible scale value, L; and the 
number of raters, k (i.e., 2). The awg index formula is: 
 
 
As in other inter rater agreement statistics (e.g., rwg, see LeBreton & Senter, 2008 
for a review) the maximum score is 1, which indicates perfect agreement. Based on the 
standard cutoff of .70 recommended in the literature, Brown and Hauenstein (2005) 
134 
 
suggested that .80 and above indicated strong agreement, .60 to .69 indicated weak 
agreement, and that 0 to .59 should “probably” be considered unacceptable. More 
recently, LeBreton and Senter proposed five levels of agreement, with scores from 0 to 
.30 indicating a lack of agreement, .31 to .50 weak agreement, .51 to .70 moderate 
agreement, .71 to .90 strong agreement, and .91 to 1.00 indicating very strong agreement.  
A total of 503 awg indices were generated, one for each matched CIS items score, 
less three missing scores that were deleted pairwise. Each CIS item had 22 awg indices, 
with the exception of the three variables that had 21 indices each because of the 
aforementioned missing scores. Agreement was measured at the item and sub-scale 
levels. Following Brown and Hauenstein’s (2005) recommendation, the mean of awg 
indices across respondents and scale items were used as the measures for item-level 
agreement and sub-scale-level agreement, respectively. All items showed moderate to 
very strong inter rater agreement.  
Figure 8 shows the distribution of the differences of agreement by item, as well as 
the modal difference of agreement by item. Figure 8 also indicates the awg indices for 
each of the final 15 CIS items and for the four CIS subscales.  
Fourteen of fifteen items showed strong agreement by both Brown and 
Hauenstein’s (2005) and LeBreton and Senter’s (2008) standards. The weakest item (i.e., 
L3) showed at least moderate inter rater agreement using Brown and Hauenstein’s more 
conservative agreement cutoffs. All four scales showed strong inter rater agreement by 






Figure 8. Item-level and Scale-level Inter Rater Agreement on the CIS Sub-scales 
 
The high level of convergence between self- and peer report scores—two 
different methods of measuring indecisiveness—suggested that the amount of method 
variance in the CIS was not high. That is, the amount of systematic variance on the CIS 
attributable to the method of measurement (e.g., because of social desirability) was not 
great enough to confound the meaning of its relationships with other constructs. Although 
the peer rating was only a limited test of method variance, it nevertheless further supports 
the validity of the CIS as a self-report scale, which in turn affords greater confidence in 
validity of the other results in Studies 2 and 3.   
Discussion 
The first two aims of Study 3 were to replicate the findings in Studies 1 and 2, 
namely, to test the multi-dimensionality and multi-determination hypotheses. The third 
aim was to test the distinct mechanisms hypothesis and test specific mechanisms using 
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facet level distal predictors. The fourth aim was to further validate the CIS using a status 
quo task, an optimistic bias task, and a decision change task. Scale validity was further 
tested by comparing self-report and peer ratings of the CIS to address common method 
variance. 
Multidimensionality. As in Study 2, confirmatory factor analysis showed that the 
CIS fits significantly better as a multi-dimensional model than it did as a unidimensional 
model. Although almost all of the CIS items loaded onto the predicted factors, the not-
deciding items formed two distinct factors—failing to decide and withholding 
commitment. This did not come entirely as a surprise, as one of the two withholding 
commitment items (i.e., “I am undecided about where I stand on a social issue”) was first 
seen in Study 2, where it loaded onto its own factor. The withholding commitment factor, 
however, is narrower than its name implies. Specifically, it encompasses not taking a 
position on (social) issues, as opposed to withholding commitment more generally. 
Tellingly, item ND7 (“I abstain from a decision”) did not end up loading highly enough 
on the withholding commitment factor to remain part of it. This suggests that there may 
be other conceptually and empirically distinct forms of not-deciding besides failing to 
decide and withholding commitment. 
As expected, the four CIS factors were all moderately inter-correlated. This 
distinct, but related, pattern is the same found for the indecisive behaviors in Studies 1 
and 2, and empirically supports the hypothesis that indecisiveness is multi-dimensional. 
Additional support for the multi-dimensionality hypothesis comes from both the evidence 
for multi-determinism, and from the distinct relational patterns between the validation 
tasks and the core indecisiveness behaviors. Both are described below. 
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 Multi-determination. Multi-determination can be thought of in two senses—
between forms of indecisiveness, and within forms of indecisiveness. In the first sense, 
the multi-determination hypothesis would hold that different forms of indecisiveness 
have distinct contributors from each other. In the second sense, the hypothesis would 
hold that a given form of indecisiveness has more than one contributing mechanism. The 
two are not mutually exclusive. 
Mirroring the results in Study 2, each core indecisiveness behavior had a distinct 
pattern of both zero-order correlations with and paths from contributors. For example, in 
the final path model, prolonged latency had direct effects from sentimentality and 
gentleness and was related to four of the five proximal behaviors. In contrast, changing 
decisions was related to only impasse and directly to (low) prudence. This supports the 
multi-determination hypothesis between forms of indecisiveness. 
There is also evidence that at least some of the core indecisiveness behaviors are 
multi-determined. With the greatest range of contributors, prolonged latency is the prime 
example. First, the concern for others mechanism has gentleness and sentimentality 
directly related to prolonged latency. Second, a lack of organization is related to 
decisional procrastination, which, in turn, is related to prolonged latency. Third, the low 
self-confidence mechanism affects prolonged latency through decisional procrastination, 
buck-passing, and impasse. Then there is the worry mechanism, which in addition to 
decisional procrastination, buck-passing, and impasse, is also mediated by concerned 
processing. Finally, in the high standards mechanism, perfectionism and prudence also 
contribute to prolonged latency through concerned processing. 
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Distinct Mechanisms. Of the 10 hypothesized mechanisms contributing to the 
different forms of indecisiveness, seven received moderate or better support from both 
the zero-order correlations and the path model: worry, low self-confidence, dependence, 
high standards, escapist impulsivity, careless impulsivity, and concern for others. In 
addition, there was some evidence for at least one new mechanism—lack of organization. 
Some of the hypothesized mechanisms are, of course, documented in the literature (i.e., 
worry, low self-confidence, and high standards), and even incorporated into some 
definitions of indecisiveness (see Table 1). In contrast, dependence, escapist impulsivity, 
careless impulsivity, and concern for others had not been previously shown to be 
associated with indecisiveness. Moreover, this is the first time that these mechanisms 
have been tested a) using the facets of an established measure of personality, b) mediated 
by proximal behavioral contributors, and c) on an a priori multi-dimensional model of 
indecisiveness. The result is that each form of indecisiveness is related to a distinct 
pattern of contributing mechanisms. 
A total of six mechanisms contributed to prolonged latency: worry, low self-
confidence, dependence, high standards, concern for others, and lack of organization. 
These were made up of no fewer than eight HEXACO facets, two of which had direct 
effects on prolonged latency, and six of which were mediated by some combination of 
decisional procrastination, buck-passing, impasse, and concerned processing. Impasse 
was the greatest singular contributor to prolonged latency, which may well explain why 
the two are often confounded (see Table 1). The range and number of contributors to 
prolonged latency strongly suggests that, even if defined this narrowly, indecisiveness is 
a more complex phenomenon than researchers had previously thought.  
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Three mechanisms contributed to withholding commitment: worry, dependence, 
and low self-confidence. The effects of the four HEXACO facets that make up these 
mechanisms were mediated by two proximal behaviors, buck-passing and impasse. 
Despite the mediation, social boldness still had a sizeable direct effect, having a roughly 
equal contribution to withholding commitment as did boldness and buck-passing. 
The same three mechanisms that predicted withholding commitment also 
predicted failure to decide. This was because the hypotheses were made for not-deciding, 
which was only revealed to be two constructs—withholding commitment and failure to 
decide—during data analysis. Nevertheless, there were meaningful differences in how the 
mechanisms contributed to each form of indecisiveness—chief among them was that 
decisional procrastination was the greatest singular contributor to failing to decide, but 
was unrelated to withholding commitment. Thus, the path model suggests that individuals 
who miss opportunities and deadlines to decide, do so most often because they put off 
those decisions, either because they have low confidence, they worry, or they are 
disorganized. In contrast, buck-passing was unrelated to failure to decide, nor was there a 
direct effect of social boldness. 
Contributing mechanisms for the fourth type of indecisiveness, changing 
decisions, were more problematic. The initial model supported three mechanisms 
contributing to changing decisions: worry, escapist impulsivity, and careless impulsivity. 
Worry consisted of anxiety mediated through concerned processing and, it was argued, 
was what drove reconsideration of decisions (e.g., via post-decisional regret). Escapist 
impulsivity consisted of the direct effects of anxiety and (low) social-self esteem, 
whereas careless impulsivity consisted of the direct effects of (low) patience, (low) 
140 
 
diligence, and (low) prudence, though only the latter two paths were in the expected 
direction and significant. In contrast to worry, the two forms of impulsivity were thought 
to contribute to making rash decisions, which were more prone to being later 
reconsidered. Furthermore, impulsivity was thought to contribute to the actual changing 
of decisions (i.e., breaking commitments) in that it contributes to less consideration of the 
consequences of changing. Finally, low honor was also thought to contribute to breaking 
commitments, though there was no empirical support for the mechanism as it was 
conceived. 
 Once the path between impasse and changing decisions was freed, only impasse 
and (low) prudence were significantly related to changing decisions. A possible account 
for how impasse contributes to changing decisions is that it too can lead to unstable 
commitments. To wit, the more serious the conflict and difficulty during the decision 
process (i.e., impasse), the less likely that it will be fully resolved at the time of 
commitment. This results in an unstable commitment, and one could expect the instability 
to be even more tenuous if the decision were arrived at by endogenously or exogenously 
induced hypervigilance (e.g., “After a decision is made I spend a lot of time convincing 
myself it was correct,” Janis & Mann, 1977).  
A lack of prudence, on the other hand, is central to the careless impulsivity 
mechanism. In both cases, the resulting decisions would be ripe for reconsideration, 
which, in turn, increases the likelihood of decision change. This means that the path 
model accounts for two of the three parts of the changing decision process: making 
unstable decisions, and, to some extent, changing them. It does not account for the 
intermediate step of post-decisional regret and reconsideration. 
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Although most of the hypothesized mechanisms received some support, three of 
mechanisms received little or no empirical support: disengagement, low honor, and AOT. 
Liveliness, the sole facet making up the disengagement mechanism, had significant, 
negative correlations with prolonged latency and failure to decide, as well as with the 
predicted mediating variables of decisional procrastination and buck-passing. However, 
the path loading on decisional procrastination was non-significant, and that on buck-
passing was significant, but positive. The change in relationship from the zero-order 
correlations to the path loadings may well be due to co-variance with social self-esteem 
and social boldness, both of which had significant, negative loadings on decisional 
procrastination and buck-passing. 
The low honor mechanism received very little empirical support as only fairness 
and sincerity had significant negative zero-order correlations with changing decisions as 
expected. Contrary to predictions, sentimentality had a non-significant, positive zero 
correlation with changing decisions. Moreover, all three path loadings in the path model 
were non-significant, and only that of sincerity was in the predicted direction. One 
account of why the low honor mechanism failed to predict changing decisions is that it is 
a fundamentally social mechanism, and of the five changing decisions items only two 
could be read as implying a social dimension to the changed decision by using the word 
“commitment” (e.g., “I commit to something, but then change my commitment more than 
once”). This does highlight, however, the importance of a distinction made in the analysis 
following Study 2 between decisions that substantially involve others (e.g., a 




Finally, the AOM mechanism received partial support. Unfortunately, because 
two of its three facets (i.e., flexibility and inquisitiveness) had low reliabilities, they were 
excluded from the analysis. Although both were uncorrelated with prolonged latency, 
they each had marginally significant correlations with the AOM’s only predicted 
mediating variable, prudent processing. The one AOM facet that was included in 
analyses, prudence, was significantly related to prudent processing. (Recall that despite 
the nominal similarity, their items are noticeably distinct.) On the other hand, prudence 
had a negative, but non-significant zero-order correlation with prolonged latency, 
suggesting the more prudent one is, the less time it takes to make a decision. In the path 
model, prudence continued to be positively related prudent processing, but prudent 
processing fell short of a significant, positive correlation with prolonged latency.   
It may be that the active open-mindedness facets did not have significant, 
negative zero-order correlations with prolonged latency because the majority of slow 
deciders have low flexibility and inquisitiveness scores. Neuroticism and openness to 
experience tend to be negatively correlated (Costa & McCrae, 1992). AOM is associated 
with Milgram and Tenne’s (2000) slow-relaxed deciders, who were outnumbered 3:1 by 
slow-tense deciders.  
Scale Validation. In Study 3, the validity of the expanded CIS was supported by 
three of the four tasks: Status quo, optimistic bias, and peer rating. These three also 
offered additional support for the multidimensionality hypothesis, and served to flesh out 
our understanding of the different forms of indecisiveness.  
Status quo task. The status quo task was positively related to withholding 
commitment, suggesting that individuals who tend not to take positions on issues also 
143 
 
tend to choose the status quo options when available. Although choosing the status quo in 
the task necessarily meant participants actively made a choice, the possibility remains 
that withholding commitment may also be related to status quo bias through inaction. 
That is, individuals who score high on withholding commitment may also tend to not 
decide and thereby end up with the status quo.  
Status quo bias was also negatively related to changing decisions, suggesting, not 
surprisingly, that if one tends to choose the option that reflects the current state of affairs, 
one is less likely to change one’s decisions. 
Optimistic bias task. Optimistic bias was negatively correlated with prolonged 
latency and failure to decide, but unrelated to withholding commitment or changing 
decisions. The logic was that the more optimistic and positive one is, the less likely one 
will be concerned about making a commitment. The same logic accounts for why 
liveliness, which taps energy and optimism, was related to shorter latencies.  
Thus, the status quo and optimistic bias results not only serve as criterion validity 
for the CIS, but also lend further support to the discriminant validity of the four CIS sub-
scales, and as such support the multi-dimensionality hypothesis. 
Sinking ship task. Contrary to predictions, the sinking ship decision change task 
was unrelated changing decision scores. Despite a range in the number of changes 
participants made, those who made two or more changes had essentially the same scores 
as those who made no changes. There are a few plausible accounts for why this might be.  
One simple explanation is that because the opportunity to change (i.e., the second 
phase of the task) came near the end of the study, respondent fatigue, boredom, or low 
patience may have led a disproportionate amount of participants to not (re-)engage in the 
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decision task. Although no study to date has looked at the effects of fatigue, boredom, or 
impatience on status quo bias, Webster, Richter, and Kruglanski (1996) did find that 
fatigue was related to lower information search and greater primacy effects in impression 
formation. They interpreted these findings to mean that fatigue increases the need for 
closure. Once a decision had been made (i.e., the ship choices), the fatigue-induced need 
for closure could be thought of as a reason for preferring the status quo (i.e., not making 
changes). 
A second interpretation of why the decision task failed to predict changing 
decision scores hinges on the unexpected effect of task transparency on participant 
participation. Of the three decision-related tasks in Study 3, the second part of the sinking 
ship task was the most obviously related to indecision and indecisiveness because it came 
after the CIS items explicitly addressed decision change. Although several people did 
make changes, it is unclear what systematic effect on participant task engagement  and 
response, if any, may have resulted from knowing that one’s decision changing behavior 
was being measured. 
Peer rating scores. The high convergence between the peer rating scores and self-
report scores supports the validity of the CIS as a self-report scale. The level of 
convergence between the two measurement methods suggests that individuals are able to 
accurately self-report the degree to which they exhibit the four core indecisiveness 
behaviors. In all likelihood, the anonymity of Study 3 contributed to the high inter-rater 
agreement scores by helping reduce social desirable responding in self-reports. 
Nevertheless, indecisiveness appears to be a phenomenon that may be less susceptible to 
social desirability when measured than are other constructs. For one, in my own casual 
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conversations about indecision and indecisiveness, many people are not only interested in 
the topic, but a surprising number enthusiastically volunteer that they are indecisive and 
offer themselves as case studies.  
Beyond this anecdotal evidence, Frost and Shows (1993) found that indecisives 
reported being bothered by their indecisiveness and claimed that it interfered with the 
quality of everyday functioning, implying that they recognized and admitted that they 
were indecisive. Finally, in Study 3 there was a slight negative trend in difference scores 
between peer and self reports, with a negative modal difference score for 40% of the 
items. This means that individuals self-reported higher indecisiveness scores than their 
respective peers did for them. If there had been a strong social desirability effect, the 
trend would have been in the opposite direction. 
Limitations. There are important conceptual, operational, and methodological 
limitations in Study 3. First, at least three conceptual issues were identified.  
Strategic waiting. As in Study 2, some of the strategic waiting items were 
moderately correlated, but again failed to form a coherent factor. Many were closely 
related to decisional procrastination, which points to the need to better distinguish items 
measuring the two constructs. Unfortunately, little research appears to exist about the 
disposition to strategically wait, so it would require considerable legwork to conceptually 
develop and improve the scale in an informed manner. 
Concerned and prudent processing. The items that ended up in the concerned 
processing and prudent processing items were mostly, but not exactly, the same ones as 
in Study 2, suggesting that the scale items need to better distinguish between the two 
constructs. It also raises the question about whether the two are quantitatively or 
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qualitatively different from each other, even though the conceptual distinction was born 
out empirically in Studies 2 and 3. 
HEXACO. Of the 24 facet scales of the HEXACO, over a quarter had low 
reliabilities. This was partly due to the low number of items for certain facets. Because 
facets with reliabilities < .60 were excluded from the path model, the AOM mechanism 
could not be fully tested and the possibility of serendipitous findings was reduced. 
A second limitation of the HEXACO is that, despite its advantages, it is less well 
established than Big Five measures of personality. Although there is considerable overlap 
between the two in the case of the NEO, one does not map easily onto the other. The 
result is that the range of research using Big Five measure of personality are sometimes 
difficult to translate into hypotheses using the HEXACO, and the HEXACO findings can 
be difficult to tie back into the relevant literatures. 
Sample. The sample in Study 3 was biased in a number of ways. First, because it 
was a convenience sample, it was not a random. Second, the participant drop-out rate was 
close to 30%. Third, the consent limited the use of data to participants who completed the 
study. Nevertheless, the missing data analysis suggested that the missingness of the data 
that was retained was MCAR. Furthermore, the sample was considerably larger and more 
diverse than that in Study 2, and participation was intrinsically motivated.    






Chapter 6: General Discussion 
Summary 
The principal aim of this dissertation was to better explain indecisiveness. Recall 
the story of Maya, who, received a variety of commitments (and non-commitments) from 
family members about attending the family reunion: Sam waited until the RSVP 
deadline, Pat missed the deadline, and Mark kept changing his mind. The three main 
hypotheses were that indecisiveness is multi-dimensional, its dimensions are multi-
determined, and by extension, there are distinct contributing mechanisms to 
indecisiveness.  
To test these hypotheses and understand the range of indecisive behaviors 
required a clear, behavioral definition and measure of indecisiveness. After searching the 
relevant literatures, none were found. Consequently, the following behavioral definition 
of indecisiveness was synthesized from the various conceptions compiled from across 
those literatures: The tendency to not make a timely and stable commitment to a course of 
action when the need for such a commitment is acknowledged. This definition was found 
to be consistent with the common usage of the term “indecisiveness,” as represented by 
entries in eight dictionaries.  
Armed with this definition, indecisiveness was initially conceived of as occurring 
at any of the four phases in a decision episode: 1) before making a commitment to a 
course of action, 2) before enacting the commitment, 3) while enacting the commitment, 
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and 4) once the commitment had been fulfilled. A scale was developed with items 
measuring various behaviors that tapped not committing or not remaining committed at 
each of these four phases.  
Results from Study 1 supported the multi-dimensionality hypothesis, but also 
revealed that the distinction between the behaviors themselves was as important as when 
they occurred in the decision process. This led to further conceptual refinement, which 
resulted in the view that indecisiveness consisted of three core indecisive behaviors—
behaviors that were indisputable manifestations of the tendency to not make a timely and 
stable commitment to a course of action when the need for such a commitment is 
acknowledged. These were: 1) prolonged latency, 2) not-deciding, and 3) changing 
decisions. By asking what might immediately lead to each of these three core behaviors,  
a taxonomy of proximal contributing behaviors was developed. The original 
indecisiveness scale was distilled and parsed into core indecisiveness and proximal 
contributing behaviors, and additional scales and items were used to complete the 
proximal contributing behaviors scales. 
Study 2 tested the multi-dimensionality of the new core indecisiveness scale 
(CIS), and tested the multi-determination hypothesis. Factor analysis confirmed the 
multi-dimensionality of indecisiveness. Using the CIS, the BFI as a distal predictor, and 
the proximal contributing behaviors scales as mediating contributors, a three-level path 
model of indecisiveness was tested. As predicted, indecisiveness was not just attributable 
to trait anxiety or high neuroticism (e.g., Goodstein, 1972; Meyer & Winer, 1993). 
Moreover, each of the core indecisiveness behaviors had different patterns of 
contributors. Thus, the path model supported the multi-determination hypotheses.  
149 
 
The CIS was validated using measures of information processing style, a 
concurrent measure of decision latency, and a disjunctive reasoning task. First, 
individuals with strong analytic information processing tendencies were more likely to 
not decide and change their decisions than were more intuitive deciders. Second, when 
decision tension was controlled for, Milgram and Tenne’s (2000) decision speed 
predicted only prolonged latency, providing both convergent and discriminant validity for 
the CIS. Third, reason-based decisions on the Hawaii task were only related to not-
deciding, again providing both convergent and discriminant validity for the CIS. 
Finally, Study 3 aimed to replicate and extend the findings of Study 2, replacing 
dimension-level with more specific, facet-level personality scales as distal predictors. 
Study 3 also used a larger and more demographically diverse sample. Factor analyses 
again supported a multi-dimensional model of indecisiveness, although two types of not-
deciding emerged: withholding commitment and failing to decide. Principal components 
analyses (PCAs) of the 62-item BIS, the 10-item CIS and the 22-item CIS (Appendix S) 
showed progressively more convergence with their corresponding confirmatory factor 
analyses (CFAs). The factor structure of the PCA and CFA of the 22-item CIS in Study 3 
were identical, lending further support to the dimensionality of indecisiveness. 
Study 3 also found evidence supporting several of the hypothesized contributing 
mechanisms, and, as in Study 2, each of the core indecisiveness behaviors had different 
patterns of contributors. Each type of indecisiveness also had at least two contributing 
mechanisms, thus the multi-determination hypothesis was again confirmed.  
Comparison of results across Studies 2 and 3 needs to be done with some caution. 
Not only were the personality measures different and not directly translatable, but the 
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facet level HEXACO scales revealed distinctions that were masked by the BFI, especially 
the effects of conscientiousness. Nevertheless, most of the relationships between 
variables in Study 2 are consistent with the mechanisms confirmed in Study 3 and are 
explained in the summary of findings below. 
Contributions: Explaining Indecisiveness 
They keystone contribution to our understanding of indecisiveness from this 
dissertation is that the phenomenon is not unidimensional. Consequently, it may be more 
appropriate to frame the following findings in terms of our understanding of the various 
types of indecisive behaviors. 
Prolonged Latency. Studies 2 and 3 confirmed and built on Milgram and 
Tenne’s (2000) finding that prolonged decision latency was related to high neuroticism. 
Study 2 found that although neuroticism had a direct effect on latency, its effects were 
also mediated by decisional procrastination, buck-passing, and impasse. The mediated 
effects were confirmed in Study 3: The worry mechanism, made up of the anxiety facet, 
predicted latency through the same three proximal behavioral contributors as well as 
through concerned processing. The worry mechanism was given further credibility by the 
fact that in Study 3 prolonged latency was found to be related to low optimistic bias. 
Study 3 also replicated Milgram and Tenne’s (2000) finding that prolonged 
decision latency was related to low extroversion, but was more specific about the 
mechanisms: low self-confidence, made up of low social boldness and low social self-
esteem, and dependence. Milgram and Tenne found that low conscientiousness was also 
related to prolonged latency, but that the effect was not significant once neuroticism and 
low openness were controlled for. In contrast, Study 3 found that both high and low 
151 
 
conscientiousness predicted prolonged latency. On the one hand, low organization was 
related to prolonged latency, with its effect mediated by decisional procrastination. On 
the other hand, the high standards mechanism—prudence and perfectionism mediated by 
concerned processing—was positively related to prolonged latency.  
Finally, Study 2 also found that agreeableness had a direct, positive effect on 
prolonged latency. This was replicated in Study 3 as the concern for others mechanism, 
which consists of gentleness and sentimentality. 
Why, then, did Sam wait until the RSVP deadline before answering? The 
evidence suggests that Sam is either concerned about others (e.g., wanted to check with 
Wendy, who had other plans), is dependent (e.g., wanted to check with Wendy because 
he makes no decisions of consequence without her advice), has low self-confidence, is 
disorganized, or has high standards (e.g., wanted to check to see if Wendy’s plans were a 
the more interesting way to spend his weekend). 
Withholding commitment. Withholding commitment emerged as a factor in 
Study 3, so there were no specific hypotheses for it. It was treated as a form of not-
deciding, and the three hypothesized mechanisms for not-deciding predicted withholding 
commitment: worry, dependence, and low self-confidence, these three mechanisms were 
mediated only through buck-passing and impasse. This suggests that people who 
withhold commitments on social issues may be doing so because they are concerned 
about the consequences, especially social consequences, of taking one position over 
another. This interpretation is further supported by the direct effect of low social boldness 
(e.g., “In a large group discussion, I would only make comments if someone asked me 
directly”) on withholding commitment. 
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Withholding commitment was also related to high status quo bias. The more 
obvious account for this finding is that by withholding commitment on certain issues, one 
can end up endorsing the status quo. Given the pattern of related mechanisms, this seems 
more plausible than a more proactive, “conservative” support for keeping things the way 
they are.  
Failure to decide. In Study 2, low conscientiousness and high neuroticism were 
related to the failure to decide. Both were mediated through decisional procrastination 
and impasse, though low conscientiousness also had a direct effect. Study 2 also found 
that a tendency to think analytically rather than intuitively was related to a failure to 
decide. A second finding sheds some light on the nature of that analytic thinking. 
Namely, individuals who fail to decide tend to rely on reason-based, as opposed to 
consequentialist, decision making. The upshot is that these individuals may be focusing 
their thinking on trying to reduce the uncertainty of their decisions by generating reasons 
for them, rather than on counterfactually considering their possible outcomes (see Yates, 
2003, on possibilities). This may be one reason why they reach impasse. It is also 
consistent with the three mechanisms found in Study 3 to be associated with failure to 
decide: worry, dependence, and low self-confidence.  
It is important to note, however, that decisional procrastination was by far the 
more prominent proximal contributor to the failure to decide. Thus it is likely that the 
bigger reason people tend to fail to decide is that they put off decisions, either because 
they worry, they have low self-confidence, or they are disorganized. 
Taken together, these studies suggest that Pat missed the RSVP deadline for at 
least one of four reasons. Pat may be a worry wart (e.g., what if Sam makes a scene when 
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he finds out about Mark and Wendy?). She may have low self-confidence (e.g., what will 
my relatives think of the way I look?). She may be dependent on someone to (help her) 
make decisions (e.g., accept the RSVP!), or else Pat may be so disorganized that she lost 
the invitation altogether. 
Changing Decisions. Study 2 found that high neuroticism and low 
conscientiousness were related to changing decisions, and that their effects were 
mediated through decisional procrastination and impasse. There was also a direct effect 
of neuroticism. These results were somewhat consistent with findings in Study 3. First, 
the careless impulsivity mechanism as represented by the conscientiousness facet of 
(low) prudence, had a direct effect on changing decisions. Buck-passing and impasse 
were also related to changing decisions, with the latter being the largest, single 
contributor.  
The interpretation of the effect of impasse on changing decisions is that it raises 
the possibility that commitments are made despite a lack of final resolution, and such 
commitments would be especially vulnerable to reconsideration and change. Although 
worry mediated through concerned processing was the predicted mechanism to account 
for this reconsideration, worry was not, ultimately, part of the path model in Study 3. 
There is some evidence, however, from Study 2 that reconsideration is involved in 
changing decisions: Analytic thinkers who tend not to trust their intuitions changed their 
decisions more than did intuitive thinkers with low analytic thinking tendencies. Not 
surprisingly, Study 3 found that changing decisions was associated with low status quo 
bias, which suggests a greater-than-average propensity to change.  
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Returning to our opening vignette one final time, these studies offer two possible 
accounts of why Mark kept changing his mind. First, Mark could have been torn between 
attending the family reunion and or spending the weekend with Wendy. As the RSVP 
deadline approached, he was forced to decide quickly (i.e., exogenously induced 
hypervigilance), but his decision was very tenuous. He thought it over and changed his 
mind, more than once. The second account is that Mark is impulsive and accepted 
immediately. He then realized he had forgotten to check with Wendy, so he impulsively 
recanted his acceptance. Soon after, it dawned on him that he could bring Wendy along, 
and so accepted again.  
Contributions: Theoretical and Methodological 
 
In addition to extending our understanding of indecisiveness, this dissertation 
makes contributions to its theory and operationalization. At the theoretical level, this 
work represents the first attempt to explicitly take stock of the range of conceptions of 
indecision and indecisiveness, and identify the different phenomena in those conceptions. 
It also provides the first strictly behavioral definition of indecisiveness derived from the 
conceptions in the relevant literatures, and validated against the common usage of the 
term “indecisiveness.”  
In terms of operationalizing indecisiveness, the CIS is the only a priori multi-
dimensional self-report measure of indecisiveness that has been validated by factor 
analysis, several different behavioral tasks, and peer report. Three of the four core 
indecisiveness scales have acceptable reliabilities, and the fourth (i.e., withholding 
commitment) shows promise. Because it emerged in the last of the three studies, it has 
not yet benefited from conceptual and operational refinement (e.g., the generation of 
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items that specifically measure different ways of withholding commitment). 
The three studies also deepened our understanding of indecisiveness in a number 
of ways. First, the multi-dimensional measure of indecisiveness allowed hypotheses to 
distinguish which mechanisms contributed to what type of indecisive behaviors, rather 
than to indecisiveness generally. The contributing mechanisms themselves were also 
more specific than in previous studies tying personality variables to indecisiveness 
because, for the first time, facet-level scales and mediating proximal behaviors were 
used.  
Limitations 
The development of any new concept and scale takes many iterations, and must 
begin somewhere. There were several shortcomings in these three studies that limit the 
generalizability of the findings, and more work needs to be done to develop and refine the 
CIS and proximal behavioral contributors. 
One persistent limitation was the failure of the strategic waiting items to converge 
in Studies 2 and 3. Their high correlation with some of the decisional procrastination 
items also highlights the need to develop items that better discriminate between 
purposefully suspending further deliberation and deferring commitment on the one hand, 
and avoiding engagement in the decision process altogether on the other.  
A second limitation is that few proximal contributing behaviors were included in 
the studies. Some of the proximal contributing behaviors that were specified in the 
taxonomy were not included in the studies, such as slow deciding caused by lower 
cognitive ability or distractedness. Future effort needs to be devoted to identifying and 
testing additional proximal contributing behaviors to indecisiveness, and research that 
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addresses decision difficulty might prove to be a fruitful starting point (e.g., Yates, 
Veinott, & Patalano, 2003; see also Yates, 2003).  
Another limitation of the three studies is that they took a variable-centered 
approach to understanding indecisiveness. A variable-centered approach focuses on 
understanding and modeling how different variables are related to each other. Such an 
approach is the dominant one in psychological research and has its advantages. However, 
it also has drawbacks—principal among them is that it focuses on mean values, which 
can mask more subtle and complex relationships between variables, such as crossover 
effects. A variable-centered approach can indicate the absence of certain contributing 
mechanisms when they are simply less prominent. This may have been the case with the 
actively open-mindedness mechanisms, as was discussed earlier. 
To address the limitation of a variable-centered approach, and to better test the 
extent to which the contributing mechanisms operate independently of one another (i.e., 
the distinct mechanisms hypothesis), one could supplement variable-centered analysis 
with some person-centered analysis. Person-centered analysis focuses on identifying 
groups of individuals who display similar patterns (i.e., scores) across a set of variables. 
Thus, its main aim is to identify and distinguish, or cluster, different homogenous groups.  
A promising person-centered technique given the present goal of understanding 
indecisiveness is latent profile analysis, which would identify the more prominent 
patterns of scores among the distal contributors, proximal contributors, and core 
indecisive behaviors. Each latent profile would consist of a type of indecisiveness from 
mechanism to core behavior. Such profiles have two advantages over the analogous 
complex interactions of variables in variable-centered approaches. First, the profiles are 
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more easily interpretable, and second, they avoid the problem of insufficient power as the 
number of variables and interactions increase (Bauer & Shanahan, 2007). Note that the 
aim of a person-centered approach would not be to identify types of indecisive 
individuals per se, as one cannot reliably infer the existence of such types from 
behavioral patterns (Bauer & Shanahan, 2007). Rather, it would help confirm or 
disconfirm the distinctness of the mechanisms that contribute to indecisiveness. 
A final major limitation of the three studies is that the samples were all 
convenience samples, and were not representative of the broader population. Even though 
Study 3 was the largest and by far the most demographically diverse of the three studies, 
it also had a dropout rate over 27%. The biased sample problem is mitigated to some 
extent by the fact that the results of Study 2 were largely consistent with those in Study 3, 
and that both sets of results, in turn, were consistent with findings in the literature. 




There are several avenues of future research that have the potential to make 
important contributions to the theory, measurement, and understanding of indecisiveness 
in addition to those already mentioned.  
With the emergence of withholding commitment as a type of indecisiveness in 
Study 3, and the failure of the decision abstention item to load onto either not-deciding 
factor, a more thorough investigation of different possible types of not-deciding is 
warranted. This investigation could be part of a broader search for other mediating 
behaviors and mechanisms, such as low cognitive ability and distractibility.  
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There is also room for further theoretical development by considering 
indecisiveness in terms of having two dimensions. The focus in this work has been on the 
first of the two, its frequency, but the degree of indecisiveness should also be looked at. 
There are a number of ways one could conceive and measure the degree of 
indecisiveness, ranging from the relative duration of decision latency, to how superior 
one option needs to be to another for someone to commit, to how many times one 
switches a given commitment.  
A promising methodological advance would involve focusing on observing and 
measuring more naturalistic indecisive behavior. This has been done with limited success 
by looking at how long it took to declare a college major (Gayton et al., 1994), although 
it would be more appropriate to study decisions that are more frequent and less 
significant. Ideally, the decisions would be such that they could realistically lead to 
prolonged latency, failure to decide, and changing decisions. Retail decisions are one 
established context where decisions have been studied for some time, though many of the 
studies of consumer choice tend to focus on larger purchases. 
Although one could study the purchase of products that commonly result in 
indecision, such as wine, ice cream, or movie rentals, it might be difficult to track many 
decisions made by the same individuals, and it is unclear whether these naturally admit 
the range of possible indecisive behaviors. How often, for example, does one leave a 
movie rental store empty-handed because no film looked good enough? Studying online 
shopping, however, may be one solution. Some of the more sophisticated commercial 
websites not only track customers’ orders and returns history, but also their browsing 
(i.e., information search) behavior. 
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Next, the role of contextual effects in the expression of individual differences in 
indecisiveness would move our understanding of the phenomenon forward in an 
important way. Given the role of negative affect in several of the definitions of indecision 
and indecisiveness, it would be informative to investigate the effects of emotion and 
mood. Milgram and Tenne (2000) started the ball rolling by distinguishing prolonged 
latency from decision tension, but they did not explore their interaction. Mixed emotions 
and dispositional ambivalence (see van Harreveld, van der Pligt, & de Liver, 2009, for a 
recent review) are closely related to decisional conflict and impasse, and so 
understanding how they might affect the different types of indecisiveness would be 
invaluable. 
Finally, decisions are not always made by individuals, and so indecisiveness can 
also be construed at the group and organizational levels. Although indecision has been 
considered (e.g., Charan, 2001) and studied in the organizational context (e.g., Denis, 
Dompierre, Langley, & Rouleau, 2006), published research is almost non-existent. Multi-
level research nesting individual indecisiveness in more social forms of indecisiveness 
would advance organizational decision-making theory, as well as open a new family of 




Scholarly Definitions of Indecision and Indecisiveness 
Source and Conceptual definition Operational definition or why inferred 
Bacanli (2000, 2005, 2006) 
Although two types of indecisiveness are defined, 
there is no account of why these are types of the 
same phenomenon—indecisiveness:  
 
1) Exploratory indecisiveness, which consists of 
“a long decision-making process even though all 
options have been explored thoroughly, as well 
as having difficulties in making decisions” 
(2006, pp. 321–322). 
  
Ten items characterized by: 
Difficulty under time pressure (1) 
Prolonged consideration (2, 9) 
Fear of mistakes (3) 
Unstable decisions (3) 
Information search (4) 
Inability (4, 6) 
Panic under time pressure (5) 
Prioritizing (6, 7) 
Instability under time pressure (8) 
Self-categorization (10) 
 
2) Impetuous indecisiveness, which consists of 
quick decision making and giving up such 
decisions easily” (2006, p. 322).  
 
Eight items characterized by: 
Impatience (11) 
Changing (11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17) 
Self-categorization (12) 
Fear of missing opportunities (13) 
Careless consideration (14) 
Divestment of responsibility (15) 
Short latency (11, 13, 14, 15, 16) 
Inability (4, 6) 
Difficulty searching for information (17) 
Change because cannot meet obligation (18) 
Personal Indecisiveness Scale (PIS) revised from 29 
items (2000) to 18 items (2005).  
 
Exploratory Indecisiveness subscale (EIS: 10 items): 
 
1. I have trouble when I have to decide quickly. 
2. I think for hours even when I make simple 
decisions. 
3. I can not [sic] generally make my decisions 
definitely for fear that I make mistakes.  
4. When deciding, I collect data on all options and 
search them. Nevertheless, I can not [sic] decide 
which is the best option. 
5. I am always in panic when I have to decide 
quickly. 
6. When deciding, I can not [sic] decide which is 
the best option for me. 
7. I have trouble to decide which I will do the first 
among the works I have to do. 
8. I can not [sic] make my decisions definite when 
I have to decide in a limited period of time. 
9. I think for hours even when I make decision 
similar to the ones that I have made before. 
10. I see myself as an indecisive person. 
 
Impetuous Indecisiveness Scale (IIS: 8 items) 
 
11. I decide quickly because of my impatience to 
search and collect data on it and then I give it up. 
12. I see myself as an impetuous person. 
13. I decide quickly for fear that I might miss the 
opportunities, and then I give my decision up.  
14. When deciding, instead of thinking in detail, I 
decide quickly and then I generally give it up. 
15. I decide quickly for want to get rid of that 
responsibility and later generally I give it up. 
16. I decide quickly and give it up quickly 
17. I choose the most attractive option to me at that 
time, since I find difficult the search on all 
options, and later I give it up. 
18. When deciding, I choose the option which gives 
me the best solution, and if I can not fulfill my 




Note, original scale is in Turkish, and English 
translation does not appear to have been back-
translated.  
Callanan & Greenhaus (1990, 1992) 
Indecision: “Inability to select a goal or, having 
selected a goal, to experience significant feelings 
of uncertainty about the goal”  
Derived from career indecision status definition 
(1990, p. 80) 
Chartrand, Robbins, Morrill, & Boggs (1990) 
Indecisiveness (explicit): “Inability to make 
decisions even when the necessary conditions to 
do so are present. High indecisiveness represents 
a lack of competence in formulating decisions” 
(1990, p. 493) 
 
(Implicit from scale): experience of difficulty, 
haziness, or frustration when deciding, 
characterized by slowness, worry, and 
uncertainty. 
 
NOTE: Criticized by Lewis & Savickas (1995) 
in their factor analysis of the CFI given 
Chartrand et al.’s definition: “GI items lack face 
validity as indicators of indecisiveness” (p. 54). 
They point out that decisions that are “hard,” 
“hazy,” “frustrating,” and decision processes that 
are “slow” and “uncertain” “do not denote an 
inability to make decisions. Instead, they denote 
a difficulty in making decisions” (p. 55).  
Generalized Indecisiveness (GI) subscale (5 items) 
from the Career Factors Inventory (CFI): 
For me, decision making seems: 
Hard/easy (item 4) 
Clear/hazy (item 5) 
Frustrating/fulfilling (item 6) 
 
While making most decisions I am: 
Persistent/easy to give up 
Quick/slow (item 18) 
Worried/calm 
Certain/uncertain (item 19) 
 
 
Cooper, Fuqua, & Hartman (1984), Fuqua & Hartman (1983) 
Indecisiveness: “Difficulty making personal 
decisions” (1984, p. 354) 
Trait Indecisiveness Scale (TIS) 
 
Crites (1969) 
Indecisiveness: “Difficulty in making all sorts of 
life decisions, whether they are of great or little 
significance…even after all the conditions for 
doing so, such as choice supply, incentive to 
make a choice, and the freedom to choose are 
provided” (p. 114, 306) 
 
Danan & Ziegelmeyer (2006)  
“An individual’s inability to determine which of 
two alternatives would leave her better off” (p.3) 
 
Notation for when an individual is indecisive between 
a and b: a   b 
indifference and indecisiveness are behaviorally 
indistinguishable 
“the lack of a behavioral characteristic of 
indecisiveness precludes observed choice behavior 
from fully revealing preference.” 




Denis, Dompierre, Langley, & Rouleau (2006)  
“Escalating indecision” occurs when “people 
and organizations continually make, unmake and 
remake strategic decisions, resulting over the 
long term in a large expenditure of energy with 
little concrete strategic action and the constant 
possibility of reversal” (p. 2). 
These definitions fall under “chronic difficulty in 
reaching decisions” (p. 2) 
 Definition of decision is a “commitment to action” 
(from Langley et al., 1995) 
Elyadi (2006) 
Indecisiveness: “Becoming stuck in the decision-
making process while experiencing negative 
concurrent emotions” (p. 1368) 
 
Specific examples of negative affect include: 
Feeling of negative affect when committing  
Decision stress 
Feeling paralyzed/stuck/trapped 
Sick when thinking about having to decide 
Frustrated and overwhelmed 
Numb, confused 
Please answer the following questions based on the 
biggest decision you are currently facing in your life. 
Indicate how much you agree or disagree using the 
following six-point scale: 
 
1. Because of this decision, I feel incapable of 
enthusiasm, commitment, or excitement 
2. I get a lot of negative feelings when I try to 
commit to one of my choices 
3. Though this is a big decision, I feel in control 
mentally and emotionally (reverse scored) 
4. I am feeling frustrated, numb, and confused 
because of this decision 
5. Thinking about committing to a choice is one of 
the most stressful parts of my day 
6. At this point, I am undecided but do NOT feel 
uncomfortable or stressed out (reverse scored) 
7. I feel paralyzed or stuck and cannot move or act 
8. I cannot think straight in trying to make this 
decision 
9. I am having an emotionally difficult time with 
making a decision and feel trapped in the 
decision-making process 
10. I feel sick when I think about making a decision 
11. I feel emotionally frustrated and overwhelmed 
when attempting to make a final decision 
12. I feel comfortable with the choices and decisions 
I will have to make (reverse scored) 
13. I feel I cannot decide, and this is causing me so 
much stress and frustration 
Ferrari & Dovidio (2001) 
Indecisiveness: Chronic “postponing [of] a 
decision when faced with conflicts and 
choices…Indecision is more than not making 
timely decisions” (p. 1113). “Decisional 
procrastination is a maladaptive pattern of 
postponing a decision when faced with conflicts 
and choices” (p. 127). 
 
 
Procrastination subscale of the Melbourne Decision 
Making Scale (Mann, Burnett, Radford, & Ford, 
1997). 
1. I waste a lot of time on trivial matters before 
getting to the final decision. 
2. Even after I have made a decision I delay acting 
upon it.  
3. When I have to make a decision I wait a long 
time before starting to think about it.  
4. I delay making decisions until it is too late.  
5. I put off making decisions.  
Frost & Shows (1993) 
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Indecisiveness (implicit definitions)  
Chronically prolonged decision latency (inferred 
from behavioral measure, and item 8) 
Procrastination or strategic waiting (Item 1) 
Not knowing what one wants (Items 2, 15) 
Experienced decision making difficulty (Items 3, 
7) 
Experienced planning difficulty (Items 4, 13, 14) 
No desire for decision authority (Item 5) 
Post-decisional doubt/worry (Items 6, 9, 12) 
Decision making worry/anxiety (Items 10, 11) 
 
 
1) Behavioral measure: Time to choice on binary 
laboratory decision tasks in a variety of domains 
 
2) Indecisiveness Scale (IS): 
1. I try to put off making decisions. 
2. I always know exactly what I want.  
3. I find it easy to make decisions.  
4. I have a hard time planning my free time. 
5. I like to be in a position to make decisions.  
6. Once I make a decision, I feel fairly confident 
that it is a good one.  
7. When ordering from a menu, I usually find it 
difficult to decide what to get. 
8. I usually make decisions quickly.  
9. Once I make a decision, I stop worrying about it.  
10. I become anxious when making a decision. 
11. I often worry about making the wrong decision. 
12. After I have chosen or decided something, I 
often believe I have made the wrong choice or 
decision. 
13. I do not get assignments done one time because I 
cannot decide what to do first. 
14. I have trouble completing assignments because I 
can’t prioritize what is most important. 
15. It seems that deciding on the most trivial things 
takes me a long time. 
Gati, Krausz, & Osipow (1996) 
Chronic problems individuals may have in 
making decisions 
Inferred from the alleged consensus on the use “career 
indecision” to mean “the problems individuals may 
have in making their career decision” (p. 510) 
Germeijs & De Boeck (2002) 
Indecisiveness: Domain-general difficulty in 
making decisions, which includes seven 
categories: 1) latency, 2) delay, 3) avoidance, 4) 
buck-passing, 5) instability, 6) worry, and 7) 
decision regret. 
 
Eleven features have been discerned: 
1. difficulty  
2. don’t know how  
3. feeling uncertain  
4. takes a long time  
5. delaying  
6. avoidance  
7. leaving to others  
8. reconsideration 
9. worrying  
10. regretting  
Taking a long time (e.g., “I make decisions quickly”) 
Delaying decisions (e.g., “I delay deciding”) 
Avoiding decisions (e.g., “I try to avoid making 
decisions”) 
Leaving decisions to someone else (e.g., “I tend to 
leave decisions to someone else”) 
Instability of decision (e.g., “I often reconsider my 
decision.”) 
Worrying about decisions after they’re made (e.g., 
“After making a decision, I can’t get it out of my 
mind.”) 
Regretting decisions after they’re made (e.g., “After 




11. calling oneself indecisive 
 
NOTES: 1) Attributes indecisive behaviors to 
difficulty; 2) Unclear whether delay is evasive or 
engaged; 3) Behaviors 1–5 each seem to be face 
valid indecisive behaviors, whereas behaviors 6 
and 7 appear to be epiphenomenal. That is, it 
seems odd to characterize someone as indecisive 
(i.e., having difficulty deciding) if they exhibited 
none of the first five behaviors, but chronically 
worry about or regret their decisions; 4) Unclear 
what the worry is about. 
Goodstein (1972) 
Indecisiveness: Inability to make decisions.  
Haraburda (1999)  
Explicitly adopts Van Matre & Cooper’s (1984) 
definition of indecisiveness. Items in 
Haraburda’s scale suggest a range of meanings 
of indecisiveness, including 1) perceptions by 
others of not being decisive (item 2); 2) low 
decision process or outcome quality (item 1 
reversed); 3) experience of stress when deciding 
(item 3); 4) hypervigilant decision-making (item 
4); 5) failure to follow-through (item 5 reversed) 
Domain general scale: 
1. I am good at making decisions. 
2. People who really know me (e.g., friends, 
family) describe me as a decisive person. 
3. Making decisions is stressful for me. 
4. If making a decision is stressful for me, I make 
quicker decisions than I should just to end the 
decision-making process. 
5. Once I make a decision, I follow through on it. 
Holland & Holland (1977) 
No explicit definition, yet identify three types of 
indecisives: 1) doesn’t have to decide yet, so 
stays undecided, 2) mildly anxious, immature, or 
incompetent, 3) indecisive 
 
NOTE: The three types of indecisives do not 
have the same logical status. The first describes 
both a cause and a behavior, the second a cause 
and no behavior, and the third is tautological. 
The authors speculate on the causes of indecisiveness: 
Failure to acquire necessary cultural involvement 
Low self-confidence 
Low tolerance for ambiguity 
Undeveloped sense of identity 
Jones (1989) 
Indecisiveness: “Inability to make decisions 
without unnecessary delay, difficulty, or reliance 
on others” (p. 479). 
1. I feel relieved if someone else makes a decision 
for me. 
2. I am an indecisive person; I delay deciding and 
have difficulty making up my mind. 
3. I frequently have difficulty making decisions. 
 
Mann, Burnett, Radford, & Ford (1997) 
Indecision (inferred from items in the 
procrastination subscale of the decisional 
conflict scale): “Delay in deciding or acting on a 
decision.” 
Procrastination subscale of the Melbourne Decision 
Making Questionnaire: 
1. I waste a lot of time on trivial matters before 
getting to the final decision. 
2. Even after I have made a decision I delay acting 
upon it.  
3. When I have to make a decision I wait a long 
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time before starting to think about it.  
4. I delay making decisions until it is too late.  
5. I put off making decisions. 
Milgram & Tenne (2000) 
Indecisiveness: Inability to make timely 
decisions in minor matters. 
 
NOTE: The authors considered defining 
“indecisiveness” as decision (cognitive) 
difficulty, but chose decision latency instead 
because the latter was less strongly correlated 
with decision tension. Decision tension itself 
consists of two parameters: i) the tension or 
discomfort experienced during the decision 
making process and (ii) the tension or discomfort 
experienced after making the decision when 
having second thoughts. By defining 
indecisiveness as latency, they were able to 
construct a 2 x 2 (indecisiveness x tension) 
typology, yielding tense and relaxed indecisives. 
  
NOTE: Response to scale items are on a 4-point 
Likert scale measuring decision latency: 1) 
“Immediately or Very Quickly,” 2) “Less 
Quickly,” 3) “Much Less Quickly,” and 4) 
“After Considerable Delay.”  
 
Questions that are of minor importance in life 
1. Whether to go out to have a good time or not?    
2. Which garment/pair of shoes to buy?    
3. Which restaurant to go to?         
4. Where to spend a vacation?   
5. What to wear in the morning?         
6. Which movie to see?   
7. Whether to go to the beach?        
8. Whether to leave a tip for the waiter when the 
service was poor?   
9. Whether to celebrate a happy occasion in an 
expensive restaurant?  
10. What to choose from the menu in the restaurant?         
11. Whether to buy a new appliance (e.g., TV, video)?             
12. Whether to work overtime nights, holidays, or 
weekends?        
13. Which road to take to reach a new destination?   
14. What birthday present to buy for a friend?    
15. Whether to buy an expensive book that everyone 
is talking about?  
 
Questions that are of major importance in life 
 
1. Which course of studies to choose?  
2. Whether to continue to study for a higher degree 
(M.A. or Ph.D.)?      
3. Which career to choose?  
4. Where (in what setting, company) to work?  
5. Whether to remain in one’s current place of 6. 
employment or to look for a better job? 
7. Whether to change one’s current occupation (field, 
profession) or to make no change?                              
8. In what direction to make a change in occupation?  
9. To choose a lifetime companion?  
10. To marry?     
11. Whom to invite to the wedding when the number 
of places is limited?  
12. To separate from/divorce one’s spouse (long-term 
companion)?  
13. Where to buy a new home/apartment?  
14. To leave the parents’ home in which one grew up?  
15. To live overseas for an extended period?  
Rassin & Muris (2005a, 2005b) and Rassin, Muris, Franken, Smit, & Wong (2007) 
Indecisiveness (implied): Domain-general Indecisiveness Scale (Frost & Shows) 15- and 11-item 
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difficulty with decisions (but see Frost & Shows 
entry above for specific breakdown). 
versions. Note that the 11-item version dropped the 
following domain-specific items: 
4) I have a hard time planning my free time. 
7) When ordering from a menu, I usually find it 
difficult to decide what to get. 
13) I do not get assignments done on time because I 
cannot decide what to do first. 
14) I have trouble completing assignments because I 
can’t prioritize what is most important. 
Reed (1985) 
Indecision: “Failure or hesitation in deciding, an 
inability to make up one’s mind or come to a 
conclusion. Basically, it refers to difficulty in 
choosing between alternatives” (p. 171). 
 
NOTE: It is unclear how asking for more 
information is a direct measure of indecision. 
Rather, it would lead to increased decision 
latency both in acquiring the information and in 
processing it, presumably. 
Suggests two ways to quantify (i.e., operationalize) 
indecision are by a) the time taken to make a choice or 
decision, or b) the number of requests made for 
further information.  
Salomone (1982) 
Indecisiveness: “Fail[ure] to make important 
decisions not because of a lack sufficient 
information, but because of personal qualities 
that will not allow one to reach a decisional state 
of mind and take a course of action” (p. 496). 
 
Van Matre & Cooper (1984) 
Indecision is herein defined as the state of being 
undecided. On the other hand, indecisiveness is 
herein defined as the trait of having difficulty 
making decisions 
 
Indecisiveness: “Trait of having difficulty 
making decisions” (p. 16). 
Personal Decisiveness Scale (Van Matre & 
Cooper, 1984), an eight item measure using a 5-point 
Likert scale 
von Neumann & Morgenstern (1944) 
Indecisiveness: inability to state which 
alternative one prefers, while not admitting that 
the alternatives are equally desirable 
 
Wanberg & Muchinsky (1992) 
Indecisiveness: The inability to make decisions 
readily.  
Inferred from their agreement with what they state is 





Definitions of “Indecision,” “Indecisive,” and “Indecisiveness” from Eight Dictionaries 
Dictionary Definition 
The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English 
Language, (2009). Fourth 
Edition. Houghton Mifflin 
Company.  
Indecision:  
Reluctance or an inability to make up one's mind; irresolution 
Indecisive:  
1. Prone to or characterized by indecision; irresolute: an indecisive manager. 
2. Inconclusive: an indecisive contest; an indecisive battle. 
3. Not clearly defined; indefinite: indecisive boundaries running through 
mountainous terrain. 
Random House Dictionary 
(2009) 
Indecision: Inability to decide 
Indecisive:  
1. Characterized by indecision, as persons; irresolute; undecided. 
2. Not decisive or conclusive: a severe but indecisive battle.  
3. Lacking definition; vague or indistinct: the indecisive outline of the distant 
hills.  
The Merriam Webster’s 
Collegiate Dictionary, 10th 
Edition 1994 Merriam-
Webster Springfield, MA 
Indecision: A wavering between two or more possible courses of action: 
IRRESOLUTION (uncertain how to act or proceed.) 
Indecisive: Marked or prone to indecision: IRRESOLUTE  
Webster's New World 
College Dictionary (2005). 
Wiley Publishing: 
Cleveland, OH  
 
Indecision:  
Lack of decision; inability to decide or tendency to change the mind 
frequently; hesitation or vacillation 
Indecisive:  
1. Not decisive; not conclusive or final 
2. characterized by indecision; hesitating or vacillating 
Oxford 2nd Edition 1989 Indecision:  
Want of decision; inability to decide or to make up one's mind; a wavering 
between possible courses of action; hesitation.  
Indecisive:  
1. Not decisive; not such as to decide or settle (a question, contest, etc.); 
inconclusive. 
2. Characterized by indecision; undecided; hesitating; irresolute. 
3. Uncertain, doubtful; not definite, indistinct. 
Indecisiveness:  
The quality of being indecisive.  
Kernerman English 
Learner’s Dictionary. 
1986-2008 K Dictionaries 
Ltd and partners. All rights 
reserved. 
Indecision: 
The state of not being able to decide; hesitation.  
Indecisive: 
1 not producing a clear decision or a definite result; an indecisive battle. 




Want of decision; want of settled purpose, or of firmness; indetermination; 
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Copyright 1996, 1998 
MICRA Inc. 
wavering of mind; irresolution; vacillation; hesitation.  
Indecisive: 
1. Not decisive; not bringing to a final or ultimate issue; as, an indecisive 
battle, argument, answer. 
2. Undetermined; prone to indecision; irresolute; unsettled; wavering; 
vacillating; hesitating; as, an indecisive state of mind; an indecisive 
character. 
Indecisiveness:  
The state of being indecisive; unsettled state. 
WordNet 3.0 Indecision:  
1. Doubt concerning two or more possible alternatives or courses of action; 
"his indecision was only momentary but the opportunity was lost" [syn: 
irresolution, indecisiveness ] 
2. The trait of irresolution; a lack of firmness of character or purpose; "the 
king's incurable indecisiveness caused turmoil in his court" [syn: 
indecisiveness ] 
Indecisive:  
1. Characterized by lack of decision and firmness; "an indecisive manager 
brought the enterprise to a standstill" 
2. Not definitely settling something; "a long and indecisive war" 







Behavioral Indecisiveness Scale 
Commitment Indecisiveness  
comm1 I take a long time to think before I settle on one of the options I am faced with. 
comm2R I come to a decision quickly. 
comm3 I take “forever” to make up my mind. 
comm4 I wait until the last minute before deciding on something. 
comm5 I avoid making definite plans until I have to. 
comm6R When I have to take a position on some matter, I do. 
comm7 I refuse to take a stand on an issue, even though I feel that I should decide. 
comm8R When faced with a choice, I make it with certainty. 
comm9 When asked to commit to something, I answer something non-committal, like “Maybe,” “I’ll see,” or “I’ll think about it.” 
comm10 When I have to decide, I find myself unwilling to commit to a specific course of action. 
comm11R I take less time to commit to a choice than do other people. 
comm12 It seems that deciding on the most trivial thing takes me a long time. 
comm13R When ordering from an unfamiliar menu, I'm the first in my party to select a meal. 
comm14R I do not spend a lot of time thinking about decisions before making them. 
comm15R I commit to a course of action well before the deadline. 
comm16 I don't come to a decision until I am reminded of the consequences of not deciding. 
comm17 I intend to make a decision, but the opportunity passes because I wait too long. 
comm18 I feel forced to make a choice when I would rather not choose at all. 
comm19R When I shop, I don't need to spend too much time thinking about what to buy. 
comm20R I do not need to be pressured in order to make a difficult commitment. 
 
Initiation indecisiveness  
init1 When I can, I take a long time to think before acting on a decision I have made. 
init2R I implement my plan at the first opportunity. 
init3 I wait until the last minute before proceeding with a path I’ve chosen. 
init4 When it comes time to implement a plan, I drag my feet. 
170 
 
init5R Once I make a decision, I do not go back over it when it comes time to act. 
init6 I deliberately pass up an opportunity to start fulfilling an obligation I have made. 
init7 When asked when I will do what I said I would do, I answer something non-committal, like “I’ll see,” “Soon,” or “I’m not sure.” 
init9 I hesitate before actually going through with a commitment. 
init10 I back out of a decision I have made. 
init11R I follow through on my promise. 
init19 When I actually have to proceed with a choice I've made, I reconsider my options. 
init8R I waste no time starting on something I said I would do. 
init12 When it comes time to act on a choice, I change my mind and choose a different option. 
init13 Before I start a course of action I intended to carry out, I change my mind and take the opposite course of action. 
init14R I do not waver when I have to actually fulfill a pledge I have made. 
init15R I do not hesitate when it comes time to honor a commitment. 
init16 I make commitments knowing I will probably not follow up on them. 
init17 I say I will do something, I intend to do it, but ultimately I don't. 
init18R When it comes time to act on a decision I've made, I do not change my mind. 
init20R I put my money where my mouth is. 
 
Completion Indecisiveness 
comp1 I take longer than I should to complete a commitment. 
comp2R I complete a task I have agreed to do without delay. 
comp3 I wait until the deadline before bringing a project to a close. 
comp4R I finish something ahead of schedule. 
comp5 I abandon a plan before I have seen it through to the end. 
comp6 After I have started to carry out my decision, I start questioning it. 
comp7R I steadfastly work to finish something even when I am not 100% confident about it. 
comp8 I hesitate about whether to complete an obligation. 
comp9R I see a commitment through to the finish. 
comp10 Before I finish acting on my decision, I abruptly stop and reverse that decision. 
comp12R I follow through on a decision I make. 
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Post-completion Indecisiveness  
post1 After I do something, I promptly change my mind and undo it. 
post2 I try to reverse the effects of a recent decision I made. 
post3 I make a decision that is inconsistent with something I decided a short time before. 
post4 I make a choice that is the opposite of a previous choice. 
post5 I take a position that is different from a position I took recently. 
post6 I have a sudden change of heart, and switch my stand on an issue. 
post7 Soon after deciding, I find myself making a second decision that reverses the effects of the first. 
post8 People find it surprising how I change my mind about a decision soon after I make it. 
post9R Once I make a commitment to something, I do not change my mind. 





Core Indecisiveness Scale 
Latency 
1. When I am in a group that is deciding something, I take longer to make a decision 
than do other people. 
2. I need more time than I actually have when I am faced with making a choice. 
3. It seems that deciding on the most trivial things takes me a long time. 
4. I am slow to decide. 
Not-deciding 
5. I miss the deadline for making a relatively straightforward decision. 
6. I intend to make a decision, but wait so long that the opportunity to decide passes. 
7. I am undecided about where I stand on a social issue. 
Changing 
8. I change my mind after I choose something. 
9. I try to undo the effects of a previous decision I made. 







Proximal Behavioral Contributors – Study 2 
Decisional Procrastination 
1. I waste a lot of time on trivial matters before getting to the final decision. 
2. When I have to make a decision, I wait a long time before starting to think about 
it. 
3. I delay making a decision until it is too late. 
4. I put off making a decision. 
5. I avoid thinking about a decision even though I know I will eventually have to 
make it. 
6. Once I know I have a choice to make, I do not put off thinking about it. (R) 
Buck-passing 
1. I leave a decision to someone else. 
2. I avoid taking the responsibility to make a decision. 
3. If a decision can be made by me or by another person, I let the other person make 
it. 
4. I let someone who is better informed decide for me. 
5. I try to get out of having to make a decision. 
6. I ask others to decide for me when I know that I should be deciding. 
Impasse 
1. I get stuck for a while when making a decision. 
2. When I am thinking about what to choose, there reaches a point where I don’t 
know how to proceed. 
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3. I end up thinking in circles when deciding something. 
4. When trying to make a decision, I get so overwhelmed that I feel paralyzed. 
5. Even after I think that I have made up my mind about something, I have trouble 
getting myself to “bite the bullet” and actually commit to that decision. 
Strategic Waiting 
1. After making a tentative selection, I wait for a while before committing to it in 
case I discover something that might change my mind. 
2. As soon I decide something, I immediately go with that decision. (R) 
3. Once I make a choice, I sleep on it before actually going through with it. 
4. When I know exactly what I want and there is pressure to decide, I still do not 
make my decision final until I have to. 
5. I make a decision without much delay, but then wait for the right moment before 
actually committing to that decision. 
Slow Processing 
1. When faced with a decision, I consider each fact one at a time. 
2. I slowly examine the relevant information in a decision. 
3. I take my time thinking about my choices before going ahead with one of them. 
4. I am not fast at comparing my alternatives. 
5. I do not decide in a rush. 
Extensive Processing 
1. When making a decision, I collect lots of facts. 




3. I research my options before deciding. 
4. When I am buying something, I compare the details on the labels. 
5. I try to consider several factors when making a simple decision. 
6. When I plan something, I make sure I have a backup. 
7. When I am presented with two good options, I look for a third option. 
Re-processing 
1. I double-check everything before making my final commitment. 
2. I triple-check things before deciding. 
3. I go over the relevant information as often as necessary for the best option to 
emerge. 
4. I re-examine the benefits of an option until I am convinced it is better than other 
options. 




Milgram and Tenne’s Minor Decision Scales 
Minor Decision Speed Scale 
 
Routine Decisions of Daily Life 
 
There are people who reach decisions on routine matters very quickly, and others who reach 
decisions on the same matters only after a considerable lapse of time. By the same token, there 
are issues that one decides immediately and other issues that the same person hesitates for some 
time before reaching a decision. How do you reach these kinds of decisions on routine matters?   
 
The following is a list of things of no great importance in and of themselves. How much time do 
you need to make up your mind about them? If a given question is not relevant for you, please try 
to answer it as if it were. Please, do not skip any of the items. For each question there are four 
choices. Circle the answer that is most correct for you and try to be as forthcoming as possible.  
 
If you decide about a given question immediately or very quickly, circle the number 1.  
If you decide about a given question less quickly, circle the number 2.  
If you decide about a given question much less quickly, circle the number 3.  
If you decide about a given question after considerable delay, circle the number 4.  
 
1 2 3 4 









How quickly do you decide 
 
1. Whether to go out to have a good time or not? 1 2 3 4 
2. Which garment/pair of shoes to buy? 1 2 3 4 
3. Which restaurant to go to? 1 2 3 4 
4. Where to spend a vacation? 1 2 3 4 
5. What to wear in the morning? 1 2 3 4 
6. Which movie to see? 1 2 3 4 
7. Whether to go to the beach? 1 2 3 4 
8. Whether to leave a tip for the waiter when the service was poor? 1 2 3 4 
9. Whether to celebrate a happy occasion in an expensive restaurant? 1 2 3 4 
10. What to choose from the menu in the restaurant?  1 2 3 4 
11. Whether to buy a new appliance (e.g., TV, video)? 1 2 3 4 
12. Whether to work overtime nights, holidays, or weekends? 1 2 3 4 
13. Which road to take to reach a new destination? 1 2 3 4 
14. What birthday present to buy for a friend? 1 2 3 4 
15. Whether to buy an expensive book that everyone is talking about? 1 2 3 4 
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Minor Decision Tension Scale 
Routine Decisions of Daily Life 
    
We would like to know how you feel when you are making a decision. There are people that feel 
comfortable and are completely relaxed when they are making a decision. There are others who 
feel tense and troubled when they are making a decision. They hesitate, shift back and forth, and 
fear they will make a mistake, etc. How is it with you?  
 
The following is a list of routine matters that appeared on the previous page. Answer each 
question according to the following scale:  
 
If you feel comfortable and relaxed while making the decision, circle the number 1.  
If you feel a little tense, but not really troubled while making the decision, circle the number 2.  
If you feel tense and uncomfortable while making the decision, circle the number 3.  
If you feel very tense and uncomfortable while making the decision, circle the number 4.  
 




A Litte Tense,  





Very Tense and 
Uncomfortable 
 
How comfortable are you when you decide 
 
1. Whether to go out to have a good time or not? 1 2 3 4 
2. Which garment/pair of shoes to buy? 1 2 3 4 
3. Which restaurant to go to? 1 2 3 4 
4. Where to spend a vacation? 1 2 3 4 
5. What to wear in the morning? 1 2 3 4 
6. Which movie to see? 1 2 3 4 
7. Whether to go to the beach? 1 2 3 4 
8. Whether to leave a tip for the waiter when the service was poor? 1 2 3 4 
9. Whether to celebrate a happy occasion in an expensive restaurant? 1 2 3 4 
10. What to choose from the menu in the restaurant?  1 2 3 4 
11. Whether to buy a new appliance (e.g., TV, video)? 1 2 3 4 
12. Whether to work overtime nights, holidays, or weekends? 1 2 3 4 
13. Which road to take to reach a new destination? 1 2 3 4 
14. What birthday present to buy for a friend? 1 2 3 4 







Big Five Inventory 
Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. For example, do you 
agree that you are someone who likes to spend time with others? Please write a number next 
to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that statement. 
 










I see myself as someone who... 
 1. Is talkative  23. Tends to be lazy 
 2. Tends to find fault with others  24. Is emotionally stable, not easily upset 
 3. Does a thorough job  25. Is inventive 
 4. Is depressed, blue  26. Has an assertive personality 
 5. Is original, comes up with new ideas  27. Can be cold and aloof 
 6. Is reserved  28. Perseveres until the task is finished 
 7. Is helpful and unselfish with others  29. Can be moody 
 8. Can be somewhat careless  30. Values artistic, aesthetic experiences 
 9. Is relaxed, handles stress well  31. Is sometimes shy, inhibited 
 10. Is curious about many different things  32. Is considerate and kind to almost 
everyone 
 11. Is full of energy  33. Does things efficiently 
 12. Starts quarrels with others  34. Remains calm in tense situations 
 13. Is a reliable worker  35. Prefers work that is routine 
 14. Can be tense  36. Is outgoing, sociable 
 15. Is ingenious, a deep thinker  37. Is sometimes rude to others 
 16. Generates a lot of enthusiasm  38. Makes plans and follows through 
with them 
 17. Has a forgiving nature  39. Gets nervous easily 
 18. Tends to be disorganized  40. Likes to reflect, play with ideas 
 19. Worries a lot  41. Has few artistic interests 
 20. Has an active imagination  42. Likes to cooperate with others 
 21. Tends to be quiet  43. Is easily distracted 
 22. Is generally trusting  44. Is sophisticated in art, music, or 
literature 




BFI scale scoring (“R” denotes reverse-scored items): 
Extraversion: 1, 6R, 11, 16, 21R, 26, 31R, 36 
Agreeableness: 2R, 7, 12R, 17, 22, 27R, 32, 37R, 42 
Conscientiousness: 3, 8R, 13, 18R, 23R, 28, 33, 38, 43R 
Neuroticism: 4, 9R, 14, 19, 24R, 29, 34R, 39 







Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) 
1. I don't like to have to do a lot of thinking. (R) 
2. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something. (R) 
3. I prefer to do something that challenges my thinking abilities rather than something 
that requires little thought. 
4. I prefer complex to simple problems. 
5. Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction. (R) 
6. I trust my initial feelings about people. 
7. I believe in trusting my hunches. 
8. My initial impressions of people are almost always right. 
9. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my “gut feelings.” 
10. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong even if I can't explain how I know. 
 
(R) denotes reverse-scored items 
 
REI scale scoring: 
Rational (Analytic): 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 








Fundamental Attitudes Scale (FAS) 
The statements below address difficult societal topics. For each one indicate whether 
you agree, disagree, or do not know. 
 
1. It is fundamentally wrong for politicians to act based on a religious viewpoint. 
2. The death penalty is sometimes justified. 
3. Marriage should exclusively take place between a man and a woman. 
4. Euthanasia is a fundamental human right. 
5. Couples that are unable to procreate should adopt children instead of turning to in vitro 
fertilization. 
6. Governmental intervention should be kept at the minimum. 
7. Suicide is never a rational option. 
8. Western society is obliged to interfere in third world countries. 
9. Humans are meant to have only one sexual partner. 
10. Crime can best be tackled by more investigations and more severe penalties. 
11. There is life on other planets. 
12. Traffic jams can best be tackled by making car driving more expensive. 
13. Official writings that contain spelling and grammar flaws should be disregarded. 
14. Ethnical integration is the best way to prevent cultural conflicts. 







Modified Hawaii Task 
Hawaii 
Imagine that you have just taken a tough qualifying examination. It is the end of 
the semester, you feel tired and run-down, and you are not sure that you passed the exam. 
In case you failed you would have to take the exam again in a couple of months—after 
the holiday break. You now have an opportunity to buy a very attractive five-day 
vacation package to Hawaii at an exceptionally low price. The special offer expires 
today. Would you (circle one) 
 
1. Not buy the vacation package 
 
2. Buy the non-refundable vacation package 
 
3. Buy the refundable vacation package for an additional $10 fee (Note: the fee is non-
refundable) 
 
4. Pay a $10 non-refundable fee to retain the rights to buy the vacation package at the 
same exceptional price the day after tomorrow—after you find out whether or not you 





Hawaii Alternative Endings… 
Imagine that you have just taken a tough qualifying examination. It is the end of the 
semester, you feel tired and run-down, and you know you failed the exam. You will 
have to take the exam again in a couple of months—after the holiday break. You now 
have an opportunity to buy a very attractive five-day vacation package to Hawaii at an 
exceptionally low price. The special offer expires today. 
 
 (Circle one)      
Would you buy the vacation package? Yes No 
 
(Counterbalancing version below) 
 
Imagine that you have just taken a tough qualifying examination. It is the end of the 
semester, you feel tired and run-down, and you know you passed the exam. You now 
have an opportunity to buy a very attractive five-day vacation package to Hawaii at an 
exceptionally low price. The special offer expires today. 
 
(Circle one)      










As you know, I am in the final stages of my graduate work at the University of 
Michigan studying how people decide. One of the reasons I'm writing is that for my last 
study, I am turning to friends and family and asking them to participate in my online 
study, and to spread the word to others they think would be willing and able to help. The 
more participants I have, the more reliable my results will be. 
 
To participate, just click the link below. I would also be very grateful if you could 
forward this e-mail to friends who you think would be willing to take about 30 minutes of 












Online Consent for Study 3 
 
Welcome to the differences in decision making study! 
Before you begin, please read the four points below describing participation in the 
study, and then decide whether you want to continue.  
 
1. I understand that participation in this study is open to adults only, and attest 
that I am at least 18 years old.  
2. I understand that my participation is anonymous. Although I will be asked to 
provide a few pieces of basic demographic information for statistical reasons, I 
will not be asked to provide any personally identifying information. 
3. I understand that participation in this study is voluntary: I can skip or refuse to 
answer any survey question that makes me feel uncomfortable, and can leave 
the study at any time.  
4. I understand that my responses will only be submitted at the end of the study. If 
I choose to end the study before the end, none of my responses will be 
submitted.  
 
If you have questions, read the Frequently Asked Questions below. If you do not 
want to participate, simply close the browser. Otherwise scroll down and click "continue" 





Frequently Asked Questions 
Q: Why do you need my help? 
A: I study decision making. In my research so far, all my participants have been 18 to 20 
year-old college students who participated for course credit. For my results to be more 
generally valid, I need to draw on a broader sample of participants—ideally ones who 
might be more intrinsically motivated to answer questions.  
Q: Who can participate? 
A: Simple: I am looking for the widest variety of people possible, but they must be fluent 
in English, and be at least 18 years old. Because the study is online, participants must 
also have internet access.  
Q: What is the study about? 
A: The study looks for differences in how people make decisions. It consists of 
responding to questions and performing a few decision-related tasks online. The study 
poses no risk and no discomfort to participants.  
Q: Why should I do the study? 
A: There is no direct and immediate benefit to you for participating in this study. 
However, your participation would really help Georges with his dissertation research, 
which aims to eventually inform methods to improve people's decision-making.  
Q: What do I need to do? 
A: Simply click on "continue" below and you will be asked to answer some questions, 
perform some decision tasks, and provide basic demographic information. Note that your 
participation in this project is voluntary. You can skip or refuse to answer any survey 





Q: How long does it take? 
A: The study itself usually takes about 30 minutes, and has to be done in one sitting.  
Q: What will you do with my responses? 
A: The study is anonymous. You are not asked to provide any personally identifying 
information. There is no way for me or anyone else to connect responses with specific 
individuals. There is also no way for me or anyone else to know whether or not you chose 
to participate. The study data will be analyzed and, hopefully, published. It is kept 
confidential to the extent provided by federal, state, and local law. However, the 
Institutional Review Board or university and government officials responsible for 
monitoring this study may inspect these records. Again, the study is anonymous.  
Q: What would I be agreeing to by participating in the study? 
A: First, you are authorizing the University of Michigan to use the information from your 
participation in this experiment for research and teaching purposes. Second you agree not 
to divulge the nature of the tasks and questions in the study to other potential participants 
until the study is completed in July 2009. I encourage you to send this e-mail invitation to 
whomever you think might want to participate, but please do not comment about the 
study in any way—positive or negative—as that may influence how that person responds.  
Q: Where can I see the results of the study? 
A: The responses will be compiled and analyzed in May and June and a summary of the 
results will be published on http: //sitemaker.umich.edu/decisionlab/home. Note that 






Core Indecisiveness Scale (CIS-22) 
Latency 
1. When I am in a group that is deciding something, I take longer to make a decision than 
do other people. 
2. I need more time than I actually have when I am faced with making a choice. 
3. It takes me a long time to decide on something trivial. 
4. I am slow to decide. 
5. I take longer to settle on an option than do other people faced with the same options. 
6. I make my choice as quickly as possible. 
7. Someone tells me that I am taking a long time to choose something. 
Not-Deciding 
1. I miss the deadline for making a relatively straightforward decision. 
2. I intend to make a decision, but wait so long that the opportunity to decide passes. 
3. I am undecided about where I stand on a social issue. 
4. I fail to make a decision that I had the opportunity to make and feel I should have made. 
5. I do not have an opinion on an important matter that others have opinions on. 
6. A decision that I am expected to make remains unmade. 
7. I abstain from a decision. 
8. I “sit on the fence” after those around me have already committed to something one way 
or the other. 
Changing 
1. I change my mind after I choose something. 
2. I try to undo the effects of a previous decision I made. 




4. I make what I think is a final choice, but then end up switching it later. 
5. I commit to something, but then change my mind and break the commitment. 
6. Someone tells me that I am flip-flopping on a choice that I have already made. 
7. I commit to something, but then change my commitment more than once. 
8. Someone points out that I am making a decision that is not consistent with a previous 







Proximal Behavioral Contributors – Study 3 
Decisional Procrastination 
1. I waste a lot of time on trivial matters before getting to the final decision. 
2. When I have to make a decision, I wait a long time before starting to think about 
it. 
3. I delay making a decision until it is too late. 
4. I put off making a decision. 
5. I avoid thinking about a decision even though I know I will eventually have to 
make it. 
6. Once I know I have a choice to make, I do not put off thinking about it. 
Buck-passing 
1. I leave a decision to someone else. 
2. I avoid taking the responsibility to make a decision. 
3. If a decision can be made by me or by another person, I let the other person  
make it. 
4. I let someone who is better informed decide for me. 
5. I try to get out of having to make a decision. 
6. I ask others to decide for me when I know that I should be deciding. 
Impasse 
1. I get stuck for a while when making a decision. 
2. When I am thinking about what to choose, there reaches a point where I don’t 




3. I end up thinking in circles when deciding something. 
4. When trying to make a decision, I get so overwhelmed that I feel paralyzed. 
5. Even after I think that I have made up my mind about something, I have trouble 
getting myself to “bite the bullet” and actually commit to that decision. 
Strategic waiting 
1. After making a tentative selection, I wait for a while before committing to it in 
case I discover something that might change my mind. 
2. As soon I decide something, I immediately go with that decision. 
3. Once I make a choice, I sleep on it before actually going through with it. 
4. When I know exactly what I want and there is pressure to decide, I still do not 
make my decision final until I have to. 
5. I make a decision without much delay, but then wait for the right moment before 
actually committing to that decision. 
Slow processing 
1. When faced with a decision, I consider each fact one at a time. 
2. I slowly examine the relevant information in a decision. 
3. I take my time thinking about my choices before going ahead with one of them. 
4. I am not fast at comparing my alternatives. 
5. I do not decide in a rush. 
6. I deliberately take my time when deciding something. 
7. I slow myself down to consider my options more carefully. 






1. When making a decision, I collect lots of facts. 
2. When faced with a choice, I make the effort to look for more information than is 
normally given. 
3. I research my options before deciding. 
4. When I am buying something, I compare the details on the labels. 
5. I try to consider several factors when making a simple decision. 
6. When I plan something, I make sure I have a backup. 
7. When I am presented with two good options, I look for a third option. 
Re-processing 
1. I double-check everything before making my final commitment. 
2. I triple-check things before deciding. 
3. I go over the relevant information as often as necessary for the best option to 
emerge. 
4. I re-examine the benefits of an option until I am convinced it is better than other 
options. 









1. If I knew that I could never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million 
dollars 
2. I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large 
3. I’d be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it 
Greed 
1. Having a lot of money is not especially important to me 
2. I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods 
Modesty 
1. I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average person is 
2. I want people to know that I am an important person of high status 
Sincerity 
1. I wouldn’t use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work, even if I thought it 
would succeed 
2. If I want something from someone, I will laugh at that person’s worst jokes 
3. I wouldn’t pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me 
Emotionality 
Anxiety 
1. I sometimes can’t help worrying about little things 




3. If I were a parent, I would probably tend to worry a lot about my children 
4. I worry a lot less than most people do 
5. Sometimes I feel nervous without really knowing why 
6. I rarely, if ever, have trouble sleeping due to stress or anxiety 
7. I tend to remain calm even when other people get stressed out 
8. I get very anxious when waiting to hear about an important decision 
Dependence 
1. When I suffer from a painful experience, I need someone to make me feel 
comfortable 
2. I can "tough it out" on my own through any kind of personal hardship 
3. When I have a problem, I like to get advice from others 
4. I can handle difficult situations without needing emotional support from anyone 
else 
Fearfulness 
1. I would feel afraid if I had to travel in bad weather conditions 
2. People say that I am a fearless person 
3. When it comes to physical danger, I am very fearful 
4. Even in an emergency I wouldn’t feel like panicking 
Sentimentality 
1. I feel like crying when I see other people crying 
2. I feel strong emotions when someone close to me is going away for a long time 
3. People sometimes say that I am not sensitive to others’ feelings 






1. I am energetic nearly all the time 
2. On most days, I feel cheerful and optimistic 
3. People often tell me that I should try to cheer up 
4. I tend to look on the bright side of a situation more than other people do 
5. Most people are more upbeat and dynamic than I generally am 
Social boldness 
1. I rarely express my opinions in group meetings 
2. In social situations, I’m usually the one who makes the first move 
3. When I’m in a group of people, I’m often the one who speaks on behalf of the 
group 
4. In a large group discussion, I would only make comments if someone asked me 
directly 
5. I can handle embarrassing social situations better than most people can 
Sociability 
1. I prefer jobs that involve active social interaction to those that involve working 
alone 
2. The first thing that I always do in a new place is to make friends 
Social self-esteem 
1. I feel reasonably satisfied with myself overall 
2. I feel that I am an unpopular person 






1. People sometimes tell me that I’m too stubborn 
2. I am usually quite flexible in my opinions when people disagree with me 
3. When people tell me that I’m wrong, my first reaction is to argue with them 
Forgiveness 
1. I rarely hold a grudge, even against people who have badly wronged me 
2. My attitude toward people who have treated me badly is "forgive and forget" 
3. I find it hard to fully forgive someone who has done something mean to me 
Gentleness 
1. People sometimes tell me that I am too critical of others 
2. I tend to be lenient in judging other people 
3. Even when people make a lot of mistakes, I rarely say anything negative 
Patience 
1. It doesn’t take much to make me angry 
2. People think of me as someone who has a quick temper 
3. I rarely feel anger, even when people treat me quite badly 
4. Most people tend to get angry more quickly than I do 
5. People can approach me without having to worry about the mood I’m in 
Conscientiousness 
Diligence 
1. I often push myself very hard when trying to achieve a goal 




3. Often when I set a goal, I end up quitting without having reached it 
4. I do only the minimum amount of work needed to get by 
5. I tend to give up on a task if it seems very difficult 
6. I tend to procrastinate a lot before really getting to work on a project 
Organization 
1. I like to keep all my belongings stored in their proper place 
2. I plan ahead and organize things, to avoid scrambling at the last minute 
3. When working, I sometimes have difficulties due to being disorganized 
Perfectionism 
1. I often check my work over repeatedly to find any mistakes 
2. When working on something, I don’t pay much attention to small details 
3. I always try to be accurate in my work, even at the expense of time 
4. People often call me a perfectionist 
5. Even when writing a personal letter, I read it over to make sure there are no errors 
Prudence 
1. I make decisions based on the feeling of the moment rather than on careful 
thought 
2. I make a lot of mistakes because I don’t think before I act 
3. I don’t allow my impulses to govern my behavior 
4. I usually stop myself before doing anything that I might later regret 
5. Sometimes I do things on impulse that turn out later to be unwise 







1. I would be quite bored by a visit to an art gallery 
2. I wouldn’t spend my time reading a book of poetry 
3. If I had the opportunity, I would like to attend a classical music concert 
Creativity 
1. I prefer doing things the way I’ve always done them, rather than waste time 
looking for a new way 
2. I would like a job that requires following a routine rather than being creative 
3. I have often solved problems by using new ideas that other people had not 
imagined 
4. I would enjoy creating a work of art, such as a novel, a song, or a painting 
5. People have often told me that I have a good imagination 
6. I don’t think of myself as the artistic or creative type 
Inquisitiveness 
1. I’m interested in learning about the history and politics of other countries 
2. I find TV nature programs to be very boring 
3. I’ve never really enjoyed looking through an encyclopedia 
Unconventionality 
1. I like hearing about opinions that are very different from those of most people 
2. I think that paying attention to radical ideas is a waste of time 
3. I like people who have unconventional views 





Optimistic Bias Task 
In the next few pages, you will be asked some questions about five events that could 
occur in the future. 
(Page 1) 
Using the scale below, rate how likely you think it is for the following events to occur to 
the average North American of your age and gender in the next 5 years. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 








• Being involved in a serious car accident 
• Food poisoning  
• Losing a job 
• Going on a vacation that ends up being a disaster 
• Being the victim of a mugging 
(Page 2) 
Using the scale below, rate the extent to which one could prevent the following events 
from occurring in the next 5 years. 
The risk of 
occurrence cannot 
be reduced 
The risk of 
occurrence can be 
reduced by a little. 
The risk of 
occurrence can be 
reduced by a lot. 









Using the scale below, rate how serious each of the following events would be if they 
occurred in the next 5 years. 
Not at all 






Using the scale below, rate how likely you think it is for the following events to occur to 
you in the next 5 years. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 














Sinking Ship Task 
Part 1 
Imagine you are on sailboat cruise on the South Pacific Ocean. You are below deck when 
the captain shouts down that the ship is sinking. You look out the window and see a 
desert island not far in the distance. You think you can swim to it. 
 
As you run to get out and off of the ship, you spot several objects on the way that might 
be useful on the desert island. With a bag in one hand, you use the other hand to grab one 
thing from each pair of items that you run past.  
 
Don’t take too much time, or the ship will sink with you on it! 
Which do you grab? 
1. A) a metal bowl B) magnifying glass 
2. A) a popular novel B) an almost fully charged iPod 
3. A) rain poncho B) fleece blanket 
4. A) cooking pot B) water purification tablets 
5. A) bug repellent B) sunscreen 
6. A) an axe B) first aid kit 
7. A) a compass B) diving mask and snorkel 
8. A) 10 feet of rope B) a hunting knife 
9. A) a box of matches B) flare gun with 1 flare 





Meanwhile, back on the desert island...  
After getting to shore safely and exploring around the island for a few days, you suddenly 
come across a couple at their makeshift camp. They are also apparently shipwrecked. 
They greet you and start up a friendly conversation. When you suggest sticking together, 
however, they insist on going their own way. You decide to respect their wishes.  
You then notice that they have managed to salvage quite a few things from their ship, 
including the same kinds of items you left behind on your ship. Their items are all in 
working condition, but your items are clearly in better condition. They too realize this, 
and propose 10 trades. For each trade, choose which item you want in the end. It can be 
the item you grabbed from the sinking ship and already have, or the item they are 
offering in trade.  
Trade #1: A metal bowl for a magnifying glass. Which do you want?  
Trade #2: A popular novel you haven't yet read for a fully charged iPod with 
headphones. Which do you want? 
Trade #3: A rain poncho for a fleece blanket. Which do you want?  
Trade #4: A cooking pot for water purification tablets. Which do you want?  
Trade #5: Insect repellent for sunscreen. Which do you want?  
Trade #6: A small hatchet for a first aid kit. Which do you want?  
Trade #7: A compass for a diving mask with snorkel. Which do you want?  
Trade #8: 10 feet of rope for a hunting knife. Which do you want?  
Trade #9: A box of matches for a flare gun with 1 flare. Which do you want?  





Status Quo Bias Task 
Next, imagine you currently have a good job at Company A on the East Coast. Recently 
you have been approached by colleagues at other companies with job offers. Your 
choices are: 
1) Remain at Company A: very prestigious company, high salary, fair job 
security. 
2) Company B: West Coast, low prestige company, high salary, good job security. 
3) Company C: Midwest, low prestige company, moderate salary, very good job 
security. 
4) Company D: West Coast, prestigious company, moderate salary, good job 
security. 
NOTE: There are a total of four versions of this task, one with each company in the status 





Principal Component Analyses for the BIS and CIS in Studies 1, 2, and 3 
Study 1 
A principal components analysis was conducted on the 62 BIS items using 
oblique rotation because the factors were believed to be correlated. A total of 13 factors 
with Eigenvalues greater than 1 were extracted that together explained 57.80% of the 




A principal components analysis was conducted on the 10 CIS items using 
oblique rotation because the factors were believed to be correlated. Two factors with 
Eigenvalues greater than 1 were extracted that together explained 56.25% of the variance 
(see table below). Factor 1 is a combination of not-deciding and changing decisions 
items, whereas factor 2 consists of prolonged latency items. CORE7 failed to load on 
either factor.  
 


















A principal components analysis was conducted on the 22 revised CIS items using 
oblique rotation because the factors were believed to be correlated. Four factors with 
Eigenvalues greater than 1 were extracted that together explained 60.15% of the variance. 




items. Factor 3 consists of withholding commitment items, and factor 4 consists of failure 
to decide items. 
 
Principal Components Analysis of the 22-Item CIS in Study 3 
Factor 1 2 3 4 
Eigenvalue 8.63 2.06 1.36 1.19 
% variance explained 39.22 9.36 6.19 5.39 
When I am in a group that is deciding something, I take longer to make a 
decision than do other people. .718       
I need more time than I actually have when I am faced with making a 
choice. .574       
It takes me a long time to decide on something trivial. .662       
I am slow to decide. .793       
I take longer to settle on an option than do other people faced with the 
same options. .745       
I make my choice as quickly as possible. (Reversed) .648       
Someone tells me that I am taking a long time to choose something. .704       
I miss the deadline for making a relatively straightforward decision.       -.766 
I intend to make a decision, but wait so long that the opportunity to decide 
passes.       -.766 
I am undecided about where I stand on a social issue.     .794   
I fail to make a decision that I had the opportunity to make and feel I 
should have made.       -.599 
I do not have an opinion on an important matter that others have opinions 
on.     .819   
A decision that I am expected to make remains unmade.       -.886 
I abstain from a decision. .320       
I “sit on the fence” after those around me have already committed to 
something one way or the other. .602       
I change my mind after I choose something.   .743     
I try to undo the effects of a previous decision I made.   .574 .310   
I have a change of heart about a commitment I made.   .838     
I make what I think is a final choice, but then end up switching it later.   .785     
I commit to something, but then change my mind and break the 
commitment.   .724     
Someone tells me that I am flip-flopping on a choice that I have already 
made.   .601     
Someone points out that I am making a decision that is not consistent with 





The PCA of the BIS yielded 13 factors with Eigenvalues greater than one, but the 
rotation failed to converge making it difficult to compare with the final confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) in Study 1. The fact that the former was conducted on 62 items and 
the latter on only 18 items suggests that many of the items themselves were ill-conceived. 
Nevertheless, in Study 2 the PCA of the CIS had two factors whereas the 
corresponding CFA had three factors. Moreover, one of the PCA factors was clearly a 
fusion of two of the factors from the CFA. This suggests that in Study 2, the factor 
structure of the CFA had some validity. 
Finally, in Study 3 the four factors in the PCA were identical to those in the CFA. 
Furthermore, most items loaded onto the same factors in both analyses. This increased 
degree of convergence lends further support to the four indecisiveness dimensions found 
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